Sunday, October 25, 2026

PHP2Shell Exploitation Hits Government Entity Amid Global Scanning and Signs of AI-Assisted Hacking

Threat actors have been observed using agentic artificial intelligence (AI) platforms for post-exploitation activity following the abuse of the PHP2Shell vulnerabilities tracked as CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619.

"In one case, the attackers targeted a government entity in Europe and within two hours of the initial exploitation they had successfully accessed password hashes and multi-factor authentication secrets," Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 said.

"They also established an NT LAN Manager (NTLM)-relay tunnel into Active Directory and attempted Domain Admin privilege escalation."

The network security company said it also observed the unknown attacker enumerating the compromised endpoint, with commands and behavioral markers suggesting the work of an agentic attacker. These include commands to facilitate -

Reconnaissance of the authentication database with stolen credentials, targeting password hashes and two-factor authentication (2FA) secrets.

Active Directory (AD) reconnaissance via curl-based anonymous LDAP queries to the domain controller (DC) in an attempt to look for the administrator account.

Reconnaissance of the host to hunt for DNS/AD integration, internal hosts, privileged groups, and interactive users.

"Each command batch is wrapped in section-header delimiters, such as ==SHELLUSER== and ==PASSWD==," it added. "These delimiters produce machine-parseable output for an AI model to read."

Suspected N. Korea Campaign Targets PHP2Shell

The disclosure comes as CYFIRMA said it uncovered a suspected North Korea-linked campaign employing PHP2Shell to actively probe global PHP infrastructure from 21 compromised nodes.

"The scanning is deliberately low-volume and paced," Kumar Ritesh, CEO and founder of CYFIRMA, told The Hacker News. "Nodes are rotated and abandoned at the first sign of blocking or rate-limiting, so threshold-based alerting is unlikely to catch it."

The targets comprise a set of 216 unpatched or partially mitigated hosts located across the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, Taiwan, India, Singapore, the U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, and the E.U. The hosts span government, financial institutions, logistics, airports and aviation, manufacturing, and online transaction platforms.

"The campaign has moved from reconnaissance into active, low-and-slow scanning of a filtered target set," CYFIRMA said. "Organizations in the prioritised sectors and geographies should assume they are in scope for deliberate targeting."

The activity, coordinated via a closed I2P channel, has been attributed with moderate confidence to a Korean-speaking operator assessed to be affiliated with the Lazarus Group ecosystem. According to CYFIRMA, the two handles (전창혁 2 aka Jeon Chang-hyuk 2) and (최아린 aka Choi A-rin) active in the I2P channel have previously been observed running covert operations for the threat actors.

"Korean-speaking operators have used [the channel] to share target lists, exploit-hosting infrastructure, and tasking and prioritisation consistent with DPRK objectives," Ritesh said. "The captured conversation uses vocabulary and spelling specific to North Korean (Munhwaŏ) rather than the South Korean standard."

Other primary indicators that link the campaign to the Lazarus cluster are below -

  • Command-and-control (C2) infrastructure that Lazarus has previously used to exploit web assets.
  • Lazarus Group's documented history of compromising PHP and WordPress servers for C2 and planting of PHP and ASP web shells, as observed in the SyncHole watering hole campaign.
  • Prioritizing government agencies and banks, specifically online transaction platforms, which is in line with Lazarus Group's track record of breaching financial institutions for financial and cryptocurrency theft.

"Exploitation is the next step," CYFIRMA said. "The operators said they would shortlist the most promising targets the same day and then choose which public exploits to adapt."

Other Exploit Efforts and Mitigations

In an October 25, 2026, post shared on X, Defused Cyber said it's also seeing PHP2Shell probes targeting its Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect honeypots. The activity originates from 204.76.203[.]7, a known mass-exploit IP address.

"The requests carry a PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS marker ('p2s-rider') and a dummy file upload with no payload, which points to someone checking for the vulnerable upload-progress behavior and likely building a target list of Palo Alto devices," the threat intelligence company said.

Both CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 are critical vulnerabilities that can lead to remote code execution in default PHP configurations. The security flaws have witnessed widespread scanning efforts, with Cloudflare stating it detected millions of exploitation attempts after public disclosure.

"An attacker faces two main constraints: they must size a request to fail allocation at the right moment, and they must defeat ASLR to find valid memory addresses," Datadog said. "The exploit needs one field name small enough to fit inside the accepted request body but large enough that copying its key exceeds memory_limit."

"When PHP parses a form-field name, it makes several copies along the way. The attacker uses that extra memory to force an allocation failure while PHP copies the name into a hash table."

ReliaQuest, in an update published on October 22, 2026, said it reproduced CVE-2026-109618 in a controlled lab and observed a sequence of errors that could help defenders identify exploitation.

"This testing identified a specific sequence of artifacts across PHP error, Apache access, Apache error, and system logs that may help defenders detect exploitation," it said. "Defenders should focus on the sequence: a POST request returns a 500 error, PHP reports memory exhaustion and heap corruption, and the Apache worker handling the request crashes."

The PHP Foundation has since warned of a third remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2026-115560), which can only "occur under an unusual combination of configuration and application code." The issue is expected to be addressed as part of the regular release cycle.

"An application must set session.serialize_handler to php_binary or php_serialize in its configuration and then switch it to php at runtime with ini_set() before calling session_start()," the Foundation said. "Session upload progress must also still be enabled. Applications that never change the serialize handler at runtime can keep the feature enabled."

Xint has released a scanner to check if a host is exposed to PHP2Shell, stating remote code execution is possible in any PHP script regardless of the application and in applications where decoding occurs, such as with session_start() and unserialize().

Bitsight's internet-wide scans show that there are nearly 37 million internet-facing systems running PHP or PHP-related software, with most of the exposures in the U.S., Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Japan.

"PHP runs a very large portion of the web, from content management systems and online shops to bespoke internal tools," Bitsight said. "A flaw in the runtime can't be repaired by changing application code, and a web application firewall or plugin update won’t remove it. Only updating PHP on the host itself closes the gap."



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Confidence or Con? The Psychology of Tech’s Boldest Leaders

Brian and Brandon take a detour from the usual tech news to ask a question every enterprise buyer of AI should be asking: why do some of tech’s most celebrated leaders project absolute confidence in claims that later prove false? Starting from the new Elizabeth Holmes documentary, they debate whether that kind of conviction is innate or learned. Brian argues it develops in stages, as each funding round and glowing press profile ties a founder’s identity more tightly to a story they must defend at all costs. Brandon describes a “contrarian effect,” in which a venture model with low hit rates rewards bold founders and tells them they are special. He recommends The Halo Effect as an antidote to success stories that confuse correlation with causation. They also question the VC preference for founders with hardship backstories. The conversation closes on Brandon’s framework of operators, believers, and pragmatists, and why every organization needs pragmatists willing to question big promises before they become fiction.



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OpenAI AI Agents Demonstrate VM Escapes and Secret Cross-Sandbox Communication

OpenAI has announced plans to conduct frontier model training with no live internet access, as it resumes reinforcement learning (RL) training and internal inference of its most advanced AI models.

"Based on the current state of alignment research, monitoring systems, and the security of internet infrastructure, we believe the responsible approach is to conduct frontier model training with no internet access," the artificial intelligence (AI) company said. "We've implemented this policy and will maintain it until advances in these safeguards justify broader internet access."

OpenAI said models' growing capabilities can have the side effect of them getting much better at devising ways around environmental restrictions to escape containment and perform unintended actions. This can involve the model exploiting a software flaw or misconfiguration to reach the live internet, or finding unauthorized ways to communicate with agents in other sandboxes.

Late last month, the Frontier Lab made the decision to pause training of its most powerful models after one of its agents during reinforcement learning (RL) training contacted an external chatbot by exploiting a misconfiguration in a DNS resolver to obtain limited internet access.

OpenAI said it also kicked off a "high-compute red-teaming campaign" to test the resilience of its research and evaluation environments in the face of increasingly powerful models, leading to the discovery of previously unknown software vulnerabilities, including a critical unauthenticated remote code execution in Google Brotli (CVE-2026-111497, CVSS score: 9.2), a widely used compression library.

Patches for the vulnerability, also called Node2Shell and HTTP2Shell, have since been released for libbrotli, Python, C++, Node.js, Bun, Envoy, and Istio.

The red-teaming agents OpenAI dispatched to test its security safeguards also uncovered virtual machine escapes, novel paths to access the internet through vulnerabilities in metrics, logging, and authentication management services, and hardware side-channels for communication between agents, bypassing isolation boundaries.

"In one test that assumed compromise of a host machine, an agent reused a firewall-approved connection to reach a blocked authentication endpoint in our metrics service and then made that endpoint fetch a model-provided URL," it said. "In other tests, agents exploited misconfigurations that allowed blocked requests to pass through DNS and firewall controls, as well as ways to make services we run fetch external URLs."

In another experiment, after prompting the AI agents in separate microVMs to exchange synthetic secrets without relying on network connections or shared writable files, OpenAI said the digital bots found a way to communicate using the processor's cache via a timing-based side-channel.

Particularly, one agent is said to have encoded information by evicting selected data from the cache. A second agent measured the time it took to reload that data, leveraging the difference between fast and slow cache reads to recover the message.

"Once the agents agreed on a protocol for encoding and decoding these signals, they could exchange the synthetic secrets without changing a shared file or opening a network connection," OpenAI said.

The AI giant said the discoveries prompted it to strengthen its own safety and monitoring mechanisms and deem them sufficient enough to restart frontier RL training and internal inference, while continuing to invest in several key areas -

  • Improving virtual machine security
  • Probing cloud infrastructure for weaknesses
  • Scanning source code and cloud configurations
  • Testing monitoring and stopping systems
  • Red-teaming sandbox and isolation guarantees

"After strengthening our containment architecture, we resumed our frontier RL training and inference on October 1," OpenAI said. "We've reserved substantial compute for continuous red-teaming, and made high-compute red-teaming part of the safety cases we use to decide whether frontier training and evaluation can proceed securely."

Earlier this month, Anthropic said it was cutting off live internet access for all its internal evaluations until further notice after discovering new incidents in which its AI models exhibited misaligned behavior and targeted real websites.

The disclosure comes as concerns have been raised over the ability of AI agents to detect and exploit software flaws, even in the guardrails designed to restrict them.

In a report published this week, third-party AI ​safety evaluators METR ⁠and Redwood Research said they found several new vulnerabilities in OpenAI's internal misalignment monitoring system as it existed before July 21, 2026, and during the time frame when the company's agents broke into model-hosting platform Hugging Face.

"We found a way Codex agents could in principle bypass Codex sandboxing and Auto-Review, allowing them to take any action that the host user could take," researchers David Rein and Adam Kaufman said. "We also discovered an exploit agents could use that would prevent hundreds of recent actions (including the actions involved in the exploit itself) from being monitored."

OpenAI is believed to have addressed all of the vulnerabilities affecting its production safeguards stack, although the safety organizations said they had not verified the fixes.

Anthropic's Mythos 5 Pursues an Unsanctioned Supply Chain Attack

The developments also coincide with a report from the U.K. AI Security Institute (AISI), which has found Anthropic's Mythos 5 model to be consistently taking unsanctioned actions even when presented with evidence that doing so would be out-of-scope and cause real harm (e.g., submitting a malicious code change).

The evaluation also revealed that the Mythos 5's chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning process failed to consider the impact of harmful actions, with the model often producing invalid justifications that implied the target was simulated when asked if the human maintainer was real, but never generating incorrect justifications implying that it was real.

"Most models tested take a range of unsanctioned actions during simulated cybersecurity evaluations, Mythos 5 most frequently," AISI said. "Taken together, these observations could indicate that models are engaging in 'motivated reasoning': producing inferences and reasoning biased towards conclusions that justify continuing a particular approach to task completion."

In the most severe case, the model has been found to attempt a supply chain attack by submitting malicious code and creating five sock-puppet accounts to vouch for the changes and pressure a software maintainer into accepting it.

Responding to the findings, Anthropic has attributed the alignment failures to recklessness, biased reasoning, and an urge to "continue on its current trajectory" to a degree that disregards potential harm. The OpenAI rival also noted that its newer models, including an internal research model, are less susceptible to this behavior.

"Nevertheless, this incident serves as further evidence that current AI models are capable of surprisingly misaligned behavior in evaluation settings," it said. "We've built new evaluations that we run on new production models automatically, and we are specifically studying biased reasoning to better understand where it comes from in our training and how it affects our models."



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Saturday, October 24, 2026

Google Says Gmail and Photos Data Shared With AI Search Could Be Used for Targeted Ads

Google has updated its privacy policy to spell out that using personalized artificial intelligence (AI) features in Search or Gemini could allow the company to serve targeted ads to users based on their activity on other connected Google services.

"You may choose to allow certain Google services, including services like Search or Gemini Apps, to access data from other Google services you use, such as Google Photos and Workspace apps like Gmail and Drive, in order to provide you with a more personalized experience, subject to the policies and settings of the accessing service," reads a policy update effective October 16, 2026.

"For example, Search may process some of the data that you allow Search to access to personalize content, including ads."

Google also notes in its revised policy that "We don't show you personalized ads based on your content from Drive, Gmail, or Google Photos, unless you choose to make data from these services available to other Google services that support personalized ads."

News of the policy update was first reported by Android Authority.

Personal Intelligence, unveiled by Google in Gemini in January 2026, allows users to connect other services like Gmail, Google Photos, and YouTube as a way to provide tailored answers in combination with their chat history preferences.

The feature is currently rolling out as a beta to eligible users over the age of 18 globally, except in the European Economic Area, Switzerland, the U.K., and Nigeria.

It's worth noting that the policy states it doesn't use content from Gmail, Drive, or Photos to personalize ads by default. However, that changes should users opt to share photos or emails with AI Mode and other Search tools via the Personal Intelligence feature.

In other words, if users interact with AI Mode or Gemini while Personal Intelligence is enabled, the data that informs those answers (i.e., content from Gmail or Photos) could be used as a signal to serve targeted ads. The privacy policy aims to make it clear that feeding personal data into its AI tools could contribute to ad personalization.

Users should be mindful of the privacy trade-off when connecting their apps to enable AI features. Those who prefer to opt out can do so by selecting the apps they want to disconnect from Personal Intelligence or disable Personalized Recommendations entirely via the Search Services Personalization settings ("www.google[.]com/search-personalization").

In January 2026, OpenAI began showing ads to logged-in adult U.S. users in both the free and ChatGPT Go tiers, while emphasizing that users' data and conversations are protected and never sold to advertisers. It has also said the ads do not influence responses from the chatbot, and that users are in control of the experience.

Earlier this week, the AI company said it's expanded advertising on ChatGPT to 26 more countries, ​bringing the total to 89. This includes 14 more ​Latin American countries and several markets across Europe, Africa, and Asia.

"We keep conversations private from advertisers and do not sell customer data," OpenAI stressed. "Ads in ChatGPT are clearly labeled and separate from ChatGPT's answers, and advertising does not influence the answers ChatGPT provides."



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Researchers Push Over 2 Million Updates to Remotely Disable Popcorn Time Updater That Could Fuel a Botnet

Between November 2025 and March 2026, the Dutch security firm Eye Security pushed more than 2 million updates to computers it did not own to switch off a background updater that it said could have allowed an outsider to take over the machine.

The updater belongs to Time4Popcorn, an abandoned copy of Popcorn Time, a free app that streamed pirated films and TV over BitTorrent.

Popcorn Time was popular about a decade ago, and the original shut down in 2014, but several copies kept running under the same name. A separate, legal project that took the Popcorn Time name in early 2025 is unrelated to it.

Eye Security, which monitors client networks for threats, found the updater during a routine threat hunt: a program called Updater.exe on one client's laptop kept trying to reach a web address that was no longer registered.

The firm registered the address itself to see what would connect, and about 50 requests a second poured in. It later laid out the operation, which it named Operation IXIM, in a write-up and a talk at Hack.lu on October 22.

Over six months, those requests carried more than 3.8 million different hardware IDs. The IDs proved an unreliable way to count machines, because some Windows PCs shared one and some Macs changed theirs, so Eye revised its estimate to 2.5 to 3 million Windows computers and 250,000 to 350,000 Macs.

The updater ran in the background on Windows and Mac from the moment the computer started. It checked for new versions over an unencrypted connection and installed whatever it was sent, at the highest privilege level, called SYSTEM on Windows and root on Mac, without checking who sent it.

Because the web addresses it called had been abandoned, Eye said, anyone who registered the right one could have served their own program to every machine still calling it.

On a machine with that access, an attacker could install ransomware, steal saved passwords, or pull the computer into a botnet, Eye said. Mapping a sample of the connecting addresses, the firm said it saw home users around the world, as well as machines on government, military, and corporate networks, though it added that it is "hard to draw conclusions" from that.

Eye had disclosed the flaw, now tracked as CVE-2026-30612, in June. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency rates it 9.8 out of 10. It affects three versions of the Time4Popcorn software:

  • Windows, up to and including 6.2.1.18
  • Mac, up to and including 6.2.1.17
  • Android, up to and including 3.5.0.173

Turning the Updater Against Itself

With no company left to fix the software and no patch coming, Eye decided to use the updater against itself. After taking legal advice, it served the machines an update that does one thing: it stops and disables the updater, deleting no files and collecting nothing.

Eye compared the step to Operation Ladybird in 2021, when Dutch police pushed an update to computers infected with the Emotet botnet to disable the malware on them.

The difference, Eye said, is that Emotet's victims never chose to be infected, while Popcorn Time's users installed the app themselves. Still, the firm said, "none of them chose to have a forgotten updater running in the background for years."

Soon after the updates began, someone uploaded Eye's update to VirusTotal, and antivirus engines started flagging it as malware, a fair description of a program that disables a Windows service. Because every product that blocked it left the vulnerable updater running, Eye reworked the update until only one scanner continued to flag it.

By December 2025, Eye had updated more than 1 million systems and cut the traffic to its web addresses by about 90 percent. By March 1, it was sending about 5,000 updates a day, a 98 percent reduction. Judging the remaining numbers too small to interest a botnet operator, Eye stopped, having sent more than 2 million update downloads in all.

In late March, Eye handed the 15 web addresses it controlled to the Shadowserver Foundation, a non-profit that takes abandoned and malicious domains out of circulation, so a trusted party would hold them rather than Eye.

Public registration records for one of them, popcorntimeupd[.]xyz, now point to Shadowserver's sinkhole servers, with a transfer dated March 20, 2026. Other addresses the updater calls were never Eye's to take and remain with outside owners, the firm said, so machines that reach those are still exposed.

Eye found no sign that anyone else was serving code through the addresses: the ones already registered by other people were parked or up for sale, not pushing updates to the machines calling them. The flaw is not listed in CISA's catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities as of October 23, 2026.

What Popcorn Time Users Should Do

Switching off the updater does not make the app safe. Eye said Popcorn Time runs on a 2014 browser engine with its security sandbox turned off, loads content over unencrypted connections, and pulls in code from other abandoned web addresses.

Eye registered those abandoned addresses too, which it said would have let it run its own code on every machine that opened the app. It did not, but it built a working proof of concept, so the risk is real. The update only changed the updater, so the rest of the app remains dangerous for anyone who keeps using Popcorn Time.

Eye's advice is to uninstall Popcorn Time. The updater can also be turned off by hand: on Windows with two commands that stop and disable its "Update service," and on a Mac with one that unloads the PT.updd helper. Removing the app is the safer step, because disabling the updater leaves the rest of it in place.

  • Windows: sc.exe stop "Update service"
  • Windows: sc.exe config "Update service" start= disabled
  • Mac: launchctl unload -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/PT.updd.plist

On Android, the updater is built into the app and cannot be turned off on its own, and it installs only if the user taps to accept, so Eye did not send updates to Android devices. Removing the app is the only fix there.

To check a network, defenders can look for the two updater files, Updater.exe on Windows and PT.updd on Mac, and for traffic to the web addresses in Eye's write-up, which lists all 20 domains and the file hashes.



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Brotli Decoder Flaw Behind Node.js RCE Also Affects Bun, Python and Other Widely Used Software

A memory-corruption flaw in Google's Brotli decoder sits in many programs that unpack Brotli-compressed data, among them Bun, the Python Brotli and brotlicffi packages, and Envoy proxies set up to decompress Brotli.

Tracked as CVE-2026-111497, the flaw allows crafted compressed data to overwrite past the end of a buffer and corrupt a program's memory, potentially causing a crash, a memory leak, or the execution of attacker-controlled code.

Imperva researchers have shown that code can run on one unpatched Node.js build. The same has not been demonstrated on the other software, and no real-world attacks have been reported.

The flaw was first disclosed on October 21, when Node.js and Google shipped fixes, and more have followed product by product since. Because the bug is in Google's decoder and each program ships its own copy of it, every one has to update that copy on its own.

Brotli is a compression format from Google, used across the web to shrink pages and other traffic. The bug is in the C code that unpacks a Brotli stream, so it travels into anything that reuses that code, from language runtimes to proxies to Python packages.

Which Software Is Affected

Product Affected Fixed in Exposed when
Google Brotli (C library) 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 1.0.10, 1.1.1, 1.2.1 code decodes untrusted Brotli
Node.js 22.x, 24.x, 26.x before the fix; 20.x and older (end of life) 22.23.4, 24.22.1, 26.12.1 fetch() of a br response, or Express or body-parser br bodies
Bun 1.4.3 and earlier 1.4.4 fetch() of a br response, or node:zlib
Envoy 1.39.2, 1.38.5, 1.37.7, 1.36.11 1.40.0, 1.39.3, 1.38.6, 1.37.8, 1.36.12 only if the Brotli decompressor is configured
Istio 1.31.0 to 1.31.1, 1.30.0 to 1.30.5, 1.29.0 to 1.29.8 1.31.2, 1.30.6, 1.29.9 only if Brotli decompression is enabled
Python Brotli 1.2.0 and earlier 1.2.1 installed, and an HTTP client decodes br
Python brotlicffi 1.2.0.x and earlier 1.2.1.0 installed, and an HTTP client decodes br
cdxgen standalone binaries and images, 13.4.0 and 12.8.8 and earlier 13.5.0, 12.8.9 standalone binary or image scanning untrusted input

A program is exposed only if it decodes Brotli data that someone else controls. For Node.js and Bun, that happens when the built-in fetch() reads a response sent with Content-Encoding: br, or when request-body code such as Express 5 and body-parser 2 unpacks a Brotli upload. A plain Node.js HTTP server does not decode request bodies on its own.

Envoy and Istio are affected only when Brotli decompression is enabled, for example, through an Envoy filter. Where it is off, the flaw cannot be reached.

In Python, the risk comes from the Brotli or brotlicffi package being installed at all. Once either is present, HTTP clients such as requests, urllib3, httpx, and aiohttp decode Brotli responses on their own, so an application can be exposed without ever importing Brotli in its own code.

A web application firewall helps only so far. Vercel, which added firewall rules on the day of disclosure, said those rules do not cover "responses your functions fetch from other servers." For that path, only updating the runtime or library closes the hole.

How far the flaw can be pushed depends on the software. Imperva's Red Team, which calls its work Node2Shell, ran attacker-supplied code on an unmodified Node.js 24.22.0 build for Linux on ARM64, delivering it both as a fetched response and as an Express request body. The exploit took several tries, has not been released, and was not tested on other builds.

OpenAI, whose Codex Security team reported the flaw, describes it as enabling unauthenticated remote code execution in Brotli and lists Node.js, Bun, and Envoy as affected software. In its account, the flaw works both ways:

an unpatched server that accepts compressed input could be taken over by a malicious client, and an unpatched client that accepts compressed input (such as "curl --compressed") could be taken over by a malicious server.

No in-the-wild exploitation has been reported. CISA's October 23 assessment recorded exploitation as "none" and automation as "no," and Red Hat said there is no reliable public proof-of-concept for running code.

Severity ratings differ by who is scoring. Google, which assigned the CVE, rates it 9.2, or critical, on the CVSS 4.0 scale. Node.js calls it high, and Red Hat rates it 8.1, or important.

The fix has an unusual history. The change that closes the flaw was added to Brotli's source code on February 27, but no new Brotli release carried it until October 21. OpenAI said the root cause "was actually fixed in the Brotli source code in February, but it wasn't known at the time that it gave rise to a security vulnerability and there was no more recent release of Brotli."

Node.js credits Khai Tran and Sylvie Mayer of OpenAI's Codex Security for reporting the flaw, and maintainers Matteo Collina and Antoine du Hamel for the fix.

What to Do Now

Update to a fixed version from the table above, then restart the service and rebuild any container image, because a running process keeps the old decoder until it restarts.

Where you cannot update yet, stop decoding untrusted Brotli. OpenAI's disclosure page and the security firm Aikido both recommend:

  • Reject incoming requests with Content-Encoding: br before any proxy or parser decodes the body.
  • Turn off automatic Brotli decoding in HTTP clients, and reject Brotli responses before they are decoded.
  • In Python, uninstall the Brotli and brotlicffi packages so clients fall back to gzip and deflate.

Dropping br from the Accept-Encoding header does not help on its own, because a server can send Brotli whatever the client asks for. For Node.js, no workaround has been published, so updating the runtime is the only fix.

System packages are being fixed at different times. Debian fixed its brotli package for Debian 13 (trixie) on October 23 in version 1.1.0-2+deb13u1. Amazon Linux 2023 still listed its brotli and Node.js 24 packages as pending a fix as of October 22.

Dependency scanners may not flag the Python packages yet. The CVE record names Google's Brotli repository, not the PyPI packages, and GitHub's advisory still lists no affected package, which is what Dependabot reads. Advisory entries for the two Python packages, PYSEC-2026-4322 and PYSEC-2026-4323, were added on October 23, so check the installed versions manually as well.



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Friday, October 23, 2026

Exposed Infrastructure Reveals How Ransomware Affiliates Used AI Agents to Execute Intrusions

Cybersecurity researchers have discovered an artificial intelligence (AI)-driven intrusion ecosystem run by affiliates of the INC and The Gentlemen ransomware groups.

Central to the operation is an "Autonomous Red Team Kill Chain Framework" referred to as Phantom. The threat actor is assessed to be Russian-speaking and functions both as an intrusion and data-extortion operator, as well as an infrastructure provider supporting different partners across the ransomware ecosystem.

"The operators exploited edge and remote-access systems at scale, including FortiClient EMS, SimpleHelp, cPanel and VPN gateways," SOCRadar said. "They used AI-managed knowledge bases to track victims, stolen credentials and campaign progress."

A notable aspect that defines the campaign is its "AI-executed, human-approved operating structure" in which a human operator provides a victim-specific prompt and reviews every step, while the intrusions themselves are executed through OpenCode with OpenRouter-hosted commercial models.

An examination of the exposed directory at 45.227.254[.]43 has revealed the activity logged 8,257 messages across 133 sessions. Should the models refuse to act on the prompts, the operator has been found to rewrite requests as an authorized red team assessment instead of simply switching models.

Initial access is achieved by exploiting public-facing edge devices at scale, following which the attackers move laterally, establish persistence, exfiltrate data, and escalate toward ransomware deployment. Operator records indicate that the attacks involve the exploitation of the following flaws -

"Once inside, the operators followed a recurring lifecycle: enumerate the domain, escalate to domain admin where possible, harvest credentials with stealer tooling, prioritize finance, HR, legal and executive files, and collect them over reverse-SOCKS tunnels," SOCRadar said.

"Credential reuse was the main force multiplier; in one case, a single reused password unlocked the VPN, servers, RMM, backup and security management platforms at once. Security products were impaired with a BYOVD killer and loader-level evasion, although the operators' own logs record mixed results against enterprise EDRs."

Supporting the threat actor in their goals is a diverse toolkit comprising bespoke frameworks, modified open-source tools, and compiled binaries -

  • Phantom, an AI-powered offensive security and penetration testing framework that's deployed in live operations via OpenCode and employs an agent that communicates with an external server to retrieve tasks, execute commands, and return outputs. It supports 18 skill modules to facilitate reconnaissance, binary reverse engineering, exploit research, steganography, telemetry assessment, and EDR fingerprinting, among others.
  • WormGPT-MCP, a set of 32 Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers connecting the AI system to 32 different modules that span functions ranging from reconnaissance to extortion.
  • Ghost C2, a collection of three generations of polymorphic implants that communicate with a remote server over Cloudflare, Telegram, or DNS, and execute tasking and maintain persistent beacons on compromised endpoints.
  • RevSocks, a reverse SOCKS5 framework used to pivot inside victim networks and stage data for exfiltration.

Other tools include a Cloudflare-fronted Mythic agent dubbed QuickLine, a Quick Heal/Seqrite EDR killer that abuses the Zemana driver ("zam64.sys") as part of a BYOVD attack, and exfiltration programs such as rks3 and BackupAgent.

Analysis of dozens of AI-authored extortion records shows that the threat actors adopt a data-centric approach. It involves examining the stolen financials to determine the amount a victim can pay without having to involve a bank or an insurer, and then sending masked proof samples and ramping up pressure through scripted vishing calls and threatening to notify customers, partners, and regulators.

The stolen data is eventually published on the data leak site if the victim fails to pay within a 24-72 hour deadline. That said, the final outcomes of these ransom demands are unknown as no cryptocurrency wallet or payment record has been recovered.

A total of 62 organizations are estimated to have been targeted by the operation, out of which four of them ended up being listed on the data leak sites for INC and The Gentlemen ransomware. The U.S. accounts for more than 50% of the targets. The attacks also primarily targeted industrial, manufacturing, and energy sectors, followed by healthcare and pharmaceutical organizations.

"Across this exposed infrastructure, the actors engaged in widespread exploitation of exposed internet services, specifically targeting FortiClient EMS gateways, Ivanti/Citrix/SonicWall/OpenVPN gateways, SimpleHelp remote management servers, and cPanel hosting controls," SOCRadar said.

"Concurrently, they orchestrated operations via the Phantom framework, established RevSocks reverse-SOCKS proxies for network pivoting, deployed Ghost C2 variants, and utilized AI-managed knowledge bases to meticulously log victim telemetry, compromised credentials, and active campaign statuses."



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Hackers Breach Enterprise Firewalls and VPNs, Exposing Over 70,000 Credentials

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a large-scale campaign that has targeted exposed network edge devices such as Fortinet FortiGate and Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect firewalls.

"Artifacts from this investigation also indicate that operators in this campaign have obtained access to numerous organizations worldwide, and have attempted to further compromise some victims, resulting in persistent remote access and data exfiltration," according to a joint investigation published by Group-IB and NyxLab.

The widespread exploitation activity has been attributed to a threat actor known as k0t, who also goes by the aliases CryptoFeel, Member19, and QazWsxShop. The cybercriminal actor was first seen in the wild on October 22, 2025.

The threat actor is assessed to share connections with ransomware groups such as Qilin and The Gentlemen, likely operating as an initial access broker or an affiliate. Analysis of the threat actor's dark web activity reveals a keen interest in purchasing vulnerability exploit code and tools or premium accounts for metadata search engines like FOFA and ZoomEye.

The campaign's victims are global and belong to a broad range of sectors, given the indiscriminate targeting of exposed network devices. A significant chunk of compromises are said to have taken place between February and June 2026, which also overlaps with another credential harvesting campaign codenamed FortiBleed.

Nearly 38% of victims are concentrated in the Asia Pacific region, followed by 31.9% in Latin America, 15.8% in Europe, and 12.7% in the Middle East and North Africa.

The attack chain plays out as follows -

  • Conduct reconnaissance through public scanning tools like FOFA and ZoomEye to enumerate internet-facing VPN and firewall appliances, filter candidates by product, and put together target lists of potentially vulnerable edge devices.
  • Attempt to exploit these devices via known vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-64446 (a path traversal flaw in FortiWeb) and CVE-2026-0257 (an authentication bypass flaw in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS and Prisma Access) through bespoke Python scripts named "fortnew.py" and "exploit_2026_0257.py," or perform brute-force attacks using common username and password combinations, to obtain initial access.
  • Establish a foothold on the targets via an OpenConnect VPN connection.
  • Conduct post-exploitation actions and additional credential theft like enumeration of Active Directory, SMB, and installed antivirus solution.
  • Establish persistence on the host via legitimate remote access tools like MeshCentral Agent, Atera, Teramind, and AnyDes, as well as an open-source, adversary-emulation framework known as AdaptixC2.
  • Exfiltrate harvested data using Rclone into Wasabi S3 buckets and MEGA cloud drives.

The attacks are also characterized by the use of legitimate administrator and pentesting utilities like NetExec, SoftPerfect, Impacket, noPac, Kerbrute, PetitPotam, and Mimikatz to burrow deeper into victims' corporate environments.

"k0t appears to select potential targets by enumerating exposed network appliances at scale rather than researching individual organizations," Group-IB and NyxLab researchers said. "His stated geographic priorities begin with the United States and Canada, followed by European countries and selected APAC markets."

"The product and location of an exposed device therefore appear to matter more than the industry of the organization operating it, consistent with the broad range of victims observed in this campaign."

k0t's links to Qilin and The Gentlemen stem from the fact that many victims of the campaign were also later listed by the ransomware groups on their data leak sites. However, the exact nature of the connection between the threat and these gangs is unclear.

What's more, Group-IB and NyxLab said they found a "negligible overlap" in compromised data between this activity and FortBleed. More than 70,000 exposed credentials associated with network devices and LDAP dumps have been identified in connection with the campaign.

"This aligns with reports that many operators are likely to be involved in the FortiBleed activity cluster, suggesting that this may be a separate dataset, operator subset, or related access operation within the broader FortiBleed-related activity," the researchers said. "Organisations are advised to act on ensuring that any vulnerabilities mentioned in this report are appropriately remedied."



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Russian-Linked Hackers Used New Mesh Network Backdoor in Destructive Ukraine Attack

The Russian state-sponsored hacking group Sandworm teamed up with another threat actor to carry out a destructive wiping attack targeting a Ukrainian logistics company last year.

According to ESET, the attack involved UAC-0099 (aka Earth Sirrush) obtaining initial access to the target on July 16, 2025, via a spear-phishing email bearing a malware-laced attachment that led to the deployment of the MATCHWOK backdoor via a downloader called MATCHBOIL.

The activity ultimately culminated with the threat actor handing off access to Sandworm, which then conducted a data-wiping attack on September 17, 2025, more than two months after it obtained a foothold.

What makes the attack stand out is UAC-0099's use of a previously undocumented backdoor called MythicRatatoskr that communicates with a command-and-control (C2) server hosted inside the Yggdrasil mesh network. The backdoor was deployed a day after MATCHWOK was executed.

There are indications that development on the backdoor started sometime between December 2024 and February 2025. Its functionality is fairly straightforward in that it sends victim metadata to the C2 server, poll for new commands, transmit command output, take screenshots, and upload/download files.

It can also alter the current working directory, enumerate directory contents, change the C2 server URL, execute a shell command via "cmd.exe," and spawn a reverse SOCKS5 proxy. In addition, some artifacts include a 10-minute startup delay in a likely effort to avoid immediately connecting to the Yggdrasil network and evade detection.

"To our knowledge, this is the first documented case of Yggdrasil being abused in this way by a state-aligned threat actor, and it may signal a broader trend of adversaries adopting experimental peer-to-peer networks to increase the resilience and stealth of their infrastructure," ESET researchers Anton Cherepanov and Peter Strýček said.

MythicRatatoskr is said to have been used to deploy a SOCKS5 server to route connections through the compromised network. The attack culminated with Sandworm carrying out a data-wiping attack by dropping the SDelete utility via Active Directory Group Policy. It's worth noting that the Sandworm-linked NikoWiper malware is also derived from SDelete.

Yggdrasil map with the C&C serve

While the attack investigated by ESET compromised a Windows system, source code references to "crond" within MythicRatatoskr suggest there possibly exists an equivalent Linux version of the malware.

The assessment that UAC-0099 is likely collaborating with Sandworm is not new. In its APT Activity Report Q2 2025–Q3 2025, ESET said it observed UAC-0099 conducting initial access operations and subsequently transferring "validated targets" to Sandworm for further post-exploitation.

These attacks targeted government, energy, logistics, and grain sectors in Ukraine, the Slovak cybersecurity company noted at the time.

This sort of cooperation between Russia-aligned actors is also not new. Last year, ESET said it identified evidence that Gamaredon and Turla were working together to target and co-compromise Ukrainian entities, with one intrusion leveraging Gamaredon's PteroGraphin to deploy Turla's Kazuar backdoor.

Furthermore, a Gamaredon-linked downloader called Pterodo has been used to retrieve and execute InvisiMole, a modular spyware program put to use against targets in Ukraine and Russia.

"This kind of cooperation underscores the potential for coordinated cyber espionage campaigns among Russia-aligned groups, likely intended to amplify their operational impact," ESET said.



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Critical Flaw in Python’s Popular Pillow Image Library Allows Code Execution via a Crafted Image

Pillow, the most widely used image library for Python, can be made to run operating system commands on a server by specifying the name of a file it is told to open.

The flaw, CVE-2026-112900, is in the way Pillow handles EPS images, which it opens by passing the file's name to Ghostscript, a separate program it runs to turn the image into pixels, without checking the name first.

Ghostscript can read a name chosen by an attacker as instructions rather than as a file, and point it to a second file that carries commands to run. Pillow's maintainers fixed it in version 13.0.0, released on October 16.

Pillow turns up almost everywhere Python handles images: web upload forms, avatar and thumbnail tools, document and PDF pipelines, and most machine-learning projects pull it in. OX Security, the firm whose report drew attention to the flaws, estimates the library is downloaded about 436 million times a month.

Version 13.0.0 is a large security release, with fixes across four severity levels, from low to critical, two of which are rated critical by the maintainers. None of the flaws is known to be under attack.

The weakness is the filename, not the picture. "The flaw is triggered by the filename, not by anything in the PostScript document," the advisory says, meaning a harmless EPS file can still cause damage when an attacker sets its name. That makes upload endpoints that keep or build a stored file's name from user input the realistic target.

The flaw only reaches Ghostscript on hosts that have the gs program installed, which Pillow needs to open EPS at all. It affects Pillow from version 2.6.0 up to 12.3.0.

The maintainers rate it moderate, because the attacker has to control the filename. The CVE record assigned by GitHub rates it 9.2 out of 10 and marks it as the same condition.

Two of the fixes sit in the maintainers' top "critical" tier. One is a separate memory bug, described in the release notes as stale image data reused after a mode change. The other covers two overflow flaws in Pillow's JPEG decoding.

One of those JPEG flaws, in the FlashPix (FPX) format, was shown to run an attacker's command from a single call to Image.open() on a crafted file, as long as the optional olefile package is installed. Pillow recognizes these files by their content, not their extension, so a server that opens untrusted uploads can be hit with no user action.

The other, CVE-2026-112403, overflows a memory buffer when a program makes a thumbnail of a crafted lossless JPEG. Its advisory reports a crash, not code execution. The bug was "found by Anthropic using Claude to study the security of open-source software, validated manually by Ada Logics," the advisory says, part of a wider effort by the company that has turned up hundreds of flaws in open-source libraries.

A third flaw, CVE-2026-112393, has been in Pillow since 2013. It overflows a memory buffer when a program saves a compressed TIFF image to memory rather than to a file on disk, the common pattern for a service that re-encodes an upload and hands it back. The advisory says the reporters crashed the process with it, and turned it into code execution only with the help of a second, separate flaw that leaked memory addresses. Saving to a real file on disk is not affected.

The CVE records, assigned by GitHub, score the EPS, TIFF, and JPEG-thumbnail flaws 9.2 out of 10, a critical rating. Each depends on conditions the score does not carry, and the maintainers' own ratings for the batch run from moderate to critical. In the CVE records, CISA's analysts mark no known exploitation for the EPS flaw and a public proof of concept for the TIFF one.

What to do

Upgrade to Pillow 13.0.0, which fixes all of these, and rebuild any containers, wheels, or base images that bundle an older copy. Pillow 13 drops Python 3.10, so installs still on 3.10 need Python 3.11 or newer as well.

pip install -U "Pillow>=13.0.0"

Until you can upgrade, Pillow's security guidance and the advisories point to steps that cut each path:

  • EPS / Ghostscript: keep the gs program off any host that processes untrusted uploads, and never pass an attacker-controlled filename to Image.open() for EPS.
  • JPEG thumbnails: avoid draft() and thumbnail() on untrusted JPEGs, or call load() first, or pass reducing_gap=None.
  • TIFF: treat saving a TIFF to an in-memory buffer such as io.BytesIO as a sensitive path when the image came from a user.



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Critical x402 SDK Flaw Could Let Malicious APIs Drain AI Agents’ Token Balances

AI agents paying for API calls with the x402 SDKs could sign a payment for their full balance of a supported token if a malicious API asked for it, security firm V12 said on October 22.

The cause was the SDKs' default client, which set no spending limit until releases on August 18 added one. The risk was limited to agents who automatically signed payments and whose apps set no limits.

The missing limit is one of 25 flaws V12 found in the x402 code, and one of three it rated critical and described in detail. The x402 Foundation, which maintains the SDKs, had already fixed all three critical flaws in the August 18 releases.

One of the other two let a facilitator, the service that checks x402 payments, accept a Solana transaction that moved no tokens as a valid payment. Among the x402 SDKs, only the TypeScript one had this flaw. The other let a malicious server get an agent to sign a login message for a different website.

V12 found the flaws by reviewing the code and running local tests. Neither V12 nor the x402 Foundation has publicly reported any attacks using them.

The foundation has published no security advisory for the three flaws, and its changelogs list the fixes without calling them security fixes. As of October 23, npm audit returned no advisories for the last TypeScript releases before the fixes, and PyPI listed no vulnerabilities for the last Python release before them, The Hacker News found. A developer who relies on those checks gets no warning to upgrade.

Coinbase created x402 and handed it to the x402 Foundation this year, a Linux Foundation project whose members include Visa and Mastercard. Coinbase holds the most senior seat on the foundation's technical steering committee.

No Spending Limit in the Default Client

x402 is an open standard that lets software, including AI agents, pay for an API call within the web request itself, without requiring a person to approve each payment.

A server that wants payment answers with the HTTP status code 402 Payment Required and lists its payment options, each with an amount, a token, and a recipient. The client picks one, signs a payment, and sends the request again.

The default client took the first option on the list, and before the fix, it set no limit on the amount.

A hostile API could use that to turn a routine data request into a request for the wallet's full balance of a supported token, V12 said. An earlier small payment could reveal the wallet address, so the server could look up the balance first.

With an automatic signer and no payment policy set by the app, the client could sign a payment for that amount. For a token that supports signed transfers, the attacker could then submit the signed payment and collect the funds.

The August 18 releases added spend controls to the TypeScript, Python, and Go clients. By default, they now cap each payment at $1 and allow only US dollar stablecoins the SDK recognizes, such as USDC.

Token Approvals Accepted as Solana Payments

In x402, a merchant's server relies on a facilitator to check each payment and submit it to the blockchain. On Solana, the facilitator also pays the transaction fee.

The TypeScript facilitator code for Solana checked that a payment called an allowed token program, then read it as a transfer without checking the instruction type. A token approval, which lets another account spend tokens later but moves none itself, differs from a transfer only in its first byte.

In V12's local test, the facilitator accepted such an approval as a valid payment. The test did not send a live transaction.

A merchant relying on the facilitator could therefore deliver a paid resource while receiving no tokens, V12 said, calling it "a complete payment bypass." The attacker needed a token account, but no balance, and the facilitator paid the transaction fee each time.

The Python and Go SDKs already checked the instruction type. The August 18 releases added the same check to the TypeScript code.

Every published @x402/svm release from 2.0.0 to 2.22.0 lacks the check, and every release from 2.23.0 on has it, The Hacker News found by searching the published packages.

Logins Signed for Other Websites

x402 also has a sign-in extension called Sign-In-With-X (SIWx). It lets an agent log in by signing a short message with its wallet, for example to prove an earlier payment instead of paying again. On Ethereum, the message names the website, the wallet address, and a one-time code.

The automated client signed these messages without verifying that the website named in them was the one it had contacted.

A malicious server could get a fresh login message from another site, pass it to the agent, and use the signature to log in to that site as the agent's wallet, V12 said. That would work wherever the other site accepted the relayed message, and the attacker would get whatever access the login allowed.

The August 18 releases make the TypeScript, Python and Go clients refuse to sign unless the site in the message matches the site that sent the 402 response. The project also changed the SIWx specification, which now says a client must refuse to sign when the two do not match.

TypeScript code that calls createSIWxPayload directly must now pass the URL of the 402 response, after any redirects. The @x402/fetch and @x402/axios wrappers pass it on their own.

What to Update

Upgrading to the latest releases also brings later fixes, including one for a separate payment bypass in @x402/core 2.27.0 in September. As of October 23, the latest versions are 2.28.0 for @x402/core, @x402/svm, @x402/extensions, @x402/fetch and @x402/axios, v2.28.0 for the Go module and 2.25.0 for the Python package.

In TypeScript, clients get the spending fix by updating @x402/fetch or @x402/axios to 2.23.0 or later, which pulls in the matching @x402/core. Apps that use SIWx also need @x402/extensions 2.23.0 or later, which holds the login check. Facilitators that check Solana payments need @x402/svm 2.23.0 or later.

After the upgrade, existing clients are capped at $1 per payment and limited to recognized stablecoins unless the app sets its own spend controls. Apps that pass spendControls: false turn all of these controls off.

Teams that cannot upgrade yet can register a payment policy that drops any option above a set amount. The older clients support this with registerPolicy in TypeScript and Go and register_policy in Python, which also has a ready-made max_amount policy.

V12 advises clients to check that a SIWx login message identifies the site they contacted before signing, to set budgets for each payment and in total, and to limit which tokens, networks, and recipients they will pay.



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PHP2Shell Exploit Attempts Hit Millions as Attackers Try to Deploy Mirai Malware

Threat actors have been observed unsuccessfully attempting to exploit the newly disclosed PHP2Shell vulnerabilities to rope infected systems into a Mirai botnet variant called Potassium, as it emerges that weaponizing the flaws may be harder than previously thought.

The attacks aim to exploit CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 (CVSS scores: 9.2), which can result in unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) via specially crafted HTTP requests. The vulnerabilities have been patched in PHP versions 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, and 8.2.35.

"However, analysis of the sample revealed that it is an updated and significantly expanded version of the Mirai-derived botnet variant identified in early 2026," Sophos said. "The sample displays downloader and network disruption functionality."

Specifically, it resolves a hard-coded, encrypted command-and-control (C2) address, establishes a TCP connection to 134.199.154[.]64, and sends an HTTP request. The malware then checks for an HTTP 200 response status and verifies that the resulting payload begins with the ELF magic bytes 7F 45 4C 46, indicating that it expects a Linux ELF binary as a follow-on payload.

"A resolver function supports IPv4 addresses and hostname resolution, with additional fallback resolution logic that includes hard-coded public DNS servers such as 8.8.8.8, 1.1.1.1, and 1.0.0.1," Sophos added. "As with Mirai malware historically, this sample can execute DDoS attacks."

The attacks have been found to originate from the following three IP addresses -

  • 85.11.167[.]243
  • 217.60.242[.]76
  • 45.198.224[.]169

These attack sources have been found to contact 92.118.112[.]100 to retrieve a loader, which is responsible for deploying the Mirai botnet variant. Further analysis of the artifact within a network-contained sandbox has revealed that the botnet issues a DNS query for thunder.godofthunder[.]st, resolves it to 134.199.154[.]64, and establish a C2 channel on TCP port 50792.

The end goal is to launch sustained volumetric flood attacks against two adjacent hosts located within a single Ukrainian network -

  • 45.88.138[.]0
  • 45.88.138[.]44

The lack of a successful attack leveraging PHP2Shell in the wild suggests that threat actors are "struggling" to come up with reliable exploits, Sophos added.

Potassium was first flagged by botnet tracking platform Synthient in March 2026. In a follow-up analysis, Nokia Deepfield researchers described the malware as a Mirai fork which uses "ChaCha20 for the static config table (the first time we have seen ChaCha20 used this way in a Mirai variant), a single static byte (0xED) for everything on the wire, a named reverse-shell protocol (SHELL / SHOUT) on the same channel as attack commands, and a DNS misdirection scheme that swaps the two 16-bit halves of every resolved A record before connect()."

Arctic Wolf, which also shared additional details of the same weaponized PHP2Shell exploitation attempt, said the botnet supports 24 commands to facilitate flood attacks over ICMP, TCP, UDP, and OpenVPN protocol. Both builds for ARM and x86 also contain configuration for resolving C2 infrastructure through Ethereum Name Service (ENS).

"ENS resolution was disabled in both samples, indicating that the capability was present but inactive," the cybersecurity firm said. "If enabled in future variants, it could complicate disruption by reducing reliance on registrars and DNS providers, requiring defenders to block the ENS names, RPC infrastructure, and resolved command-and-control addresses."

Threat Actor Mass Exploits PHP2Shell

The development comes as SOCRadar said it found PHP2Shell exploit tooling for PHP 8.4.26 on an exposed attacker-controlled server ("206.188.197[.]105:9999"), alongside three screening scripts that check live websites for preconditions the PHP2Shell chain depends on.

The scripts, according to the cybersecurity company, checked about 20 public websites for the PHP version, server setup, and session settings the exploit needs. These websites span Canada, China, Finland, France, Poland, the U.K., and the U.S.

"The central file, aslr_exploit.py, is a Python exploit the operator labels a 'one-click' PHP2Shell exploit for PHP 8.4.26 under Apache mod_php," SOCRadar said. "It works entirely over ordinary HTTP requests in three broad steps: it recycles the target's PHP worker, leaks memory addresses through the session cookie to defeat address space layout randomization (ASLR), and then abuses PHP's session upload progress handling to run a shell command."

ASLR, short for Address Space Layout Randomization, is a cybersecurity mechanism that randomizes the memory locations used by system files and programs each time they are run, making it harder for attackers to predict where code will load. This built-in defense helps defend against memory-based exploits, such as buffer-overflow attacks.

The other three companion scripts are as follows -

  • php2shell_fp.py, which reads PHP version and server setup from about 20 sites
  • deep_probe.py, which examines 11 of those sites for visible errors, phpinfo pages, file inclusion, and session injection to ascertain whether they meet exploit prerequisites
  • wp_attack.py, which focuses on five WordPress sites to conduct user and plugin enumeration

That said, there is no evidence of shell access on any screened site as of October 22, 2026, indicating the targeted sites did not meet the exploit's preconditions.

The toolset is assessed to be part of a broader operation that involves the attacker extracting API keys and backend URLs from websites' client-side JavaScript, systematically sweeping web and API routes for unauthenticated access, and using a pool of rotating proxies to spread traffic and evade rate limits and blocking.

"Related artifacts on the server additionally point to web-archive reconnaissance and automated CAPTCHA solving," SOCRadar noted. "Taken together, the toolset points to a financially motivated actor focused on cryptocurrency and Web3 targets."

The same exploitation server ("206.188.197[.]105") has also been flagged by Hunt.io, which said the threat actor behind the operation has targeted 123 servers across cloud, shared-hosting and ISP networks. "About 57 run PHP, many on unsupported 5.x to 7.x," the threat intelligence firm said. "Ten rejected the request outright, including three of the five sitting behind Cloudflare. None was exploited."

In all, 10 open directories hold PHP2Shell-related tooling -

  • 206.188.197[.]105
  • 102.210.149[.]166
  • 122.10.110[.]72, 122.10.17[.]49
  • 58.221.60[.]160:8000
  • 41.223.30[.]7, 157.230.117[.]70
  • 104.219.251[.]31
  • 107.150.31[.]151
  • 217.160.132[.]82
  • 47.100.125[.]108, 54.169.109[.]7, 139.162.165[.]136

Defeating ASLR Protections

The disclosure also coincides with the development of a PHP2Shell exploit that can achieve remote code execution on ASLR-enabled x86-64 systems with PHP's recommended production configuration.

"One of the biggest obstacles has been address space layout randomization (ASLR), a protection designed to make memory corruption vulnerabilities much harder to exploit," Spencer McIntyre, director of exploit development at VulnCheck, told The Hacker News.

"Our team developed a novel technique [...] that chains the two vulnerabilities together, using a memory leak to bypass ASLR and achieve remote code execution on x86-64 systems, even with PHP's recommended production error-display setting."ir

"We haven't identified another public or commercial exploit that achieves this under the same conditions. Developing this capability was far from trivial, but it demonstrates that a major barrier to exploiting PHP2Shell on production-configured systems can be overcome."

Consequences of successful exploitation of the flaws are severe, as it permits an attacker to execute code with the permissions of the web application, potentially gaining access to API keys, database connections, and other internal services the application can reach, VulnCheck said.

"An attacker doesn't necessarily need administrator or root access to cause significant damage," McIntyre said. "Access to a vulnerable web application could provide a foothold into other parts of an organization's infrastructure."

Exploit Attempts Plenty, None Successful

The findings also coincide with reports indicating broad exploitation attempts targeting the flaws are underway, including by a China-based IP address that has been observed trying to drop a web shell via a server-side session file.

Web infrastructure company Cloudflare said it observed tens of thousands of attempts to exploit the flaw 45 minutes after the flaws were publicly announced, before climbing to hundreds of thousands within 2 hours and millions as of early October 22, 2026.

"So far, most of the activity is scanning, along with some uncoordinated attempts to deliver various payloads," Cisco Talos said. "This is expected: scanning or basic exploitation with public proof-of-concept (PoC) code takes far less effort than integrating a vulnerability into an actor's own tooling."

Data from Previdian's telemetry has so far recorded hundreds of exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-109618 from dozens of IP addresses, and against CVE-2026-109619 to a lesser degree. The first exploit event aimed at CVE-2026-109618 was recorded on October 21, 2026, at 1:05 p.m. UTC.

"We've seen plenty of php2shell probes and exploitation attempts in our honeypots," Previdian said. "At the time of writing, we've observed no successful remote code execution and no dropped PHP files. Reliable RCE may be harder to achieve than initially expected."

This assessment has also been echoed by Beelzebub, Dataminr, and Wordfence, with observed activity so far limited to scanning, fingerprinting, and attempts to confirm command execution, steal credentials and secrets from environment variables, install persistent access, and retrieve and execute a second-stage payload.

Wordfence has shared the following IP addresses as among those attempting to exploit the flaws -

  • 87.121.84[.]174
  • 181.215.186[.]252
  • 185.196.220[.]132
  • 185.161.210[.]29
  • 152.233.51[.]69
  • 45.134.225[.]16
  • 107.189.14[.]87
  • 193.47.62[.]24
  • 2409:40d2:204e:4be:2a1f:f9c9:a055:e00b
  • 103.147.220[.]17

The severity of the flaws has also led to several government, school and hospital websites going offline across Asia, Europe, and North America out of an abundance of caution. The U.K. government has confirmed that 32 digital services are unavailable and four are partially unavailable, largely stemming from the precautionary shutdowns while security updates and mitigations were applied. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has issued approximately 50,000 warnings to businesses and other organizations.

"The vulnerable code dates back to PHP 5.4, released in 2012," the Sysdig Threat Research Team said. "The bugs live in the PHP engine, not within any application. For that reason, any WordPress, Drupal, or Joomla site with clean application code is still exposed."

With the fixes not available for older versions of PHP, PHP2Shell is expected to have a long tail, along the lines of Log4Shell. According to estimates from Google-owned VirusTotal, about 272,000 hosts run a supported PHP branch (8.2 to 8.5), Organizations on PHP 7.4, 8.0, or 8.1 are advised to move to a supported branch, or use a distribution backport.

Attack surface management platform Censys said it currently detects over 3.08 million hosts and 56.6 million web properties running PHP. Of these, more than 34.4 million PHP services are still assessed to be vulnerable as of October 23, 2026.

"Many applications with web servers and similar will likely remain vulnerable until their respective vendors patch these items," Dataminr said. "The implications of this are that many organizations will likely remain vulnerable to some degree for far longer than when patches are directly applied to owned and managed applications."



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Thursday, October 22, 2026

Meta Ordered to Pay $25 Billion After Court Finds 43 Million Privacy Violations

Social media giant Meta was ordered to pay 25 billion in penalties by a New Mexico court on Wednesday as part of a data privacy lawsuit that sprang from the company's Cambridge Analytica data scandal, which came to light in 2018.

According to multiple reports from the Associated Press, the New York Times, Reuters, and the Wall Street Journal, state District Court Judge Francis J. Mathew called out Meta and Facebook for making misleading statements about the privacy of consumers in the state.

"Facebook promised users that they (the users) controlled their data," Mathew wrote in his ruling. "This was false."

The penalty relates to more than 43 million violations of the state's unfair practices law. The case, filed in 2021, was filed in the aftermath of revelations that Cambridge Analytica, a British political consulting firm, obtained data belonging to millions of Facebook users without their consent to build psychographic profiles.

The data was collected via a personality quiz app called "thisisyourdigitallife." Around 300,000 users are said to have taken the psychological test, although it later emerged that the app also collected the data associated with their friends, thereby amassing a dataset of 87 million profiles.

Meta banned the app in 2015 for violating its platform policy. The company also sent a legal request to Cambridge Analytica to delete the collected data. Following the data scandal, Cambridge Analytica announced in May 2018 that it was immediately ceasing operations. Notably, the company was involved in Donald Trump's campaign during the 2016 presidential election.

In December 2022, Meta agreed to pay $725 million to settle a class-action lawsuit that accused the company of improperly sharing users' information with Cambridge Analytica. Previously, it faced a $5 billion fine from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission in 2019 for undermining users' ability to control their privacy on Facebook.

Back in August, the company also reached a settlement with nearly all U.S. states and territories, except New Mexico and Florida, to pay $18 billion over the next decade and implement stronger child-safety measures on Facebook and Instagram. This also includes $459 million for claims related to the Cambridge Analytica matter.

Meta chief legal officer C.J. Mahoney criticized the latest penalty, adding the company intends to appeal the decision.



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INTERPOL Arrests 1,462 Suspects, Disrupts 10,909 Cybercrime Networks in Global Crackdown

INTERPOL on Thursday announced that a coordinated law enforcement action has disrupted 10,909 malicious networks and recovered more than $105 million in illicit funds.

In tandem, the effort saw law enforcement agencies from 21 countries arrest 1,462 suspects. Codenamed Operation Serengeti III, the cybercrime crackdown took place between June 29 and August 31, 2026.

"Authorities identified 65,929 victims targeted by cybercriminal networks, underscoring the scale and sophistication of today's digital threats," INTERPOL said in a statement. "Financial investigations linked criminal activity to losses exceeding USD 385 million."

Participating nations included Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, United States, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Group-IB, which was one of the many private sector partners, said it provided INTERPOL with threat intelligence data on phishing kits, botnets, and other malicious resources hosted in Africa or used to conduct cyber attacks targeting the region.

"Criminals cannot operate without infrastructure. They have to build it, connect it and maintain it, and those activities create opportunities to find them," said Jacomo Piccolini, vice president of Global Data Partnerships at Team Cymru.

"Instead of waiting for an attack and then investigating the damage, we can help expose the networks behind criminal operations and enable defensive actions. Operation Serengeti III demonstrates the real-world impact of putting that intelligence in the hands of law enforcement."

Some of the key operational highlights are listed below -

  • Disruption of two transnational fraud rings and the arrest of 365 foreign nationals in Uganda linked to sophisticated online investment and pension fraud schemes targeting victims across Asia.
  • Dismantling of two illegal cryptocurrency mining centers and the arrest of nine suspects in Angola, along with the seizure of 2,000 cryptocurrency mining devices and six illegal power transformation stations valued at over $1 million.
  • Arrest of a suspect in Nigeria in connection with a large-scale phishing and business email compromise operation that collected software credentials and amassed about 2.1 million email addresses.
  • Arrest of another suspect in Nigeria for operating an international investment fraud scheme advertised via messaging apps. The operation led to the movement of more than $2.4 million in suspected criminal proceeds, with a huge chunk of the funds laundered through cryptocurrency transactions.
  • Arrest of 30 suspects linked to a cybercrime operation in the Republic of Congo.

Operation Serengeti III follows two previous waves that took place between September and October 2024, and June and August 2025, leading to more than 2,000 arrests.

"Cybercrime networks operate without regard for borders, exploiting technology to target victims on an unprecedented scale," Neal Jetton, INTERPOL's director of cybercrime, said.

"Operation Serengeti III reinforces a clear message: while cybercrime is increasingly borderless, international cooperation remains one of the most effective tools for disrupting criminal networks, recovering criminal assets and protecting communities from digital harm."



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The AI Agent Nobody Owns: Watch Expert Webinar On Your Newest Insider Threat

Right now, there is probably an AI agent running on a laptop somewhere in your network. It stores API keys and database passwords, can access your internal systems, and works without anyone watching.

Nobody reviewed its access. Nobody owns it.

If an employee had that much reach with that little oversight, you would call it an insider risk. So why do we still call the agent a productivity tool?

Most of the conversation about AI security is about what threat actors are doing with it. But the bigger threat may already be inside your organization.

That's the focus of our upcoming webinar, AI as an Insider Threat: From Shadow AI to Governed AI, with expert guest Richard De La Torre, Technical Product Marketing Manager at Bitdefender. Save your seat for a practical security playbook on bringing that unseen AI under control.

Where AI is hiding on your endpoints

It isn't only developers. AI agents, coding assistants, MCP servers, and browser extensions are turning up across the business.

And most of them never cross your network gateway in a way the tools you already run would recognize.

The result is a hard irony. The AI with the most access is often the AI your security team can't see.

📅 Save Your Spot: Watch the Webinar

The visibility gap, by the numbers

According to Bitdefender's 2026 Cybersecurity Assessment report, only 51.8% of organizations report having full visibility into the AI tools their staff use. That leaves nearly half without the full picture.

That blind spot has a cost. IBM found that 20% of breached organizations were compromised through shadow AI.

Which raises the question: what can organizations realistically do about it? That's exactly what the webinar gets practical about. Register now to see what a lean team can do about the AI it can't yet see.

From shadow AI to governed AI

New research from Bitdefender Labs looks at what's really running on endpoints, based on real machines; among the findings: a malicious agent skill caught in the wild.

Blocking AI outright is the obvious response, but it tends to fail. The alternative is governed adoption, and the session shows what that looks like in practice.

What you'll take away

  • Where AI is actually showing up on your endpoints, and why the tools you already run don't see most of it.
  • New research from Bitdefender Labs on real machines, including the malicious agent skill caught in the wild.
  • Why an AI agent with credentials and no owner behaves like an insider risk, and what to do about it.
  • Why blocking AI outright tends to fail, and what governed adoption looks like instead.

The AI already running on your endpoints won't wait for a policy. Join expert guest Richard De La Torre, Technical Product Marketing Manager at Bitdefender, and save your seat for AI as an Insider Threat.

📅 Save Your Spot: Watch the Webinar

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