Wednesday, July 29, 2026

Ruflo MCP Flaw Lets Unauthenticated Attackers Run Commands and Poison AI Memory

Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a maximum-severity security flaw in Ruflo, an open-source agent meta-harness for Anthropic Claude Code and OpenAI Codex, that could result in unauthenticated remote code execution.

The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-59726 (CVSS score: 10.0), impacts all versions of the project before version 3.16.3. It has been codenamed RufRoot by Noma Security's research team, Noma Labs.

Originally launched as Claude Flow, Ruflo is an AI multi-agent orchestration platform and harness that allows users to deploy multi-player swarms, coordinate autonomous workflows, and build conversational AI systems. The project has more than 66,500 stars on GitHub.

The crux of the vulnerability is that Ruflo exposed 233 tools, including shell command execution, database operations, agent management, and memory storage, through an unauthenticated Model Context Protocol (MCP) bridge that's open to the network by default.

Specifically, the "docker-compose.yml" YAML configuration file was found to bind port 3001 to 0.0.0.0 by default, exposing the bridge on all network interfaces. That said, the extent of exposure depends on the deployment's firewall rules, security groups, and network segmentation. It's worth noting that any network-reachable instance is fully exploitable without authentication.

As a result, a single unauthenticated HTTP POST to port 3001 made it possible to gain full remote code execution inside a susceptible Ruflo deployment, per security researcher Eli Ainhorn -

curl -s -X POST https://<target>:3001/mcp -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"ruflo__terminal_execute","arguments":{"command":"id && hostname"}}}'

Armed with this foothold, an attacker could siphon the API keys Ruflo uses to interact with large language model (LLM) providers, read every user conversation stored on the platform, and interfere with the AI system's memory to influence model responses and behavior.

In other words, command execution serves as a stepping stone for full compromise, enabling LLM API key theft, agent weaponization, AI memory poisoning, conversation harvesting, and persistent backdoor deployment by writing a malicious payload to the "/app" directory.

"Prior to 3.16.3, Ruflo's default docker-compose deployment exposed the MCP bridge POST /mcp and POST /mcp/:group endpoints without authentication, allowing an unauthenticated network attacker to invoke tools/call to terminal_execute, obtain a shell in the bridge container, read provider API keys, and poison AgentDB learning-store patterns," according to a description of the flaw in NIST's National Vulnerability Database (NVD).

Following responsible disclosure on June 30, 2026, a fix for the vulnerability was pushed by the project's maintainer, Reuven Cohen, within 24 hours. As part of the patch, the MCP bridge now binds to the loopback interface by default, gates "terminal_execute" behind server-side executeTool controls, and enables MongoDB authentication to prevent conversation theft, among others.

"The MCP bridge shipping in ruflo/docker-compose.yml exposed POST /mcp with no authentication," Cohen said in the release notes. "The docker-compose defaults bound the bridge and MongoDB to all interfaces."

"Combined, an unauthenticated network attacker could invoke tools/call → terminal_execute inside the bridge container, obtain a shell, read every provider API key from the container env, spawn attacker-controlled swarms on the victim's keys, and persist a poisoned pattern into the AgentDB learning store that steers future AI outputs."

Operators running an exposed instance are recommended to immediately close firewall ports 3001 and 27017, rotate all LLM API keys, audit the AgentDB pattern store for injected agentdb_pattern-store entries, and check MongoDB for signs of tampering.

"The Ruflo vulnerability enabled spinning up a swarm of agents to do whatever the attacker wanted and even tamper with the AI's memory," Noma said. "The ability to write malicious instructions into a platform's persistent AI memory means an attacker can influence the responses that AI gives to every future user of the platform, long after the original intrusion has ended."

"For organizations exposed to a vulnerability like this, remediation requires more than a software update. AI provider credentials should be treated as compromised and rotated, the platform's AI memory should be audited for tampering, and containers should be rebuilt from a clean image."



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73% of Organizations Say They Are Not Fully Ready for a Major Cyberattack

Most organizations have incident response plans, security tools, and technical teams in place. Yet new research suggests that many still lack the coordination, visibility, and executive alignment needed to withstand a serious cyberattack.

According to The State of Incident Response Readiness 2026, based on a survey of 600 senior IT security decision makers conducted by Vanson Bourne in January and February 2026, 73% of organizations admit they would not be "fully ready" if a significant cybersecurity attack occurred tomorrow.

The findings point to a critical gap between having incident response capabilities and being able to execute them effectively under pressure.

The report also found that cyberattacks are already a recurring business risk. More than three-quarters of organizations, 76%, experienced at least one cyberattack in the past 12 months, while 32% experienced more than one.

Incident Response Readiness Remains a Weak Point

Incident response has evolved far beyond technical containment. A mature response now requires executive crisis management, legal and regulatory coordination, stakeholder communications, enterprise-wide investigation, remediation, recovery, and post-incident monitoring.

The survey indicates that many organizations are struggling to bring these elements together in a coordinated way. Fewer than 40% of respondents described key incident response components as "highly effective," including areas such as documented plans, tabletop exercises, threat hunting, digital forensics, and 24/7 monitoring.

The issue is not simply whether these capabilities exist. The larger concern is whether they work together when decisions must be made quickly.

Coordination Breakdowns Slow Response

One of the most significant findings is the extent to which internal friction affects response efforts. The report found that 90% of organizations expect difficulty coordinating stakeholders during a significant incident.

That coordination challenge becomes especially problematic when legal, communications, security, IT, and executive teams are not aligned before an incident begins. The research found that 75% of respondents agree delays or uncertainty around legal and communications team involvement slow decision-making during cyber incidents.

The report also found that 89% cite limited executive or board involvement in incident response readiness and decision-making.

This creates a dangerous pattern during a live incident:

  • Technical teams investigate and contain the attack
  • Executives require updates before approving major actions
  • Legal and communications teams become involved late
  • Disclosure, customer messaging, and escalation decisions lag
  • Response teams lose time when containment decisions need speed

In practice, unclear ownership can turn an incident response process into a reactive cycle. Instead of executing a rehearsed plan, teams spend critical time briefing stakeholders, clarifying authority, and waiting for approvals.

Visibility Gaps Increase the Risk of Repeat Incidents

The report also highlights a major technical challenge: organizations often cannot fully see where attackers have moved.

According to the survey, 78% of respondents agree blind spots in their environment create persistent attacker access and increase the risk of repeated incidents. These blind spots can span on-premises infrastructure, public cloud environments, endpoints, SaaS platforms, identity systems, and operational technology environments.

That lack of visibility can prevent responders from confidently answering essential questions, such as:

  • Where did the attacker enter?
  • Which systems were accessed?
  • Has the attacker moved laterally?
  • Are privileged accounts compromised?
  • Has malware or persistence been removed?
  • Could the attacker return after recovery?

Without reliable visibility, organizations risk containing only part of the incident while leaving attacker access intact.

OT and ICS Environments Add Business Risk

The report found that 84% of organizations are concerned about attackers crossing from corporate IT systems into operational technology or industrial control system environments.

This concern is particularly serious for sectors such as manufacturing, energy, healthcare, transportation, and critical infrastructure, where cyber incidents can affect physical operations. If attackers move from IT into OT or ICS systems, the impact may extend beyond data theft or business disruption. It can affect production, safety, service delivery, and recovery timelines.

The findings suggest that many organizations recognize this exposure but still lack the unified visibility needed to detect and stop cross-environment movement quickly.

Cyberattacks Are Already Causing Business Damage

The report shows that cyber incidents are producing tangible consequences across sectors and regions. Among organizations hit by a cyberattack in the past 12 months, impacts included operational shutdowns, data loss, reputational damage, customer loss, lost revenue, and executive disruption.

The findings vary by sector:

  • Retail organizations were most likely to report operational shutdowns and lost revenue or profit.
  • Manufacturing and financial services organizations were more likely to report data loss.
  • Crypto and decentralized finance organizations reported the highest attack incidence.
  • Private healthcare organizations reported high concern around legal and communications delays.

Regional differences also emerged. North America reported the highest cyberattack incidence, while APAC respondents were most likely to report data loss, reputational damage, and customer loss. Europe reported fewer incidents overall, but incidents there were more likely to result in lost revenue or profit.

Ransomware and Cloud Attacks Lead Future Concerns

Looking ahead, respondents identified a broad set of threats that could cause serious financial, operational, or reputational disruption. Ransomware ranked as the leading concern, followed closely by cloud environment attacks.

However, the findings suggest that organizations are not facing a single dominant threat. Instead, they are preparing for a crowded threat landscape that includes cloud compromise, identity abuse, third-party risk, AI-enabled threats, ransomware, and attacks that move across hybrid environments.

This makes incident response readiness harder to define. Organizations must be able to respond across multiple attack paths, not just prepare for one scenario.

AI Adoption Is Rising, but It Is Not a Substitute for Readiness

The report shows that organizations are increasingly adopting AI and machine learning-driven capabilities for threat detection and incident response.

Nearly one-third of organizations now report extensive AI use across most or all threat detection and incident response activities, up from 25% last year. By 2027, 63% expect AI to be embedded across these activities.

The report suggests that AI can strengthen incident response when it is integrated into mature workflows. Organizations with moderate or extensive AI use were more likely to rate incident response elements as effective compared with organizations using AI in a limited way.

However, the findings also indicate that AI should not be treated as a replacement for governance, visibility, and disciplined response execution. AI can accelerate triage, threat hunting, and investigation, but it cannot resolve unclear decision rights, fragmented stakeholder coordination, or incomplete visibility on its own.

Organizations Are Re-Evaluating Incident Response Support Models

Another notable finding is that many organizations are reconsidering their external incident response and managed detection and response relationships.

The report found that many organizations expect to switch providers at the end of their current contracts. Drivers include the need for:

  • More proactive readiness support
  • Better coverage across IT, OT, cloud, and hybrid environments
  • Stronger expertise in complex incidents
  • Improved visibility beyond a single technology ecosystem
  • Faster support during high-pressure investigations

The findings also highlight concern about overreliance on narrow technology ecosystems during incident response. When response teams are limited to one platform or toolset, investigation and containment may be constrained by what that ecosystem can detect, access, or support.

Organizations may benefit from evaluating whether their internal teams and external providers can operate across multiple security tools, cloud platforms, identity systems, SaaS applications, and OT environments.

How Organizations Can Strengthen Incident Response Readiness

The findings suggest that incident response readiness should be treated as an ongoing operational discipline rather than a static plan or annual compliance exercise. Organizations can reduce response delays by focusing on several practical areas.

1. Define decision rights before an incident

Security teams, executives, legal, communications, compliance, and business leaders should understand their roles before a crisis begins. Escalation paths, approval thresholds, and communication responsibilities should be documented and rehearsed.

2. Test cross-functional coordination

Tabletop exercises should include both technical and non-technical stakeholders. These exercises can help identify where decision-making slows, where authority is unclear, and where response plans do not reflect real business dependencies.

3. Validate visibility across critical environments

Organizations should assess whether they can investigate activity across endpoints, identity systems, cloud platforms, SaaS applications, on-premises infrastructure, and OT environments where applicable. Visibility should be tested through exercises such as threat hunting, attack simulation, red team assessments, or purple team engagements.

4. Use AI to support, not replace, response processes

AI and automation can help accelerate triage, alert enrichment, investigation, and threat hunting. However, these capabilities should be embedded into defined workflows with human oversight, clear escalation criteria, and tested response procedures.

5. Assess internal and external response capacity

Organizations should determine which incident response functions they can handle internally and where external expertise may be required. External providers, where used, should be evaluated based on incident experience, response speed, technical depth, ability to operate across environments, communication practices, and support for post-incident improvement.

The central lesson is that readiness depends on execution. Plans, tools, and providers all matter, but they only reduce risk when they are connected through tested processes, clear authority, and reliable visibility.

The Bottom Line

The research paints a clear picture: most organizations are being attacked, but many are not confident that their incident response capabilities will hold under pressure.

The challenge is no longer just building a response plan. It is ensuring that the plan works across teams, technologies, executives, legal stakeholders, communications teams, and business operations when a real attack occurs.

As attackers move faster across cloud, IT, identity, SaaS, and OT environments, incident response readiness must become a continuous business discipline. Organizations that wait until a live incident to discover gaps in visibility, authority, or coordination may find that the cost of delay is measured not only in systems affected, but in revenue, reputation, and trust.

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Russia Charges Telegram Founder Pavel Durov With Aiding Terrorist Activity

The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) on Wednesday said it charged Telegram founder Pavel Durov for allegedly facilitating terrorist activities and for failing to remove prohibited information in violation of Russian law.

The principal security agency said the instant messaging platform "failed to remove numerous channels, chats, and bots on the platform that are actively used by Ukrainian special services and by terrorist and extremist organizations to plan and coordinate acts of sabotage and terrorism, mass killings, and cyber-fraud operations within the Russian Federation."

These actions have resulted in numerous casualties, including among women and children, as well as significant damage amounting to billions, it added.

Durov has been charged in connection with an ongoing criminal investigation under Part 1.1 of Article 205.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation for aiding terrorist activity. He has also been placed on the international wanted list.

The FSB said it also found numerous instances where Ukrainian special services employed a Telegram chatbot named "Daivinchik/Leo-Dating, Chatting, and New Friends" to recruit Russian citizens for sabotage and terrorist activities through what it said were deception and psychological manipulation.

Per joint operations conducted with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Investigative Committee of Russia, 46 Russian citizens aged 12 to 22 were allegedly detained between July 2025 and the present. These individuals carried out armed attacks on law enforcement officers and acts of arson targeting transport, energy, communications, and financial infrastructure, it said.

"Additionally, they acted as couriers, transporting funds obtained from defrauded citizens to cryptocurrency exchange points for deposit into accounts controlled by the adversary," the agency said in a statement.

Furthermore, it accused Ukrainian intelligence agents of using the "Daivinchik" Telegram dating service to masquerade as young women and initiate online contact with young Russian men. Upon building romantic relationships, the men are said to have sent the geolocation of a desired meeting place, such as a large shopping mall or an area near a critical facility, and pay for movie tickets, concert tickets, or gifts via phishing links shared by the agents.

In the next phase, representatives of Ukrainian intelligence services posing as Russian law enforcement authorities or officials from Rosfinmonitoring, the Federal Financial Monitoring Service, would contact the men through foreign messaging apps.

"These impostors claimed that the funds sent by the men had ended up in the accounts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and that the coordinates they had shared were being used by the enemy to plan missile strikes and drone attacks," the FSB alleged.

"The deceived and intimidated citizens - rendered unable to critically assess the situation due to psychological pressure - were then coerced under threat of criminal prosecution into carrying out armed attacks and acts of arson. These actions were ostensibly framed as checks on the counter-terrorism security of the targeted facilities or as participation in other 'pseudo-operational activities.'"

In response, Telegram's official account on X posted a photo of the Telegram founder giving the middle finger. Durov, who lives in Dubai, has not publicly commented on the development.

The charges come as Russia introduced a number of restrictions on Telegram, including throttling its use at the start of the year followed by a near-complete blockade in April 2026. Almost two years ago, Durov was also arrested and charged in France for failing to tackle illicit activity on the popular messaging platform.



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New Gitea RCE Lets Repository Writers Plant a Git Hook to Run Shell Commands

Gitea, the self-hosted Git platform, has patched a critical remote code execution vulnerability. A user with ordinary repository write access can turn attacker-controlled patch content into a live Git hook and run shell commands as the Gitea service account.

Tracked as CVE-2026-60004 (CVSS score: 9.8), the flaw affects Gitea versions 1.17 and later before 1.27.1 and is fixed in 1.27.1. The vulnerable API call requires authentication and repository write permission. But Gitea enables registration by default, so an outside visitor can create a normal account and repository on an unchanged installation, then exploit the bug without pre-existing credentials.

Upgrading to 1.27.1 is the fix. Gitea said on July 27 that Gitea Cloud instances would be upgraded automatically. Gitea's July 28 advisory does not say the flaw has been exploited in the wild, but it includes public proof-of-concept (PoC) code.

Disabling open registration can remove the public account-creation path while the update is deployed, but it does not fix the flaw or protect against existing users with repository write access.

The flaw was reported by security researcher Shai Rod, who goes by NightRang3r. Gitea credits NightRang3r as the reporter in its advisory.

Gitea's affected route invokes reqToken(), which rejects requests without a signed-in user. The no-prior-credentials path comes from the project's default configuration, which leaves registration open, requires neither email nor manual approval, does not mark new users as restricted, and imposes no default repository-creation limit.

The bug sits in the POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/diffpatch endpoint. According to Gitea's security advisory, the endpoint applies a supplied patch inside a shared bare temporary clone. Vulnerable builds invoke git apply with --index, --recount, --cached, and --binary, adding the -3 three-way fallback option when the server runs Git 2.32 or later.

An attacker submits the same patch twice to create an add/add collision. The three-way fallback then checks the indexed path out even though the operation uses --cached. Because the temporary clone is bare, its root is $GIT_DIR. An executable file placed at hooks/post-index-change therefore lands in Git's hook directory and becomes active. Git runs it while updating the index.

The PoC signs in with a normal account, creates an initialized private repository, sends the malicious patch twice, and retrieves the command output. It needs no outbound callback. The hook stores the output in Git objects, creates a branch containing the result, and lets the attacker fetch it over authenticated smart HTTP.

As of July 29, 2026, none of the cited primary sources reports whether the flaw was exploited before or after version 1.27.1 became available.

Successful exploitation gives the attacker the privileges of the Gitea operating-system account. Depending on how the instance is isolated, Gitea said that could expose application and environment secrets, mounted repositories, database credentials and contents, OAuth credentials, and reachable internal services.

Exploitation still requires repository write access, Git 2.32 or later, an enabled diffpatch route, and a writable, executable temporary filesystem. Default registration lets an outsider obtain the required write access on an unchanged installation.

The fix is easy to miss in the changelog. Gitea changed the temporary clone from bare to non-bare. The code comment explicitly warns that Git commands using --index may operate on the working tree. The change was merged and backported on July 26, 2026.

Version 1.27.1 shipped on July 27, and the security advisory followed on July 28. The release notes listed the change under MISC as "refactor: git patch apply," not under SECURITY.

Rod had previewed the RCE alongside a separate file-inclusion issue, with a PoC retrieving /etc/passwd from a Gitea 1.27.0 host. That issue appears to correspond to a separate change included in 1.27.1 that altered Gitea's Org-mode renderer so #+INCLUDE paths are returned as plain text instead of being read from the server's filesystem. Gitea has not published a separate advisory or CVE for the file-inclusion issue.



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Flying Eagle Android RAT Traces Found on 170 Servers as Source Code Circulates

Source code for the Flying Eagle Android remote access trojan (RAT) framework is circulating through criminal Telegram channels. Hunt.io and independent researcher NetAskari traced matching control panels and certificates to 170 internet servers.

They linked the framework to a fake "公安一网通办" Public Security service application targeting Android users in China. The kit supports payment-password and keystroke capture, screen recording, camera access, and phishing prompts for financial, adult-content, and government-service applications.

Hunt.io's search of the preceding 30 days of telemetry found infrastructure fingerprints on 170 servers, a count that does not establish 170 infected phones, victims, operators, or confirmed command-and-control (C2) systems.

The researchers found 158 servers through the AdminPro page title, HTTPS redirect behaviour, and matching response headers, then identified 12 more through a default certificate packaged with Flying Eagle. They said the total is likely conservative because it excluded otherwise similar servers that did not return the expected 302 redirect.

Chinese authorities advised anyone who installed the fraudulent application to remove it, scan the device, change affected account passwords, freeze payment channels if funds moved, and report the incident to police.

China's National Cybersecurity Notification Center warned on June 18 that the fake application was being distributed from 110gongan[.]com, associated with 207.56.30[.]188, and could steal payment data and remotely control devices.

According to joint research published July 28, the Flying Eagle code was distributed as a 388 MB archive called 中国龙.zip, or Chinese Dragon. It contains a full Docker deployment with nginx, PHP, MySQL, a Node.js WebSocket server, Android build tools, phishing templates, and a default Transport Layer Security certificate.

The panel lets an operator choose an app name, icon, lure text, and C2 address, then produces a signed APK from one of two templates. The builder randomises package and class names, encrypts embedded C2 URLs using AES-128-CBC, and adds 2.8 MB to 3.5 MB of low-entropy JSON padding designed to resemble legitimate software development kit configuration data.

Flying Eagle is the builder and control framework; Hunt.io said samples it analysed from the builder were detected as SpyNote and used Android accessibility services for privilege escalation and gesture injection.

The researchers observed two Telegram channels, SQLRCE0 and Yx Technology, distributing modified versions of the framework. Messages reviewed by them claimed an unidentified party had compromised customer infrastructure containing 189 Flying Eagle servers and exfiltrated database data, but neither claim has been independently confirmed. Yx Technology also advertised cash-out services charging 20% to 50% of the transaction value.

The server count and the source-code circulation are documented, but no causal relationship between them has been established.

SQLRCE0 introduced a separate Android control kit called Night Dragon on June 23, 2026. The researchers found two associated servers and an exposed panel that listed 46 devices as online and 29 as actively connected, but said it could not determine whether the entries represented victims or test data.

Hunt.io says Night Dragon appears to be an independent build, with a second version in development as of July 12. The report establishes that SQLRCE0 distributed Flying Eagle and promoted Night Dragon, but it does not establish shared code. This is not the 2011 China-linked espionage campaign McAfee named Night Dragon. The 2026 kit is financially motivated Android crimeware.



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OpenAI Agent Used Exposed Credentials Across Four Services During Hugging Face Breach

OpenAI on Tuesday revealed the rogue artificial intelligence (AI) agent that escaped its sealed evaluation environment and broke into Hugging Face's production environment, and also hacked multiple third-party accounts and services as part of the attack.

The latest disclosure shows that the security incident, which stemmed from an internal security test, was more extensive in scope than previously thought.

The AI company said its ongoing review of the incident revealed a "small number of cases" where the models, including GPT-5.6 Sol and an "even more capable pre-release model," identified and used exposed credentials at the account-level on other publicly-available services.

"This includes four accounts on four services as part of the Hugging Face incident (and a few accounts accessed as part of other evaluations)," it said.

"One of these four accounts was used as an outbound relay and staging path, and another account was used for data storage. The remaining two accounts were accessed by the models in a read-only manner, and were not used in furtherance of compromising Hugging Face."

OpenAI did not disclose what companies or organizations the accounts belonged to, but noted it will continue to notify service owners directly, and that it has not seen any evidence of broader impact to these providers or accounts as a result of the breach. That said, Reuters reported that a customer of Modal Labs was among the entities compromised by OpenAI's agent.

In addition, the models are said to have used a series of publicly-available services, including code paste websites, request capture services, screenshot services, file-drop services, and other web utilities. No platform- or account-level compromise was observed in these scenarios.

OpenAI, which is working with Hugging Face after the breach came to light on July 16, 2026, acknowledged that the models identified and exploited a previously unknown zero-day vulnerability in self-hosted versions of Artifactory, a package registry cache proxy maintained by JFrog, to obtain internet access and break out of its sandbox. The issue has been addressed in Artifactory 7.161.

The release notes for Artifactory 7.161.15 state that the version patches multiple security vulnerabilities that could be chained together into a critical attack scenario if Anonymous Access is enabled. Anonymous Access is disabled by default and is not recommended for production environments due to security risks, it said.

"There is an important, and frankly optimistic, lesson buried in this incident: AI models are becoming extraordinary zero-day discovery engines," JFrog CTO Yoav Landman said. "The same capability that lets a model find an exploit path no human had found is the capability that will let defenders find and eradicate those paths first."

The American AI company also described the pre-release model as an internal-only research prototype that was meant for public release. The model has since been deactivated, encrypted, and restricted from research access.

Hugging Face Publishes Postmortem of the Incident

According to a detailed timeline published by Hugging Face, the autonomous AI agent spent roughly two and a half days inside its infrastructure with an aim to cheat ExploitGym, a benchmarking framework that scores AI systems on their ability to discover and exploit software vulnerabilities. The company said it reviewed roughly 17,600 attacker actions that it recovered from logs between July 9 and 13, 2026.

"We believe the entire intrusion was, from the agent's point of view, an attempt to cheat the evaluation: reach our production systems and steal the test solutions rather than solve the challenge on its own," Hugging Face said.

The end-to-end intrusion is said to have played out in two stages -

  • The agent escaped its sandbox by exploiting a zero-day in Artifactory, a permitted network egress with internet, followed by abusing a public code-evaluation external sandbox hosted on a third-party provider's infrastructure to run commands as root and use that sandbox as an "external launchpad."
  • From that sandbox, the agent leveraged Hugging Face's dataset-processing pipeline to obtain administrator access to Kubernetes clusters; conduct lateral movement via a combination of node impersonation, CSI token theft, and forged identity tokens; establish command-and-control (C2); and ultimately gain unauthorized write access to a subset of internal source code repositories on GitHub.

"While the intrusion did reach Hugging Face's internal infrastructure, the only customer content accessed was the set of ExploitGym/CyberGym challenge solutions stored in five datasets," the company said. "No other customer-facing models, datasets, Spaces, or packages were affected, and the only customer records read were operational metadata tied to search queries against the dataset server."

One of the defining aspects of the attack is the use of an improvised communication protocol for C2. Layered atop public services request-capture services, Pastebins, and file-drop services, the protocol allows each message to carry a payload along with details about the type of compressed and Base64-encoded payload, a channel grouping a stream of related messages, a sequence number to put the messages back in order, and a checksum.

The sequence plays out in this manner: (1) the agent posts a self-describing envelope to a public request-capture service, (2) the receiver polls it, reassembles the chunks, and then runs the payload as a shell command and stages the results.

Hugging Face also characterized the agent as ephemeral and resilient in a manner that's reminiscent of autonomous evaluation runs, with each code-evaluation sandbox run getting a fresh identity, while taking steps to avoid exposing payloads in cleartext.

"The agent chained vulnerabilities across several trust boundaries, escaped its evaluation environment, reached the public internet, and sustained a coherent campaign against our production infrastructure for several days," it said. "Each short-lived code evaluation environment started from scratch, yet the agent rebuilt its tooling, recovered its channels, and continued."

In response to the incident, the company has plugged the code-execution paths in its dataset processing pipeline, locked down access to cloud metadata, rotated tokens and credentials, rebuilt the core infrastructure, isolated clusters, and improved alerting mechanisms.

Hugging Face CEO Clem Delangue, in a post shared on X over the weekend, called for "radical transparency," adding "the first autonomous agent cyber attack is an unprecedented event. It deserves an unprecedented response."

The findings once again underscore how AI tools are rapidly maturing in their cyber offensive capabilities, even if they don't reveal innovative or paradigm-shifting uses of the technology. This, in turn, can not only lower the barrier to exploit development, but also allow bad actors to find, probe, and exploit misconfigurations at scale and enhance the efficiency of their criminal operations, resulting in attacks that are better, bigger, and faster.

The development also comes as rival Anthropic said its Claude Mythos Preview AI agent has discovered ways to attack cryptographic algorithms, including devising a key recovery technique that "significantly weakens" HAWK, one of the candidate digital signature schemes selected by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as part of the post-quantum standardization process.



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How AI Stacks are rewriting the Rules of Business

SUMMARY: Brian speaks with Dave Vellante, Co-Founder/CEO theCUBE, about how AI is changing the entire tech stack, the evolution of systems of intelligence, and how the competitive landscape is forcing companies to make difficult decisions about their AI future.

SHOW: 1049

SHOW TRANSCRIPT: The Enterprise AI Show #1049 Transcript

SHOW VIDEO: https://youtu.be/EgIvsBnZnmg

SHOW SPONSORS:


SHOW NOTES:

Topic 1 - The new technology stacks being driven by AI. Where is intelligence being built and distributed? 

Topic 1a - Where is value in the stack being created and commoditized?

Topic 1b - Where do you see powerful software ecosystems defending themselves and where are they most vulnerable because of AI?

Topic 2 - Alex Karp’s thesis that the harness will generate more value than the models, and owning and managing the harness is a path to enable companies to better control their AI future. 

Topic 3 - Is AMD potentially cracking NVIDIA’s monopoly on AI accelerators? 


FEEDBACK?



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Tuesday, July 28, 2026

24,650 Internet-Exposed BMCs Disclose IPMI Password Hashes Before Login

Cybersecurity researchers have sounded an alert after finding more than 36,000 Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) management interfaces exposing Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) protocol to the public internet.

Of the 36,872 internet-exposed server-management interfaces running IPMI, 24,650 have been found to disclose password-derived authentication hashes before login due to a vulnerability with the IPMI v2.0 specification itself, according to a new report Lava shared with The Hacker News. IPMI v2.0 was introduced in February 2024.

The issue in question is CVE-2013-4786 (CVSS score: 7.5), a high-severity information disclosure flaw that enables remote attackers to obtain password hashes for valid accounts and conduct offline password guessing attacks by obtaining the HMAC from an RMCP+ Authenticated Key-Exchange Protocol (RAKP) message response from a BMC.

Per an advisory released by Dell, "this is an inherent problem with the specification for IPMI v2.0," with the PC maker noting that there is no patch.

"More than 30% of the returned hashes were associated with passwords that could be recovered using common wordlists and predictable factory chassis-sticker formats," security researcher Michael Katchinskiy said. "The exposure also affected modern Supermicro and HPE servers operated by GPU providers, including systems that were still using factory-issued passwords."

BMCs are specialized management processors embedded on a server's motherboard that control power, firmware, remote console access, operating system installation, and system recovery. They also act as a crucial component for remote data center automation and uptime to monitor hardware telemetry and facilitate mass deployment of firmware updates and BIOS configurations.

To bridge remote commands to the hardware, the BMC typically communicates using protocols like IPMI and Redfish. As highlighted by firmware security company Eclypsium in late 2022 and early 2023, the privileged position enjoyed by BMCs can also make them ideal attack targets for bad actors looking to gain remote control and deploy persistent malware.

Because BMCs run completely independently of the host operating system, a mechanism known as Out-of-Band (OOB) management, an attacker who manages to successfully compromise an exposed BMC can sidestep traditional security controls, survive operating system reinstalls, and maintain access.

"In modern AI data centers, where the same bare-metal environment often hosts multiple tenants, a single exposed BMC can potentially place multiple organizations' workloads at risk through shared infrastructure or lateral movement, making this a significant blind spot in the infrastructure underpinning the AI data center boom," the Israeli company said.

At the heart of the research is CVE-2013-4786, a 20-year-old weakness in IPMI 2.0, which an attacker can exploit to recover weak, reused, factory-set, or predictably formatted passwords.

"During the authentication process, the BMC can return a message response containing an HMAC-SHA1 authentication code calculated using the account password and session values known to the requester," Katchinskiy explained. "An unauthenticated remote party that can reach UDP port 623 can request this response and test password guesses offline. Unlike repeated online login attempts, the offline process does not require a new request to the BMC for every password candidate."

As of May 6, 2026, a search of the public internet for IPMI services exposed on UDP port 623 uncovered 36,872 unique hosts, of which more than 14,000 are located in the U.S. The remaining systems are concentrated in Germany, China, the Netherlands, and the U.K.

Further analysis has determined that nearly 25,000 exposed password-derived authentication materials before login, allowing offline credential cracking. Perhaps even more concerningly, a total of 6,240 BMCs returned authentication material for an empty username that matched a weak password candidate and another 2,340 BMCs returned authentication data for a named account such as ADMIN or root that matched a password from publicly available wordlists.

In tests conducted by Lava, HPE iLO factory passwords were recoverable within a minute using modern GPU hardware, while Supermicro factory passwords were recoverable in approximately one hour despite being uniquely assigned to each server. In response to the findings, Supermicro said it will evaluate possible improvements to the default password policy for future hardware revisions.

"CVE-2013-4786 is not new, but the risk around it has changed," Lava said. GPU cracking has made offline password recovery faster, while modern AI and bare-metal environments have made each exposed server more valuable.

On top of that, evidence has emerged that threat actors are already targeting internet-exposed BMC interfaces, including ransomware operators leaving an extortion note on an HPE iLO 4 login page. It's not clear who is behind the activity. That said, HPE iLO servers have been singled out as far back as 2020 to deploy a rootkit called iLOBleed.

To counter the risk, it's advised to block UDP port 623 at the network edge, rotate factory-issued passwords during provisioning, disable legacy or weak options such as IPMI 1.5, restrict BMC access to a dedicated private management network, and apply network access controls to ensure only approved administrative systems can reach BMC interfaces.

"Organizations have spent years hardening cloud workloads and operating systems, but many have overlooked the infrastructure that sits beneath them," said Yakir Kadkoda, CTO and co-founder at Lava, in a statement.

"These management controllers hold the keys to servers and data centers. Once compromised, attackers can operate below the visibility of almost any security tools, maintain persistence even after systems are rebuilt, and potentially move deeper into critical infrastructure. As AI infrastructure rapidly expands, securing this layer has become far more urgent."



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Nimbus Manticore Deploys NightLedger and Turns Victim Systems Into Covert Relays

The Iranian state-backed hacking group tracked as Nimbus Manticore (aka GalaxyGato, Mirage Kitten, Smoke Sandstorm, Subtle Snail, and UNC1549) has been attributed to a fresh set of attacks targeting entities across the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia.

The intrusions involve the use of a previously undocumented Windows backdoor called NightLedger and two custom WebSocket tunnelers, BridgeHead and ArcBridge, with an aim to maintain covert access.

Targets of the campaign include Egypt, SMB and government environments in Jordan and Tanzania, aviation organizations in Pakistan, telecommunication companies in Ethiopia, and financial-sector entities in Burkina Faso, per Kaspersky.

"The toolset includes NightLedger, a new Windows backdoor for reconnaissance, command execution, file operations, process discovery, and screenshot capture; and two custom WebSocket-based tunnelers, ArcBridge and BridgeHead, for covert network access and operator-controlled tunneling," Kaspersky researchers Omar Amin and Vasily Berdnikov said.

The exact initial access method used in the attacks is presently unknown, although the adversary is known to employ highly tailored job opportunity-themed phishing lures masquerading as trusted brands and hiring platforms, as well as lookalike videoconferencing pages, to redirect recipients to malicious archives hosted on third-party file-sharing services.

The as-yet-undetermined access route is then abused to deliver the malicious payloads, including NightLedger, which is launched as a DLL via DLL side-loading. The malware is designed to contact an external server over HTTPS to parse and run commands in a manner that's analogous to TWOSTROKE, another backdoor deployed by the threat actor in the past. The list of supported commands is below -

  • Gather user and host identity information
  • Execute a process/program
  • List directories
  • Download a file to the infected system
  • Collect host and network information
  • Copy or delete files
  • Update beacon interval
  • Take a screenshot
  • Load a DLL
  • Terminate a process or thread
  • Upload file to the command-and-control (C2) server via an HTTP POST request
  • Enumerate logical drives
  • List processes
  • Collect C:\Windows\debug\NetSetup.log (a diagnostic file used for troubleshooting domain join issues) together with process-list output

Two other malware families delivered as part of the attacks are BridgeHead ("unbcl.dll"), a SOCKS5 tunnel proxy observed in environments in Egypt and Pakistan that shares some level of functional overlaps with MiniFast (aka MiniUpdate and Retrograde), and ArcBridge, another WebSocket tunneling tool observed in April 2026 in activity targeting victims in the Middle East.

"The C2 server initiates all tunnel connections by sending binary commands over the WebSocket; the implant simply forwards traffic between server-specified targets and the WebSocket channel," the researchers said about BridgeHead. "This makes it a relay node: the operator runs tools server-side, and all resulting TCP traffic is tunneled through the victim's machine as if originating from the victim's network."

The use of BridgeHead and ArcBridge indicates the threat actor's continued use of tunneling utilities, which has been previously observed relying on bespoke tunnelers such as LIGHTRAIL and POLLBLEND.

The disclosure comes days after Group-IB uncovered a new malware sample codenamed HOLLOWGRAPH that's linked to the Cavern (aka Cav3rn) framework used by an Iranian hacking crew dubbed Cavern Manticore.

"HOLLOWGRAPH abuses Microsoft Graph API to transform a compromised Microsoft 365 calendar into a covert two-way command-and-control channel," it said.

"Using the Microsoft Graph API, it treats the compromised mailbox's calendar as a two-way dead-drop: operators plant tasking as calendar events, and the implant exfiltrates stolen files by creating its own events with encrypted data attached. To avoid catching the mailbox owner's attention, every event is dated far into the future - 13 May 2050 - with payloads attached as files to the event."



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Patch Management in Mixed Environments: Why Tools Like PatchMon Matter for Small Businesses or Enterprises

When you manage an IT infrastructure, few tasks are as critical yet as routinely underestimated as patching. Whether you’re running a small business with a handful of Linux servers and Windows machines or an enterprise with hundreds of nodes across multiple distributions, keeping systems up to date is non-negotiable. Unpatched systems are low-hanging fruit for attackers, and compliance requirements like CIS benchmarks only add to the pressure.

I’ve spent years working with VMware, Microsoft, and various Linux setups, writing about upgrades, security patches, and keeping environments stable. The challenges haven’t changed much: SSH marathons, inconsistent scripts, forgotten hosts, and auditors asking for evidence that takes days to compile. Tools like PatchMon are here to help and to change that by providing unified visibility and management for Linux, FreeBSD, and Windows fleets.

 

Default overview of PatchMon dashboard

Default overview of PatchMon dashboard – screenshot from Patchmon.net

 

The Patching Reality Check

Let’s be honest. Patch Tuesday (or its Linux equivalents) often turns into chaos. You have Ubuntu servers using APT, RHEL/AlmaLinux with DNF, Alpine with APK, Arch with Pacman, FreeBSD pkg, and Windows Update – all needing attention. PatchMon has Six package mangers within the dashboard to help you. In small businesses, one or two admins juggle this alongside everything else. In enterprises, it scales to dozens or hundreds of nodes, with different teams, maintenance windows, and risk profiles.

The consequences of falling behind are severe. Exploits targeting known vulnerabilities spread fast. We’ve seen major incidents where a single unpatched system became the entry point for ransomware or data breaches. Security isn’t just about firewalls and antivirus anymore – it’s fundamentally about reducing the attack surface through timely updates.

Beyond security, there’s compliance. Standards like CIS Benchmarks, SOC 2, ISO 27001, or industry-specific regulations demand proof that you’re managing vulnerabilities systematically. Manual processes make this painful. Spreadsheets get out of date quickly, and “I think we patched it” doesn’t satisfy auditors.

Why Patching Matters More Than Ever

Security and Exploits: Most breaches exploit known vulnerabilities with available patches. Delaying updates means living with unnecessary risk. Critical security updates often address remote code execution, privilege escalation, or denial-of-service flaws. In a mixed environment, one weak Linux node can compromise the whole network.

Operational Stability: Patching isn’t just “apply and forget.” Poorly tested updates can break applications or cause downtime. That’s why dry-run capabilities, scheduling, and approval workflows are essential. Tools that let you preview changes reduce surprises.

Compliance and Audit Readiness: CIS benchmarks cover everything from file permissions and service configurations to network settings. Running OpenSCAP scans manually across fleets is time-consuming. Automated scanning with historical tracking turns compliance from a quarterly fire drill into ongoing visibility.

 

Screenshot from PatchMon.net site

Screenshot from PatchMon.net site

 

Resource Efficiency: Admins shouldn’t spend Mondays doing patch reconnaissance tours. Time saved on patching can go toward strategic work like infrastructure optimization or new projects.

For small businesses, this means fewer nights worrying about security. For enterprises, it means better control, consistent policies, and reduced mean time to patch.

Introducing PatchMon: Unified Patch Management

PatchMon is an open-source (AGPL v3) platform designed specifically for mixed environments. It provides a single dashboard for Linux, FreeBSD, and Windows visibility, with patching capabilities focused on Linux/FreeBSD today (Windows deployment is on the roadmap). Over 55K servers reportedly run it, with a growing community.

 

Screenshot from PatchMon.net site

Screenshot from PatchMon.net site

 

Key Capabilities:

  • Multi-Package Manager Support: Automatic detection and reporting for APT, DNF/YUM, APK, Pacman, FreeBSD pkg, and Windows Update. One view show pending updates across everything, with security flagging.
  • Patch Policies and Scheduling: Define policies for immediate application, delayed rollout, or fixed maintenance windows. Assign to host groups with exclusions for special cases. Timezone support helps global teams.
  • Dry-Run and Approval Workflows: Preview exactly what will change before touching production. Approval gates for critical systems, with full audit trails including who approved what and shell output.
  • Compliance Scanning: Integrated OpenSCAP for CIS benchmarks and Docker Bench. Rule-level results, severity ratings, remediation guidance, and trend tracking over time. This is gold for auditors—generate reports in minutes.
  • Additional Features: Browser-based SSH/RDP (outbound agent connections, no exposed ports or VPN needed), Docker inventory and security scanning, alerting to Slack/Discord/etc., RBAC with SSO, and integrations with Proxmox, Ansible, and more.

Deployment is straightforward: Cloud option for quick start or self-hosted Community Edition. Lightweight agents use outbound connections only, which is a security win – no inbound firewall holes required.

Real-World Benefits for Small Businesses and Enterprises

For Small Businesses: With limited staff, PatchMon replaces ad-hoc scripts and manual checks with a clean dashboard. Install the agent with a one-liner, and you immediately see your patch status. Scheduling prevents “I forgot to update that test server” scenarios. Compliance becomes manageable even without a dedicated security person.

For Enterprises: Scale matters. Centralized visibility across heterogeneous fleets, policy enforcement, audit trails for SOC 2/ISO, and integration into existing workflows (Ansible inventories, webhooks, REST API). High-availability options and PRO support for large deployments address enterprise needs. Air-gapped and custom deployments are possible.

In my experience with VMware and Microsoft environments, unified tools reduce “patch drift” – where some nodes lag behind. PatchMon helps maintain consistency, which is crucial in virtualized or containerized setups where one vulnerable host can affect others.

Best Practices for Effective Patching

Regardless of the tool, follow these principles:

  1. Inventory Everything: Know every node, its OS/distribution, and role. PatchMon’s discovery helps here.
  2. Prioritize: Focus on security updates first. Separate critical from nice-to-have.
  3. Test Before Deploy: Use staging environments or dry-runs. Monitor for regressions post-patch.
  4. Schedule Smartly: Align with maintenance windows. Automate where possible but keep human oversight for production.
  5. Document and Audit: Every change should be traceable. Automated trails beat manual logs.
  6. Monitor Compliance Continuously: Don’t wait for audit time. Track CIS scores over time and remediate systematically.
  7. Combine Tools: PatchMon integrates well with configuration management like Ansible. Use it alongside your existing stack rather than replacing everything.

Potential Considerations

Like any tool, evaluate fit. Test it. Self-hosted which is available at Github, gives full control but requires maintenance of the platform itself. Cloud simplifies operations. Windows patching visibility is strong now, but full deployment is upcoming—factor that in if Windows is dominant. As with any agent-based solution, review security implications and test in your environment.

 

A screenshot of a computer AI-generated content may be incorrect.

Open-source version is available through Github – https://github.com/PatchMon/

 

The open-source nature allows code auditing and community contributions, which is a plus for transparency-focused teams.

Final Words

Take Control of Your Patch Posture. Patching isn’t glamorous, but it’s foundational to security, compliance, and reliability. In today’s threat landscape, with exploits targeting everything from kernels to container runtimes, staying up-to-date on every managed node is essential. Tools that eliminate spreadsheets, reduce SSH fatigue, and generate audit-ready evidence deliver real ROI.

PatchMon stands out by focusing on the mixed Linux/FreeBSD/Windows reality many of us face, with strong emphasis on visibility, safe deployment practices, and compliance. Whether you’re a small team tired of manual processes or an enterprise seeking better control, it’s worth exploring – especially the self-hosted option for those who prefer owning their infrastructure. This is a good plan. Enjoy. Please note that the tool is evolving. For example the Windows patching was added only recently, and IMHO, it was a goo plan.

FAQ

How often should business systems be patched?

Critical security patches should be assessed and deployed as soon as practical. Other updates can follow a regular monthly maintenance cycle.

Do software patches always require downtime?

No. Many updates can be installed without interruption, but kernel, driver, and core system patches may require a reboot.

Which patches should be prioritized?

Prioritize actively exploited vulnerabilities, internet-facing systems, critical business services, and updates with high severity ratings.

How can teams verify that patching was successful?

Check installation results, reboot status, service health, application logs, and vulnerability scan results after deployment.



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IR Trends Q2 2026: Phishing and weaponized remote management tools drive attack chains

IR Trends Q2 2026: Phishing and weaponized remote management tools drive attack chains

Phishing was the primary means of gaining initial access this quarter, appearing in over half of all Cisco Talos Incident Response (Talos IR) engagements – an increase from approximately a third of engagements last quarter. Attackers continued to innovate their delivery methods to evade defenses, deploying QR code-embedded PDFs to bypass traditional email gateways and hosting links on trusted cloud platforms. We also saw a spike in authentication abuse this quarter — observed in 65 percent of engagements compared to 35 percent last quarter — with attackers frequently bypassing or defeating multi-factor authentication (MFA) using adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) proxies, session-token theft, MFA fatigue attacks, and self-enrolled devices, amongst other methods.  

Ransomware incidents made up over 20 percent of engagements this quarter, similar to just under 20 percent last quarter. Talos IR responded to Sinobi ransomware for the first time, as well as previously seen variants Nitrogen and Warlock. We observed ransomware operators leveraging legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, such as trojanized MeshAgent binary and Zoho Assist, for stealthy access, requiring defenders to prioritize behavior-based monitoring and strict control over administrative binaries.

QR phishing campaign leverages trusted infrastructure to target Australian organizations     

Starting in April, we observed a persistent QR code phishing campaign targeting primarily Australian organizations that leverages compromised Microsoft 365 accounts to harvest credentials and propagate the attack via internal contact lists. The campaign, which remained ongoing as of late June 2026, employs auto-generated, victim-tailored PDF documents containing QR codes that direct to adversary-controlled M365 credential harvesting pages. If credentials are successfully captured, the adversary attempts access to the victim’s Microsoft account and conducts various post-compromise actions including creating email inbox rules for defense evasion, leveraging SharePoint to host malicious documents, and sending additional internal and external phishing emails to continue the compromise chain. 

We assess with high confidence that the threat actor, who we have dubbed UAT-11764, will almost certainly continue leveraging this QR code phishing operation, using each newly compromised mailbox's contact lists to expand its reach and sustain the campaign's momentum. By weaponizing existing, trusted infrastructure like SharePoint and M365, UAT-11764 can bypass many standard email security gateways. As such, network defenders should implement policies that block or flag emails containing QR codes within PDF attachments, enforce phishing-resistant MFA on M365 accounts, and monitor for suspicious inbox rule creation and anomalous SharePoint file staging as indicators of post-compromise activity. 

ARToken platform provides toolkit for Microsoft 365 account compromise 

Talos uncovered a phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) operator platform, ARToken, in an engagement this quarter that is closely linked to the EvilTokens platform. According to our analysis, the ARToken panel exposes 80+ API endpoints for device code phishing, primary refresh token (PRT) persistence, email access, business email compromise (BEC) operations, and SharePoint exfiltration — all accessible to operators through a React-based dashboard. Our investigation into the platform found phishing lures that impersonate trusted vendors and abuse legitimate Microsoft services, allowing attackers to bypass MFA through the OAuth device authorization flow rather than stealing passwords. 

ARToken extends beyond a typical phishing kit by providing affiliates with a comprehensive post-compromise toolkit. We observed capabilities including automated token management, persistent access through PRTs, OneDrive and SharePoint administration, geo-dynamic templates, inbox rule manipulation, cross-account keyword monitoring, and collaborative token sharing. We also identified advanced anti-analysis techniques, including layered evasion mechanisms and encrypted client-side payloads, highlighting the increasing sophistication of modern PhaaS platforms and reinforcing the need for organizations to monitor device code authentication, enforce Conditional Access policies, and strengthen defenses against token-based attacks.  

Ransomware trends 

Ransomware and pre-ransomware incidents made up over 20 percent of engagements this quarter, relatively similar to just under 20 percent last quarter. As previously mentioned, Talos IR responded to Sinobi ransomware for the first time, as well as previously seen variants Nitrogen and Warlock. We observed operators from these groups leveraging tools not previously identified in public reporting, including a trojanized MeshAgent binary and Zoho Assist for remote access.

Sinobi ransomware operators weaponize MeshAgent for covert backdoor access

We responded to a Sinobi ransomware engagement for the first time in April; while this ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation emerged nearly a year ago, there has been minimal public reporting on the actors’ operations.  

Notably, we observed the threat actors use a trojanized MeshAgent binary as their primary C2 mechanism during this engagement, a tactic that has not been previously associated with the group in public reporting. MeshAgent is the open-source agent component of the MeshCentral remote management platform. Here, the actor weaponized it into a covert durable backdoor installed as a SYSTEM-level auto-start service, communicating over encrypted WebSocket (WSS) to an attacker-controlled server. This approach allowed the actor to blend malicious traffic with legitimate remote management activity and maintain undetected access for approximately three days before ransomware deployment. 

Following C2 establishment, the actor moved laterally through the network using RDP and WinRM, leveraging a service account with a weak, easily cracked password obtained from the domain credential store, ntds.dit. The actor ultimately deployed the ransomware across the entire domain using a malicious Group Policy Object (GPO) logon script. The incident resulted in the encryption of systems with the .SINOBI file extension, alongside observed data exfiltration staging activity conducted via rclone.exe.

IR Trends Q2 2026: Phishing and weaponized remote management tools drive attack chains

Looking forward, Sinobi operators will likely continue weaponizing legitimate tools like MeshAgent because these binaries blend into standard administrative traffic and bypass many traditional signature-based alerts. The use of GPO-based deployment scripts suggests an understanding of enterprise architecture, and operators will likely continue to exploit centralized management features to ensure rapid, domain-wide encryption. Defenders should prioritize monitoring of administrative tools and implement strict application allowlisting to prevent unauthorized binaries from running as services. Further, proactive hunting for unauthorized MeshAgent instances and auditing service account permissions may help in identifying and disrupting Sinobi activity before encryption. 

Warlock actors deploy Zoho Assist to attempt remote access without active user sessions

In one engagement, we observed Warlock ransomware operators (also known as Storm-2603) deploying an installer for the RMM tool Zoho Assist Unattended Agent, which is designed to allow administrative remote control of an endpoint without a user logged in. The tool, which we have not previously seen attributed to Warlock, enables the attackers to maintain persistent, stealthy, and unrestricted control, significantly increasing the potential malicious impact of an incident.  

While the activity in this particular did not lead to encryption, it was consistent with a successful Warlock ransomware attack Talos observed in May. To counter this threat, organizations must shift from signature-based detection to behavior-based monitoring, focusing on the specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) utilized by Storm-2603, such as the abuse of legitimate administrative tools and rapid movement within the network.

Targeting 

For the second quarter in a row, health care led as the most targeted industry vertical accounting for 17 percent of all engagements, with public administration and manufacturing following at 14 percent each. A shared characteristic of these top-targeted sectors is a critical lack of downtime tolerance. The vast majority of targeted health care organizations were entities that directly support clinical operations and/or diagnostic services, where service interruption can result in operational and patient-care consequences. Almost all targeted public administration organizations were local governments, which provide essential public services, while the targeted manufacturing entities represented high-value targets within the industrial supply chain, where potential disruptions could create cascading effects across the downstream technology and energy sectors.

IR Trends Q2 2026: Phishing and weaponized remote management tools drive attack chains

Initial access 

As mentioned, phishing was the top means of gaining initial access this quarter, accounting for over half of engagements where initial access could be determined — an increase from 35 percent last quarter. Many phishing engagements included MFA-bypass techniques, such as OAuth device-code phishing and AiTM frameworks, allowing adversaries to intercept session tokens. Other observed means of achieving initial access included exploitation of public-facing applications and drive-by compromise.

IR Trends Q2 2026: Phishing and weaponized remote management tools drive attack chains

Recommendations for addressing top security weaknesses

IR Trends Q2 2026: Phishing and weaponized remote management tools drive attack chains

Implement properly configured, phishing-resistant MFA and tighten authentication controls 

Authentication abuse was the most prevalent security weakness this quarter, observed in 65 percent of engagements — up sharply from 35 percent last quarter. Adversaries consistently defeated or bypassed MFA using AitM proxies and session-token theft, MFA fatigue attacks, registration of attacker-controlled devices for authentication, and legacy authentication protocols that circumvent MFA altogether. To reduce this risk, Talos IR recommends transitioning from push- and SMS-based MFA to phishing-resistant methods such as FIDO2/WebAuthn and hardware security keys. Organizations should also restrict self-service MFA enrollment by requiring helpdesk verification, block legacy authentication through Conditional Access, enforce number matching or verified push where phishing-resistant methods are not yet feasible, and condition access on device compliance and trusted infrastructure rather than geographic location alone.   

Configure centralized logging with adequate retention across the environment 

Insufficient logging and visibility was the second most common weakness, observed in 42 percent of engagements compared to 18 percent last quarter. Deficiencies included domain controller security logs retained for only a few hours, host event logs truncated or overwritten before capture, absent NetFlow that prevented reconstruction of external authentication and exfiltration, on-device-only logs that adversaries deleted to evade detection, and short cloud-telemetry retention that did not extend back to the true initial-access date. In several engagements these gaps prevented definitive determination of the initial access vector or the scope of data exfiltration. Talos IR recommends implementing a SIEM or centralized logging platform with a minimum of 90 days of retention, forwarding logs from servers, workstations, network infrastructure, cloud identity providers, and security appliances off-device so they survive log tampering and host rebuilds, and enabling process-creation, command-line, and cloud API (e.g., Microsoft Graph) auditing. Talos IR's Log Architecture Assessment service can identify gaps and provide a roadmap to a complete view of the environment. 

Conduct robust patch management and reduce exposed infrastructure 

Vulnerable, exposed, or unpatched internet-facing infrastructure was the third most common weakness, observed in 31 percent of engagements, similar to last quarter’s 25 percent.  A variety of different vulnerabilities were targeted including ToolShell, an older Telerik UI deserialization flaw, and SD-WAN and perimeter-VPN appliance CVEs. Internet-exposed services were also subjected to SQL-injection and denial-of-service activity. Talos IR recommends identifying and prioritizing the patching or decommissioning of all end-of-life and externally exposed systems, isolating systems that cannot be immediately upgraded, restricting management plane and remote access services behind a VPN or trusted source, deploying a Web Application Firewall (WAF) with rules for known exploitation patterns, and establishing a vulnerability management process capable of rapidly identifying and patching exposed assets — particularly given the accelerating reduction in time between vulnerability disclosure and exploitation. 

Enforce strict outbound email thresholds to disrupt attack propagation 

Finally, unlimited outbound email thresholds were a notable security weakness this quarter, enabling threat actors to propagate malicious activity in almost 15 percent of engagements. Though not as prevalent as the above weaknesses, it was more frequently observed than in previous quarters and warrants mention. For example, in one engagement, a user clicked on a malicious phishing email that led to credential theft and account compromise. Shortly after the threat actors gained access to the user’s mailbox, they sent over 6,600 phishing and spam emails to continue the attack chain. The failure to contain the compromise via outbound rate limiting significantly amplifies the damage of a single compromised credential; implementing these controls is a low-effort, high-impact mitigation strategy that effectively disrupts the attack chain. 

Top-observed MITRE ATT&CK techniques  

The table below represents the MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed in this quarter’s Talos IR engagement. Given that some techniques can fall under multiple tactics, we grouped them under the most relevant tactic in which they were leveraged. Please note this is not an exhaustive list.  

Key findings from the MITRE ATT&CK framework include:  

  • Consistent with phishing being a top threat this quarter, email hiding rules was the most observed tactic for persistence while internal spearphishing was most seen for lateral movement. 
  • Use of valid accounts was frequently observed for both privilege escalation and persistence, highlighting how identity abuse remains a key theme across engagements.  
  • Actors also relied on legitimate tools and web protocols to challenge detection, abusing native email features and cloud APIs, relying on standard web protocols for C2, and using valid administrative credentials for RDP and SSH.

Tactic 

Technique 

Example 

Reconnaissance (TA0043) 

T1598 Phishing for Information 

Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. 

 

T1595 Active Scanning 

Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. 

 

T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains 

Adversaries may search open websites and domains to gather information about a victim that can be used during targeting. 

 

T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information 

Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. 

Initial Access (TA0001) 

T1566 Phishing 

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. 

 

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application 

Adversaries may exploit a vulnerability to gain access to a target system. 

 

 T1078 Valid Accounts 

Adversaries may use compromised credentials to access valid accounts during their attack. 

Execution (TA0002)  

T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link 

An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. 

 

T1078 Valid Accounts   

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts to access systems within the network and execute their payload. 

Persistence (TA0003) 

T1564.008 Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules 

Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. 

 

T1663 Remote Access Software 

Adversaries may use legitimate remote access software, such as VNC, TeamViewer, AirDroid, AirMirror, etc., to establish an interactive command and control channel to target mobile devices. 

 

T1053 Scheduled Task/Job   

Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. 

 

T1133 External Remote Services 

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. 

 

T1078 Valid Accounts 

The adversary may compromise a valid account to move through the network to additional systems. 

Defense Impairment (TA0112)  

T1687 Exploitation for Defense Impairment 

Adversaries may exploit vulnerabilities in security software, infrastructure, or defensive components to degrade, disable, or otherwise continue to impair their ability to prevent, detect, or respond to malicious activity. 

 

T1078 Valid Accounts 

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. 

 

T1484 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification 

Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain or identity tenant to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in centrally managed environments. 

Stealth (TA0005) 

T1564.008 Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules 

Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound or outbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. 

 

T1070 Indicator Removal   

Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated within systems to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses. 

Credential Access (TA0006)  

T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception   

Adversaries may target MFA mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. 

 

T1621 Multi-factor Authentication Request Generation 

Adversaries may attempt to bypass MFA mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users. 

 

T1110.003 Brute Force: Password spraying 

Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. 

Discovery (TA0007) 

T1018 Remote System Discovery 

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. 

 

T1083 File and Directory Discovery   

Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. 

 

T1087 Account Discovery   

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. 

 

T1082 System Information Discovery 

An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. 

 

T1526 Cloud Service Discovery 

An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. 

Lateral Movement (TA0008)  

T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol 

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. 

 

T1534 Internal Spearphishing 

After they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment, adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or compromise other users within the same organization. 

 

T1021.004 Remote Services: SSH 

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into remote machines using SSH. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. 

Command and Control (TA0011)  

T1219 Remote Access Software 

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. 

 

T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols   

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. 

 

T1102 Web Service 

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. 

 

T1572 Protocol Tunneling 

Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. 

Exfiltration (TA0010)  

T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service 

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. 

 

T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol 

Adversaries may exfiltrate data over a different protocol than the command and control channel. 

Impact (TA0040)  

T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact 

Adversaries may use ransomware to encrypt data on a target system.   



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