Monday, January 19, 2026

⚡ Weekly Recap: Fortinet Exploits, RedLine Clipjack, NTLM Crack, Copilot Attack & More

In cybersecurity, the line between a normal update and a serious incident keeps getting thinner. Systems that once felt reliable are now under pressure from constant change. New AI tools, connected devices, and automated systems quietly create more ways in, often faster than security teams can react. This week's stories show how easily a small mistake or hidden service can turn into a real break-in.

Behind the headlines, the pattern is clear. Automation is being used against the people who built it. Attackers reuse existing systems instead of building new ones. They move faster than most organizations can patch or respond. From quiet code flaws to malware that changes while it runs, attacks are focusing less on speed and more on staying hidden and in control.

If you're protecting anything connected—developer tools, cloud systems, or internal networks—this edition shows where attacks are going next, not where they used to be.

⚡ Threat of the Week#

Critical Fortinet Flaw Comes Under Attack — A critical security flaw in Fortinet FortiSIEM has come under active exploitation in the wild. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-64155 (CVSS score: 9.4), allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via crafted TCP requests. In a technical analysis, Horizon3.ai described the issue as comprising two issues: an unauthenticated argument injection vulnerability that leads to arbitrary file write, allowing for remote code execution as the admin user, and a file overwrite privilege escalation vulnerability that leads to root access and complete compromise of the appliance. The vulnerability affects the phMonitor service, an internal FortiSIEM component that runs with elevated privileges and plays an integral role in system health and monitoring. Because the service is deeply embedded in FortiSIEM's operational workflow, successful exploitation grants attackers full control of the appliance.

🔔 Top News#

  • VoidLink Linux Malware Enables Long-Term Access — A new cloud-native Linux malware framework named VoidLink focuses on cloud environments, providing attackers with a wide assortment of custom loaders, implants, rootkits, and plugins that are designed for additional stealth and for reconnaissance, privilege escalation, and lateral movement inside a compromised network. The feature-rich framework is engineered for long-term access, surveillance, and data collection rather than short-term disruption, allowing an operator to control agents, implants, and plugins via a web-based dashboard localized for Chinese users. Key to the malware's architecture is to "automate evasion as much as possible" by profiling a Linux environment and intelligently choosing the best strategy for operating without detection. Indeed, when signs of tampering or malware analysis are detected on an infected machine, it can delete itself and invoke anti-forensics modules designed to remove traces of its activity. It's fitted with an "unusually broad" feature set, including rootkit-style capabilities, an in-memory plug-in system for extending functionality, and the ability to adjust runtime evasion based on the security products it detects. VoidLink draws inspiration from Cobalt Strike, an adversary simulation framework that has been widely adopted and misused by attackers over the years. It's believed to be the work of Chinese developers. "Together, these plugins sit atop an already sophisticated core implementation, enriching VoidLink's capabilities beyond cloud environments to developer and administrator workstations that interface directly with those cloud environments, turning any compromised machine into a flexible launchpad for deeper access or supply-chain compromise," Check Point said. "Its design reflects a level of planning and investment typically associated with professional threat actors rather than opportunistic attackers." However, its intended use remains unclear, and no evidence of real-world infections has been observed, which supports the assumption that the modular malware was created "either as a product offering or as a framework developed for a customer."
  • Microsoft Disrupts RedVDS Criminal Service — A cybercriminal subscription service responsible for fraud campaigns causing millions of dollars in losses has been disrupted in a coordinated action by Microsoft alongside legal partners in the U.S. and, for the first time, the U.K. The Windows makers said it seized the website and infrastructure of RedVDS, a platform that hosted cybercrime-as-a-service tools for phishing and fraud campaigns, which cost users as little as $24 a month. The subscription service is known to have cost victims in the U.S. alone over $40 million since March 2025. In total, Microsoft has identified nearly 190,000 organizations worldwide that fell victim to RedVDS-supported campaigns. In one month, the company noted approximately 2,600 RedVDS virtual machines sent an average of 1 million phishing messages to Microsoft customers daily. RedVDS provided cybercriminals with access to cheap, effective, and disposable virtual computers running unlicensed software, including Windows, allowing criminals to conduct phishing attacks and business email compromise (BEC) schemes. The service is also said to have been a player in the spread of real estate payment diversion scams, affecting more than 9,000 customers primarily in Canada and Australia. RedVDS did not own physical data centers and instead rented servers from third-party hosting providers in the U.S., Canada, the U.K., France, and the Netherlands. "Once provisioned, these cloned Windows hosts gave actors a ready‑made platform to research targets, stage phishing infrastructure, steal credentials, hijack mailboxes, and execute impersonation‑based financial fraud with minimal friction," Microsoft said. "Threat actors benefited from RedVDS's unrestricted administrative access and negligible logging, allowing them to operate without meaningful oversight. The uniform, disposable nature of RedVDS servers allowed cybercriminals to rapidly iterate campaigns, automate delivery at scale, and move quickly from initial targeting to financial theft."
  • Over 550 Kimwolf Botnet C2 Nodes Null-Routed — Lumen Technologies' Black Lotus Labs has blocked more than 550 command-and-control (C2) nodes linked to Aisuru and Kimwolf's servers since October 2025, as the botnets gained attention for their role in orchestrating hypervolumetric distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Kimwolf, which is said to mainly target unsanctioned Android TV boxes, has caught on like wildfire, corralling over 2 million devices into its botnet. The disruption of RapperBot and the arrest of its alleged leader in August 2025 played a key factor in the rise of Aisuru and Kimwolf. Recent research by QiAnXin XLab and Synthient revealed how the botnet's operators have leveraged proxy services to expand its reach. In a separate report, Infoblox said nearly 25% of its cloud customers made a query to a Kimwolf domain since October 1, 2025. "The main takeaway is these residential proxies are literally everywhere," Chris Formosa, senior lead information security engineer at Lumen Technologies' Black Lotus Labs, told The Hacker News. "Like everywhere and in most organizations you can think of. Given we know the actors were exploiting it, the story is mainly a story of a lot of networks you may think are secured, but have devices running residential proxies which can provide attackers with an opportunity to get an initial foothold, bypassing a large majority of your devices you likely have in place."
  • Reprompt Attack Targets Microsoft Copilot — Security researchers discovered a new attack named Reprompt that allowed them to exfiltrate user data from Microsoft Copilot once a victim clicks on a specifically crafted link pointing to the artificial intelligence (AI) chatbot. The attack bypasses data leak protections and allows for persistent session exfiltration even after the Copilot session was closed. The attack leverages a combination of Parameter 2 Prompt (P2P) injection (i.e., the exploitation of the "q" parameter), a double-request technique, and a chain-request technique to obtain a data exfiltration primitive. "Client-side monitoring tools won't catch these malicious prompts, because the real data leaks happen dynamically during back-and-forth communication — not from anything obvious in the prompt the user submits," Varonis said. The attack does not affect enterprise customers using Microsoft 365 Copilot. Microsoft has since addressed the issue.
  • AWS CodeBuild Misconfiguration Creates Supply Chain Risks — A critical misconfiguration in Amazon Web Services (AWS) CodeBuild could have allowed complete takeover of the cloud service provider's own GitHub repositories, including its AWS JavaScript SDK, putting every AWS environment at risk. The vulnerability, codenamed CodeBreach, was fixed by AWS in September 2025. "By exploiting CodeBreach, attackers could have injected malicious code to launch a platform-wide compromise, potentially affecting not just the countless applications depending on the SDK, but the Console itself, threatening every AWS account," Wiz said.

‎️‍🔥 Trending CVEs#

Hackers act fast. They can use new bugs within hours. One missed update can cause a big breach. Here are this week's most serious security flaws. Check them, fix what matters first, and stay protected.

This week's list includes — CVE-2025-20393 (Cisco AsyncOS Software), CVE-2026-23550 (Modular DS plugin), CVE-2026-0227 (Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS), CVE-2025-64155 (Fortinet FortiSIEM), CVE-2026-20805 (Microsoft Windows Desktop Window Manager), CVE-2025-12420 (ServiceNow), CVE-2025-55131, CVE-2025-55131, CVE-2025-59466, CVE-2025-59465 (Node.js), CVE-2025-68493 (Apache Struts 2), CVE-2026-22610 (Angular Template Compiler), CVE-2025-66176, CVE-2025-66177 (Hikvision), CVE-2026-0501, CVE-2026-0500, CVE-2026-0498​, CVE-2026-0491 (SAP), CVE-2026-21859, CVE-2026-22689 (Mailpit), CVE-2026-22601, CVE-2026-22602, CVE-2026-22603, CVE-2026-22604 (OpenProject), CVE-2026-23478 (Cal.com), CVE-2025-14364 (Demo Importer Plus plugin), CVE-2025-14502 (News and Blog Designer Bundle), CVE-2025-14301 (Integration Opvius AI for WooCommerce plugin), CVE-2025-52493 (PagerDuty Runbook), CVE-2025-55315 (ASP.NET Core Kestrel server), CVE-2026-20965 (Microsoft Windows Admin Center), and CVE-2025-14894 (Livewire Filemanager).

📰 Around the Cyber World#

  • Unpatched Flaw in Livewire Filemanager — An unpatched security flaw was disclosed in Livewire Filemanager, a file manager component for Laravel-based websites that allows file uploads. The vulnerability (CVE-2025-14894, CVSS score: 7.5) can permit threat actors to upload malicious PHP files to a remote server and trigger its execution. "When a user uploads a PHP file to the application, it can be accessed and executed by visiting the web-accessible file hosting directory," the CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC) said. "This enables an attacker to create a malicious PHP file, upload it to the application, then force the application to execute it, enabling unauthenticated arbitrary code execution on the host device."
  • More GhostPoster Extensions Spotted — LayerX said it found a new cluster of 17 extensions related to GhostPoster impacting Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge. The new extensions, which are designed to hijack affiliate links, inject tracking code, and commit click and ad fraud, have a collective install base of over 840,000 users, and some of them date back to 2020. GhostPoster, first disclosed last month, is part of a broader campaign undertaken by a Chinese threat actor dubbed DarkSpectre. The new findings show that GhostPoster first originated on Microsoft Edge in February 2020 and then expanded to Firefox and Chrome.
  • RedLineCyber Distributes Clipboard Hijacking Malware — A threat actor named RedLineCyber has been observed leveraging the notoriety of the well-known RedLine information stealer to distribute an executable called "Pro.exe" (or "peeek.exe"). It's a Python-based clipboard hijacking trojan that is designed for cryptocurrency theft by continuously monitoring the Windows clipboard for cryptocurrency wallet addresses and substituting them with a wallet address under their control to facilitate cryptocurrency theft. "The threat actor exploits trust relationships within Discord communities focused on gaming, gambling, and cryptocurrency streaming," CloudSEK said. "Distribution occurs through direct social engineering, where the actor cultivates relationships with potential victims, particularly cryptocurrency streamers and influencers, over extended periods before introducing the malicious payload as a 'security tool' or 'streaming utility.'"
  • Fake Shipping Documents Deliver Remcos RAT — A new phishing campaign is using shipping-themed lures to trick recipients into opening a malicious Microsoft Word document that, in turn, triggers an exploit for a years-old security flaw in Microsoft Office (CVE-2017-11882) to distribute a new variant of Remcos RAT that's executed directly in memory, Fortinet said. Successful exploitation of the vulnerability triggers the download of a Visual Basic Script, which executes Base64-code PowerShell code to download and launch a .NET DLL loader module responsible for launching the RAT in addition to setting up persistence using scheduled tasks. An off-the-shelf malware, Remcos RAT (version 7.0.4 Pro) enables comprehensive data gathering capabilities, including system management, surveillance, networking, communication, and agent control.
  • Google Releases Rainbow Tables to Speed Up Demise of Net-NTLMv1 — Google's Mandiant threat intelligence division released a comprehensive dataset of Net-NTLMv1 rainbow tables to emphasize the need for urgently moving away from the outdated protocol. While Microsoft previously announced its plans to deprecate NTLM in favor of Kerberos, Google said it continues to identify the use of Net-NTLMv1 in active environments, leaving organizations vulnerable to trivial credential theft. "While tools to exploit this protocol have existed for years, they often required uploading sensitive data to third-party services or expensive hardware to brute-force keys," Google said. "The release of this dataset allows defenders and researchers to recover keys in under 12 hours using consumer hardware costing less than $600 USD."
  • Former U.S. Navy Sailor Sentenced to 200 Months for Spying for China — Jinchao Wei (aka Patrick Wei), 25, a former U.S. Navy sailor, was sentenced in the U.S. to 200 months in prison for selling secrets to China by abusing his security clearance and access to sensitive national defense information about the amphibious assault ship U.S.S. Essex. Wei was convicted of espionage charges in August 2025 following his arrest in August 2023. "By sharing thousands of documents, operating manuals, and export-controlled and sensitive information with a Chinese intelligence officer, Petty Officer Wei knowingly betrayed his fellow service members and the American people," said NCIS Director Omar Lopez. Wei was recruited by a Chinese intelligence officer in February 2022 and sent photographs and videos of the Essex via an encrypted messaging application, and advised the officer of the location of various Navy ships. He also described the defensive weapons of the Essex, sent thousands of pages of technical and operational information about U.S. Navy surface warfare ships, and sold approximately 60 technical and operational manuals about U.S. Navy ships. In exchange, Wei received more than $12,000 over 18 months. Post his arrest, Wei admitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that what he did amounted to espionage and that "I'm screwed."
  • Australia Warns Domestic Firms About AI Security Risks — The Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) has warned local businesses against uploading customer data and files to AI chatbots or genAI platforms without proper anonymization. "Some artificial intelligence providers may use customer‑submitted data to train or refine their models. This can depend on the configuration settings or the type of subscription," ASD said. "As a result, information entered into these platforms could potentially be reused or disclosed in unexpected contexts later." It also warned that AI systems are susceptible to hallucinations and can be tricked by malicious cyber actors through prompt injections, which refer to malicious inputs disguised as legitimate requests designed to confuse or mislead the AI into giving sensitive, wrong, or unsafe answers. Furthermore, ASD warned of potential supply chain risks resulting from AI integration, emphasizing the need for secure deployment of AI chatbots.
  • Jordan National Pleads Guilty to Selling Access — A Jordanian national pleaded guilty in the U.S. to charges of selling access to the networks of at least 50 companies through a cybercriminal forum. Feras Khalil Ahmad Albashiti (aka r1z, Feras Bashiti, and Firas Bashiti), 40, is facing a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison after being charged with fraud and related activity in connection with access credentials. Albashiti was arrested in July 2024. His sentencing will take place in May 2026. The FBI, which contacted the defendant in September 2026 under cover, said it was able to trace the "r1z" cybercrime forum account to Albashiti because it was registered in 2018 with the same Gmail address that was used to apply for a U.S. visa in October 2016. According to a report from SentinelOne, the "r1z" account marketed a malware dropper and bypass service called EDR Killer on underground forums. The account was previously identified as advertising access to 50 vulnerable Confluence servers acquired by exploiting the critical Confluence unauthenticated RCE vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2022-26134, and claimed to be in possession of a list of over 10,000 vulnerable Confluence servers. Other tools included illicit versions of Cobalt Strike, private exploits for local privilege escalation (LPE) vulnerabilities in different services, access to 30 SonicWall VPN and 50 Microsoft Exchange servers with a working exploit, as well as a service that buys compromised VPN and RDP login credentials from other criminals on the XSS forum. R1z is said to have been active on XSS since 2019.
  • Google Agrees to Pay $8.25M to Settle Children Privacy Violations — Google has agreed to pay $8.25 million to settle a class-action lawsuit that claimed the company illegally collected data from devices belonging to children under age 13, The Record reported. The case was brought more than two years ago by the parents of six minors who allegedly downloaded apps and games from the Play Store that were targeted at children, such as Fun Kid Racing, GummyBear, and Friends Speed Racing. The apps, according to the lawsuit, came with Google's AdMob software development kit that collected data from children at scale, violating the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA).
  • U.S. Bank Targeted by Keylogger — Sansec identified a keylogger on the employee merchandise store of a major U.S. bank. The store is used by the bank's 200,000 employees to order company-branded items. "The malware intercepts everything typed into the site's forms: login credentials, payment card numbers, personal information," the Dutch company said. "The stolen data is exfiltrated via image beacon, a common technique that bypasses many security controls." The malware has since been removed from the site. The activity is assessed to share overlaps with an October 2024 breach of the Green Bay Packers Pro Shop, citing infrastructure pattern similarities.
  • Payroll Pirates Redirect Paychecks to Accounts Under Their Control — In a new social engineering attack targeting an unnamed organization, the threat actors behind Payroll Pirates reached out via a phone call, impersonating employees to manipulate multiple help desks and successfully perform password resets and re-enroll multi-factor authentication (MFA) devices. The threat actor has also been observed attempting to establish persistence by registering an external email address as an authentication method for a service account within the client's Azure AD environment. "Once authenticated into the payroll system, the attacker moved quickly," Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 said. "In total, they compromised multiple employee accounts, each one granting access to sensitive payroll information. The attacker then proceeded to modify direct-deposit details for multiple individuals, redirecting their paychecks into bank accounts under the attacker's control. Because the credentials were valid and MFA appeared legitimate, the activity blended in with normal operations. The incident was discovered only when employees reported missing paychecks."
  • New Attack Uses DLL Side-Loading to Distribute PDFSIDER Malware — An unknown threat actor is leveraging DLL side-loading to deploy PDFSIDER, a backdoor with encrypted C2 capabilities, using a legitimate executable associated with PDF24 Creator ("pdf24.exe"). The malware operates primarily in memory, minimizing disk artifacts. "PDFSIDER blends traditional cyber-espionage behaviors with modern remote-command functionality, enabling operators to gather system intelligence and remotely execute shell commands covertly," Resecurity said. "The malware uses a fake cryptbase.dll to bypass endpoint detection mechanisms. Once loaded, the malware provides attackers with an interactive, hidden command shell and can exfiltrate command output through its encrypted channel." The malware is delivered via spear-phishing emails that guide victims to a ZIP archive attached to the message.

🎥 Cybersecurity Webinars#

  • How Top MSSPs Are Using AI to Grow in 2026: Learn Their Formula — By 2026, MSSPs are under pressure to do more with less, and AI is becoming the edge that separates those who scale from those who stall. This session explores how automation reduces manual work, improves margins, and enables growth without adding headcount, with real-world insights from Cynomi founder David Primor and Secure Cyber Defense CISO Chad Robinson on turning expertise into repeatable, high-value services.
  • Stop Guessing Your SOC Strategy: Learn What to Build, Buy, or Automate — Modern SOC teams are overloaded with tools, noise, and promises that don't translate into results, making it hard to know what to build, buy, or automate. In this session, AirMDR CEO Kumar Saurabh and SACR CEO Francis Odum cut through the clutter with a practical, vendor-neutral look at SOC operating models, maturity, and real-world decision frameworks—leaving teams with a clear, actionable path to simplify their stack and make their SOC work more effectively.
  • AuraInspector — It is an open-source tool for auditing Salesforce Experience Cloud security. It helps find misconfigurations that could expose data or admin functions by checking accessible records, self-registration options, and hidden "home URLs." The tool automates much of the testing, including object discovery through GraphQL methods, and works in both guest and authenticated contexts. It's a research utility, not an official Google product, designed to make Salesforce Aura security testing faster and more reliable.
  • Maltrail — It is an open-source tool for detecting malicious network traffic. It compares network activity against known blacklists of suspicious domains, IPs, URLs, and user agents linked to malware or attacks, and can also flag new threats using heuristics. The system uses sensors to monitor traffic and a central server to log and display events through a web interface, helping identify infected hosts or abnormal activity in real time.

Disclaimer: These tools are for learning and research only. They haven't been fully tested for security. If used the wrong way, they could cause harm. Check the code first, test only in safe places, and follow all rules and laws.

Conclusion#

The message is clear. Today's threats aren't just single break-ins. They come from connected weak spots, where one exposed service or misused tool can affect an entire system. Attackers don't see cloud platforms, AI tools, and enterprise software as separate. They see one shared space. Defenders need to think the same way, treating every part of their environment as connected and worth watching all the time, not just after something goes wrong.

What happened this week isn't unusual. It's a warning. Every update, setting, and access rule matters, because the next attack will likely begin from something already inside. This recap shows how small gaps turned into big openings—and what's being done to close them before the next round begins.



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New StackWarp Hardware Flaw Breaks AMD SEV-SNP Protections on Zen 1–5 CPUs

A team of academics from the CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security in Germany has disclosed the details of a new hardware vulnerability affecting AMD processors.

The security flaw, codenamed StackWarp, can allow bad actors with privileged control over a host server to run malicious code within confidential virtual machines (CVMs), undermining the integrity guarantees provided by AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization with Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP). It impacts AMD Zen 1 through Zen 5 processors.

"In the context of SEV-SNP, this flaw allows malicious VM [virtual machine] hosts to manipulate the guest VM's stack pointer," researchers Ruiyi Zhang, Tristan Hornetz, Daniel Weber, Fabian Thomas, and Michael Schwarz said. "This enables hijacking of both control and data flow, allowing an attacker to achieve remote code execution and privilege escalation inside a confidential VM."

AMD, which is tracking the vulnerability as CVE-2025-29943 (CVSS v4 score: 4.6), characterized it as a medium-severity, improper access control bug that could allow an admin-privileged attacker to alter the configuration of the CPU pipeline, causing the stack pointer to be corrupted inside an SEV-SNP guest.

The issue affects the following product lines -

  • AMD EPYC 7003 Series Processors
  • AMD EPYC 8004 Series Processors
  • AMD EPYC 9004 Series Processors
  • AMD EPYC 9005 Series Processors
  • AMD EPYC Embedded 7003 Series Processors
  • AMD EPYC Embedded 8004 Series Processors
  • AMD EPYC Embedded 9004 Series Processors
  • AMD EPYC Embedded 9005 Series Processors

While SEV is designed to encrypt the memory of protected VMs and is intended to isolate them from the underlying hypervisor, the new findings from CISPA show that the safeguard can be bypassed without reading the VM's plaintext memory by instead targeting a microarchitectural optimization called stack engine, responsible for accelerated stack operations.

"The vulnerability can be exploited via a previously undocumented control bit on the hypervisor side," Zhang said in a statement shared with The Hacker News. "An attacker running a hyperthread in parallel with the target VM can use this to manipulate the position of the stack pointer inside the protected VM."

This, in turn, enables redirection of program flow or manipulation of sensitive data. The StackWarp attack can be used to expose secrets from SEV-secured environments and compromise VMs hosted on AMD-powered cloud environments. Specifically, it can be exploited to recover an RSA-2048 private key from a single faulty signature, effectively getting around OpenSSH password authentication and sudo's password prompt, and attain kernel-mode code execution in a VM.

The chipmaker released microcode updates for the vulnerability in July and October 2025, with AGESA patches for EPYC Embedded 8004 and 9004 Series Processors scheduled for release in April 2026.

The development builds upon a prior study from CISPA that detailed CacheWarp (CVE-2023-20592, CVSS v3 score:m 6.5), a software fault attack on AMD SEV-SNP, which permits attackers to hijack control flow, break into encrypted VMs, and perform privilege escalation inside the VM. It's worth noting that both are hardware architectural attacks.

"For operators of SEV-SNP hosts, there are concrete steps to take: First, check whether hyperthreading is enabled on the affected systems. If it is, plan a temporary disablement for CVMs that have particularly high integrity requirements," Zhang said. "At the same time, any available microcode and firmware updates from the hardware vendors should be installed. StackWarp is another example of how subtle microarchitectural effects can undermine system-level security guarantees."



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CrashFix Chrome Extension Delivers ModeloRAT Using ClickFix-Style Browser Crash Lures

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of an ongoing campaign dubbed KongTuke that used a malicious Google Chrome extension masquerading as an ad blocker to deliberately crash the web browser and trick victims into running arbitrary commands using ClickFix-like lures to deliver a previously undocumented remote access trojan (RAT) dubbed ModeloRAT.

This new escalation of ClickFix has been codenamed CrashFix by Huntress.

KongTuke, also tracked as 404 TDS, Chaya_002, LandUpdate808, and TAG-124, is the name given to a traffic distribution system (TDS) known for profiling victim hosts before redirecting them to a payload delivery site that infects their systems. Access to these compromised hosts is then handed off to other threat actors, including ransomware groups, for follow-on malware delivery.

Some of the cybercriminal groups that have leveraged TAG-124 infrastructure include Rhysida ransomware, Interlock ransomware, and TA866 (aka Asylum Ambuscade), with the threat actor also associated with SocGholish and D3F@ck Loader, according to a Recorded Future report from April 2025.

In the attack chain documented by the cybersecurity company, the victim is said to have searched for an ad blocker when they were served a malicious advertisement that redirected them to an extension hosted on the Official Chrome Web Store.

The browser extension in question, "NexShield – Advanced Web Guardian" (ID: cpcdkmjddocikjdkbbeiaafnpdbdafmi), masquerades as the "ultimate privacy shield" and claims to protect users against ads, trackers, malware, and intrusive content on web pages. It was downloaded at least 5,000 times. It's currently no longer available for download.

The extension, per Huntress, is a near-identical clone of uBlock Origin Lite version 2025.1116.1841, a legitimate ad blocker add-on available for all major web browsers. It's engineered to display a fake security warning, claiming the browser had "stopped abnormally" and prompting users to run a "scan" to remediate a potential security threat detected by Microsoft Edge.

Should the user opt to run the scan, the victim is presented with a bogus security alert that instructs them to open the Windows Run dialog and paste the displayed command already copied to the clipboard, and execute it. This, in turn, causes the browser to completely freeze, crashing it by launching a denial-of-service (DoS) attack that creates new runtime port connections through an infinite loop that triggers one billion iterations of the same step repeatedly.

This resource exhaustion technique results in excessive memory consumption, causing the web browser to become slow, unresponsive, and eventually crash.

Once installed, the extension is also designed to transmit a unique ID to an attacker-controlled server ("nexsnield[.]com"), giving the operators the ability to track victims. In addition, it adopts a delayed execution mechanism that ensures the malicious behavior is only triggered 60 minutes after it's installed. After that, the payload is executed every 10 minutes.

"The pop-up only appears on browser startup after the browser becomes unresponsive," researchers Anna Pham, Tanner Filip, and Dani Lopez said. "Before the DoS executes, a timestamp is stored in local storage. When the user force-quits and restarts their browser, the startup handler checks for this timestamp, and if it exists, the CrashFix popup appears, and the timestamp is removed."

"The DoS only executes if the UUID exists (meaning the user is being tracked), the C2 server responds successfully to a fetch request, and the pop-up window has been opened at least once and subsequently closed. This last condition may be intentional to ensure user interaction with the extension before triggering the payload."

The end result is that it creates a loop of its own, activating the fake warning every time the victim force-quits and restarts the browser after it becomes unresponsive due to the DoS attack. In the event the extension is not removed, the attack is triggered again after 10 minutes.

The pop-up also incorporates various anti-analysis techniques that disable right-click context menus and prevent attempts to use keyboard shortcuts to launch developer tools. The CrashFix command employs the legitimate Windows utility, finger.exe, to retrieve and execute the next-stage payload from the attacker's server ("199.217.98[.]108"). KongTuke's use of the Finger command was documented by security researcher Brad Duncan in December 2025.

The payload received from the server is a PowerShell command that's configured to retrieve a secondary PowerShell script, which, in turn, takes a page out of SocGholish's playbook, using multiple layers of Base64 encoding and XOR operations to conceal the next-stage malware.

The decrypted blob scans running processes for over 50 analysis tools and virtual machine indicators, and immediately ceases execution, if found. It also checks if the machine is domain-joined or standalone, and sends an HTTP POST request to the same server containing two pieces of information -

  • A list of installed antivirus products
  • A flag with the value "ABCD111" for standalone "WORKGROUP" machines or "BCDA222" for domain-joined hosts

In the event, the compromised system is marked as domain-joined, the KongTuke attack chain culminates with the deployment of ModeloRAT, a fully-featured Python-based Windows RAT that uses RC4 encryption for command-and-control (C2) communications ("170.168.103[.]208" or "158.247.252[.]178"), sets up persistence using Registry, and facilitates the execution of binaries, DLLs, Python scripts, and PowerShell commands.

ModeloRAT is equipped to update or terminate itself upon receiving a self-update ("VERSION_UPDATE") or exit ("TERMINATION_SIGNAL") command. It also implements a varied beaconing logic to fly under the radar.

"Under normal operation, it uses a standard interval of 300 seconds (5 minutes)," Huntress said. "When the server sends an activation configuration command, the implant enters active mode with rapid polling at a configurable interval, defaulting to 150 milliseconds."

"After six or more consecutive communication failures, the RAT backs off to an extended interval of 900 seconds (15 minutes) to avoid detection. When recovering from a single communication failure, it uses a reconnection interval of 150 seconds before resuming normal operations."

While the targeting of domain-joined machines with ModeloRAT suggests that KongTuke is going after corporate environments to facilitate deeper access, users on standalone workstations are subjected to a separate multi-stage infection sequence that ends with the C2 server responding with the message "TEST PAYLOAD!!!!," indicating it could still be in the testing phase.

"KongTuke's CrashFix campaign demonstrates how threat actors continue to evolve their social engineering tactics," the cybersecurity company concluded. "By impersonating a trusted open-source project (uBlock Origin Lite), crashing the user's browser on purpose, and then offering a fake fix, they have built a self-sustaining infection loop that preys on user frustration."



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Security Bug in StealC Malware Panel Let Researchers Spy on Threat Actor Operations

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the web-based control panel used by operators of the StealC information stealer, allowing them to gather crucial insights on one of the threat actors using the malware in their operations.

"By exploiting it, we were able to collect system fingerprints, monitor active sessions, and – in a twist that will surprise no one – steal cookies from the very infrastructure designed to steal them," CyberArk researcher Ari Novick said in a report published last week.

StealC is an information stealer that first emerged in January 2023 under a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) model, allowing potential customers to leverage YouTube as a primary mechanism – a phenomenon called the YouTube Ghost Network – to distribute the malicious program by disguising it as cracks for popular software.

Over the past year, the stealer has also been observed being propagated via rogue Blender Foundation files and a social engineering tactic known as FileFix. StealC, in the meantime, received updates of its own, offering Telegram bot integration for sending notifications, enhanced payload delivery, and a redesigned panel. The updated version was codenamed StealC V2.

Weeks later, the source code for the malware's administration panel was leaked, providing an opportunity for the research community to identify characteristics of the threat actor's computers, such as general location indicators and computer hardware details, as well as retrieve active session cookies from their own machines.

The exact details of the XSS flaw in the panel have not been disclosed to prevent the developers from plugging the hole or enabling any other copycats from using the leaked panel to try to start their own stealer MaaS offerings.

In general, XSS flaws are a form of client-side injections that allows an attacker to get a susceptible website to execute malicious JavaScript code in the web browser on the victim's computer when the site is loaded. They arise as a result of not validating and correctly encoding user input, allowing a threat actor to steal cookies, impersonate them, and access sensitive information.

"Given the core business of the StealC group involves cookie theft, you might expect the StealC developers to be cookie experts and to implement basic cookie security features, such as httpOnly, to prevent researchers from stealing cookies via XSS," Novick said. "The irony is that an operation built around large-scale cookie theft failed to protect its own session cookies from a textbook attack."

CyberArk also shared details of a StealC customer named YouTubeTA (short for "YouTube Threat Actor"), who has extensively used Google's video sharing platform to distribute the stealer by advertising cracked versions of Adobe Photoshop and Adobe After Effects, amassing over 5,000 logs that contained 390,000 stolen passwords and more than 30 million stolen cookies. Most of the cookies are assessed to be tracking cookies and other non-sensitive cookies.

It's suspected that these efforts have enabled the threat actor to seize control of legitimate YouTube accounts and use them to promote cracked software, creating a self-perpetuating propagation mechanism. There is also evidence highlighting the use of ClickFix-like fake CAPTCHA lures to distribute StealC, suggesting they aren't confined to infections through YouTube.

Further analysis has determined that the panel enables operators to create multiple users and differentiate between admin users and regular users. In the case of YouTubeTA, the panel has been found to feature only one admin user, who is said to be using an Apple M3 processor-based machine with English and Russian language settings.

In what can be described as an operational security blunder on the threat actor's part, their location was exposed around mid-July 2025 when the threat actor forgot to connect to the StealC panel through a virtual private network (VPN). This revealed their real IP address, which was associated with a Ukrainian provider called TRK Cable TV. The findings indicate that YouTubeTA is a lone-wolf actor operating from an Eastern European country where Russian is commonly spoken.

The research also underscores the impact of the MaaS ecosystem, which empowers threat actors to mount at scale within a short span of time, while inadvertently also exposing them to security risks legitimate businesses deal with.

"The StealC developers exhibited weaknesses in both their cookie security and panel code quality, allowing us to gather a great deal of data about their customers," CyberArk said. "If this holds for other threat actors selling malware, researchers and law enforcement alike can leverage similar flaws to gain insights into, and perhaps even reveal the identities of, many malware operators."



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Sunday, January 18, 2026

It's the beginning of Cloud 2.0

15 years ago, when we started The Cloudcast the definition of cloud was pretty clear cut. But now in 2026, the rules are all different and a new era of Cloud is upon us. Let’s explore what the next generation might provide. 

SHOW: 994

SHOW TRANSCRIPT: The Cloudcast #994 Transcript

SHOW VIDEO: https://youtube.com/@TheCloudcastNET 

CLOUD NEWS OF THE WEEK: http://bit.ly/cloudcast-cnotw

CHECK OUT OUR NEW PODCAST: "CLOUDCAST BASICS"

SHOW NOTES


WHAT IS AND ISN’T CLOUD IN 2026?

  • Cloud isn’t a single company
  • Cloud isn’t just public cloud
  • A CIA cloud isn’t a Gov cloud isn’t your Enterprise Cloud
  • Multi-cloud is a real thing that needs technology
  • Google, the people that invented “cloud” are a real company in cloud
  • Defining cloud by purity, or IaaS/PaaS/SaaS terms doesn’t really matter
  • Does data locality matter more in an AI-Cloud era?
  • Do we begin to see price wars over the core Cloud 1.0 primitives?
  • Are we in the 9th inning of Cloud, and the 1st inning of what’s next? 
  • AI has replaced SaaS in immediacy, so does that have impact on Cloud services? 
  • Does the lack of application portfolio finally come back to bite AWS? 
  • Can niche cloud services emerge (e.g. is Vercel another Digital Ocean, or something unique?)


FEEDBACK?



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Saturday, January 17, 2026

Black Basta Ransomware Leader Added to EU Most Wanted and INTERPOL Red Notice

Ukrainian and German law enforcement authorities have identified two Ukrainians suspected of working for the Russia-linked ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group Black Basta.

In addition, the group's alleged leader, a 35-year-old Russian national named Oleg Evgenievich Nefedov (Нефедов Олег Евгеньевич), has been added to the European Union's Most Wanted and INTERPOL's Red Notice lists, authorities noted.

"According to the investigation, the suspects specialized in technical hacking of protected systems and were involved in preparing cyberattacks using ransomware," the Cyber Police of Ukraine said in a statement.

The agency said the accused individuals functioned as "hash crackers," who specialize in extracting passwords from information systems using specialized software. Once the credential information was obtained, members of the ransomware group broke into corporate networks and ultimately deployed ransomware and extorted money to recover the encrypted information.

Authorities conducted searches at the defendants' residences located in Ivano-Frankivsk and Lviv, allowing them to seize digital storage devices and cryptocurrency assets.

Black Basta first emerged in the threat landscape in April 2022, and is said to have targeted more than 500 companies across North America, Europe, and Australia. The ransomware group is estimated to have earned hundreds of millions of dollars in cryptocurrency from illicit payments.

Early last year, a year's worth of internal chat logs from Black Basta leaked online, offering a glimpse into the group's inner workings, its structure and key members, and the various security vulnerabilities exploited to gain initial access to organizations of interest.

The leaked dossier also unmasked Nefedov as Black Basta's ringleader, adding he goes by various aliases, such as Tramp, Trump, GG, and AA. Some documents alleged that Nefedov had ties to high-ranking Russian politicians and intelligence agencies, including the FSB and GRU.

Nefedov is believed to have leveraged these connections to protect his operations and evade international justice. A subsequent analysis from Trellix revealed that Nefedov was able to secure his freedom despite getting arrested in Yerevan, Armenia, in June 2024. His other aliases include kurva, Washingt0n, and S.Jimmi. Although Nefedov is said to be in Russia, his exact whereabouts are unknown.

Furthermore, there is evidence linking Nefedov to Conti, a now-defunct group that sprang forth in 2020 as a successor to Ryuk. In August 2022, the U.S. State Department announced a $10 million reward for information related to five individuals associated with the Conti ransomware group. They included Target, Tramp, Dandis, Professor, and Reshaev.

It's worth mentioning here that Black Basta surfaced as an autonomous group, alongside BlackByte and KaraKurt, following the retirement of the Conti brand in 2022. Other members joined groups like BlackCat, Hive, AvosLocker, and HelloKitty, all of which are now no longer active.

"He served as the head of the group. As such, he decided who or which organisations would be the targets of attacks, recruited members, assigned them tasks, took part in ransom negotiations, managed the ransom obtained by extortion, and used it to pay the members of the group," Germany's Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA or Bundeskriminalamt) said.

The leaks have led to Black Basta's apparent demise, with the group remaining silent after February and taking down its data leak later that month. But with ransomware gangs known to shut down, rebrand, and reemerge under a different identity, it won't be surprising if members of the erstwhile criminal syndicate pivot to other ransomware groups or form new ones.

Indeed, per reports from ReliaQuest and Trend Micro, it's suspected that several of the former Black Basta affiliates might have migrated to the CACTUS ransomware operation – an assessment based on the fact that there was a massive spike in organizations named on the latter's data leak site in February 2025, coinciding with Black Basta's site going offline.



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Friday, January 16, 2026

Anatomy of an Attack: The Payroll Pirates and the Power of Social Engineering

No employee wants their paycheck to go missing. One organization learned about an incident when they started hearing exactly this complaint. It turned out that an attacker had modified direct-deposit details in order to redirect an organization’s paychecks into attacker-controlled accounts.

What happened to this organization started with nothing more than a phone call.

In fact, findings in our 2025 Unit 42 Global Incident Response Report: Social Engineering Edition suggest that 36% of all incidents Unit 42 engaged with began with a social engineering tactic. This includes phishing, vishing, search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning, fake system prompts and help desk manipulation.

In spite of technical protection tools available, attackers find that old-fashioned exploitation attempts still work. Instead of breaching networks, dropping malware or exploiting cloud misconfigurations, some threat actors are bypassing technical controls altogether and going straight for the humans who run them.

The Attack: Social Engineering in Action

The threat actor's initial access was not gained through a technical breach but rather through a social engineering campaign. The attacker impersonated employees to manipulate multiple help desks, including those for payroll, IT and HR shared services. They then tricked the help desk personnel by successfully circumventing the challenge/response authentication into performing password resets and re-enrolling multi-factor authentication (MFA) devices.

Social platforms provide easy access to publicly available information needed for threat actors to bypass help desk authentication. In many cases, attackers even call back multiple times to probe for the types of verification questions being asked, thereby allowing them to gather the necessary data for a successful subsequent attempt. As social platforms continue to expand the amount of personal and professional data available, this reconnaissance has become easier than ever.

In addition, the threat actor tried to establish persistence by registering an external email address as an authentication method for a service account within the client's Azure AD environment. This demonstrates a clear intent for long-term access beyond the immediate payroll diversion.

Once authenticated into the payroll system, the attacker moved quickly. In total, they compromised multiple employee accounts, each one granting access to sensitive payroll information. The attacker then proceeded to modify direct-deposit details for multiple individuals, redirecting their paychecks into bank accounts under the attacker’s control. Because the credentials were valid and MFA appeared legitimate, the activity blended in with normal operations. The incident was discovered only when employees reported missing paychecks. That triggered an internal investigation, which traced suspicious account changes dating back weeks. The organization engaged legal counsel, who referred them to Unit 42 to conduct a full-scope investigation.

How Unit 42 Helped

Once Unit 42 was engaged, we conducted a thorough investigation. Our team performed extensive threat hunting by deploying Cortex XSIAM and correlating telemetry from various sources, including the payroll system, HR system and the client's Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW) logs. This in-depth analysis allowed Unit 42 to confirm the incident and limit its impact. Our investigation confirmed that the incident was limited to the payroll diversion and account compromises, with no evidence of broader lateral movement or data exfiltration from the internal network.

But, unrelated to the payroll incident, our threat hunting effort identified evidence of an ongoing compromise related to the WannaCry ransomware in the client’s legacy OT environment. (Yes, you read that right! Given when it came out, WannaCry has been lurking in their environment for years!)

The Outcome: How We Closed Critical Security Gaps

Unit 42 worked with the customer to quickly contain the account compromises, reverse fraudulent payroll changes and regain control over impacted cloud identities.

At the same time, the team began advising on hardening measures across both IT and OT environments, including:

  • Enhancing help desk verification procedures
  • Strengthening MFA enforcement and recovery workflows
  • Improving logging, including forwarding application logs into Cortex XSIAM
  • Addressing the WannaCry foothold within OT systems

Despite the initial compromise, the impact was contained to just three employee accounts. This is largely because the organization acted quickly. Additionally, the attacker’s objective was financial gain rather than deeper network access. We were able to accelerate incident resolution and strengthen their security posture with stronger help desk protocols and identity governance.

What This Investigation Revealed

This incident highlights how modern attackers are increasingly bypassing traditional technical controls and focusing on operational processes, especially help desks. Human-driven workflows like password resets and MFA enrollment can become high-impact vulnerabilities if not tightly governed. It also illustrates how narrowly scoped fraud investigations can reveal deeper systemic issues, such as the discovery of a long-standing WannaCry presence in OT systems.

As attackers continue to refine their social engineering tactics, organizations must treat help desk and similar interactions with the same rigor as technical authentication flows. The case underscores the importance of:

  • Unified visibility across the environment
  • Security team skillset
  • Strong verification procedures for all identity-related requests

Interested in learning more about the latest attack trends? If so, take a look at our 2025 Unit 42 Global Incident Response Report: Social Engineering edition, which distills the most critical findings based on our direct experience responding to real-world cyberattacks at over 500 organizations across 38 countries.

About Unit 42

Unit 42 strengthens your team with the tools and expertise needed to stay ahead of threats and protect your business. With our proven strategies and insights from thousands of engagements, we’ll help your team handle the toughest situations with confidence.



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GootLoader Malware Uses 500–1,000 Concatenated ZIP Archives to Evade Detection

Jan 16, 2026Ravie LakshmananMalvertising / Threat Intelligence

The JavaScript (aka JScript) malware loader called GootLoader has been observed using a malformed ZIP archive that's designed to sidestep detection efforts by concatenating anywhere from 500 to 1,000 archives.

"The actor creates a malformed archive as an anti-analysis technique," Expel security researcher Aaron Walton said in a report shared with The Hacker News. "That is, many unarchiving tools are not able to consistently extract it, but one critical unarchiving tool seems to work consistently and reliably: the default tool built into Windows systems."

This leads to a scenario where the archive cannot be processed by tools like WinRAR or 7-Zip, and, therefore, prevents many automated workflows from analyzing the contents of the file. At the same time, it can be opened by the default Windows unarchiver, thereby ensuring that victims who fall victim to the social engineering scheme can extract and run the JavaScript malware.

GootLoader is typically distributed via search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning tactics or malvertising, targeting users looking for legal templates to take them to compromised WordPress sites hosting malicious ZIP archives. Like other loaders, it's designed to deliver secondary payloads, including ransomware. The malware has been detected in the wild since at least 2020.

In late October 2025, malware campaigns propagating the malware resurfaced with new tricks: leveraging custom WOFF2 fonts with glyph substitution to obfuscate filenames and exploiting the WordPress comment endpoint ("/wp-comments-post.php") to deliver the ZIP payloads when a user clicks a "Download" button on the site.

The latest findings from Expel highlight continued evolution of the delivery methods, with the threat actors employing more sophisticated obfuscation mechanisms to evade detection -

  • Concatenate together 500-1,000 archives to craft the malicious ZIP file
  • Truncate the archive's end of central directory (EOCD) record such that it misses two critical bytes from the expected structure, triggering parsing errors
  • Randomize values in non-critical fields, such as disk number and Number of Disks, causing unarchiving tools to expect a sequence of ZIP archives that are non-existent

"The random number of files concatenated together, and the randomized values in specific fields are a defense-evasion technique called 'hashbusting,'" Walton explained.

"In practice, every user who downloads a ZIP file from GootLoader's infrastructure will receive a unique ZIP file, so looking for that hash in other environments is futile. The GootLoader developer uses hashbusting for the ZIP archive and for the JScript file contained in the archive."

The attack chain essentially involves the delivery of the ZIP archive as an XOR-encoded blob, which is decoded and repeatedly appended to itself on the client-side (i.e., on the victim's browser) until it meets a set size, effectively bypassing security controls designed to detect the transmission of a ZIP file.

As soon as the downloaded ZIP archive is double-clicked by the victim, it will cause Windows' default unarchiver to open the ZIP folder containing the JavaScript payload in File Explorer. Launching the JavaScript file, in turn, triggers its execution via "wscript.exe" from a temporary folder, since the file contents were not explicitly extracted.

The JavaScript malware then creates a Windows shortcut (LNK) file in the Startup folder to establish persistence, ultimately executing a second JavaScript file using cscript, spawning PowerShell commands to take the infection to the next stage. In previous GootLoader attacks, the PowerShell script is used to collect system information and receive commands from a remote server.

To counter the threat posed by GootLoader, organizations are advised to consider blocking "wscript.exe" and "cscript.exe" from executing downloaded content if not required and use a Group Policy Object (GPO) to ensure that JavaScript files are opened in Notepad by default, instead of executing them via "wscript.exe."



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The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in Cybersecurity – Week 3

The Good | Authorities Arrest 34 in Black Axe Cyber Fraud Crackdown

Spanish police have arrested 34 suspects tied to a cyber fraud network allegedly linked to the Black Axe group, following a joint operation with Europol. After raids across four cities, authorities seized €66,400 in cash, vehicles, devices, and froze €119,350 held in bank accounts.

Investigators say the Nigeria-led ring ran man-in-the-middle (MitM) and business email compromise (BEC) scams, causing over $6 million in losses total. So far, four suspected leaders of the network habe been jailed pre-trial as the probe continues into Europe-wide money mule networks.

In other news this week, the latest iteration of BreachForums has suffered another data breach after a MyBB users database was leaked online. This occurred after a site named after the ShinyHunters extortion gang released a 7Zip archive exposing over 323,000 user records and the forum’s PGP private key. While most IP addresses mapped to local loopback values, more than 70,000 resolved to public addresses valuable to cybersecurity researchers and law enforcement.

In Amsterdam, the nation’s Court of Appeal has sentenced a Dutch national to seven years for computer hacking and attempted extortion with evidence stemming from Sky ECC, an end-to-end encrypted chat service that Europol dismantled in 2021. Though one cocaine import charge was dropped, judges upheld the convictions tied to hacking port logistics systems in Rotterdam, Barendrecht, and Antwerp.

The individual was found using malware-laced USB sticks, which then enabled covert drug imports, data theft, and malware re-sale between 2020 and 2021.

The Bad | Researchers Expose ‘Reprompt’ Attack That Could Hijack Microsoft Copilot Sessions

Security researchers have disclosed a novel attack technique dubbed ‘Reprompt’ that could enable attackers to silently hijack a user’s Microsoft Copilot session and exfiltrate sensitive data with a single click. The method abuses how Copilot processes URL parameters, enabling malicious prompts to be injected directly through a legitimate Copilot link.

Reprompt works by embedding hidden instructions in the “q” parameter of a Copilot URL. Should a victim click the link, Copilot automatically executes the malicious prompt within the user’s authenticated session. That session remains active even after the Copilot tab is closed, meaning attackers could continue issuing follow-up commands without further user interaction. Since no plugins, malware, or visible prompts are required, the activity is effectively invisible.

To bypass Copilot’s safeguards, the researchers combined three techniques: parameter-to-prompt (P2) injection, a double-request trick that exploits guardrails applying only to the initial request, and a chain-request model where Copilot dynamically fetches new instructions from an attacker-controlled server.

Combined, these techniques could enable continuous, stealthy data exfiltration, while client-side, legacy security tools would be unable to determine what information was being stolen.

Double request to bypass safeguards (Source: Varonis)

Reprompt only impacts Copilot Personal; those using Microsoft 365 Copilot are not impacted due to additional controls such as auditing, DLP, and administrative restrictions. Varonis disclosed the issue to Microsoft on August 31, 2025 and the vulnerability was addressed in this month’s Patch Tuesday. Currently, there are no reports of in-the-wild exploitation.

The findings, however, are indicative of the risks posed by LLMs and AI assistants. They underscore the need for security teams to understand the attack surface these tools present as their use in enterprise environments continues to proliferate.

The Ugly | Charity-Themed ‘PluggyApe’ Malware Targets Ukrainian Defense Forces

Ukraine’s CERT-UA has reported a charity-themed cyber espionage campaign targeting officials within the country’s Defense Forces between October and December 2025. The activity is attributed with medium confidence to a Russian-aligned threat group tracked as Laundry Bear (aka Void Blizzard or UAC‑0190), a cluster previously linked to the 2024 breach of Dutch police systems.

These attacks have been observed relying heavily on tailored social engineering tactics delivered via Signal and WhatsApp. Targets receive instant messages, often from compromised or spoofed Ukrainian phone numbers, directing them to fake charity websites where they are urged to download password-protected archives.

These archives contain malicious executables disguised as documents, including PIF files built with PyInstaller, which ultimately deploys a Python-based backdoor called ‘PluggyApe’. Once installed, PluggyApe profiles the infected system, assigns a unique victim identifier, and establishes persistence through Windows Registry changes. The malware supports remote command execution and data exfiltration, communicating over WebSocket or MQTT.

Examples of malicious lures (Source: CERT-UA)

Later versions of PluggyApe, observed from December 2025 onward, introduced stronger obfuscation, additional anti-analysis checks, and more resilient command-and-control (C2) mechanisms. Instead of hardcoding C2 infrastructure, the malware dynamically retrieves server addresses from public paste services such as rentry[.]co and pastebin[.com], encoded in Base64, allowing operators to rapidly rotate infrastructure.

CERT-UA emphasized that mobile devices and messaging platforms have become primary attack vectors due to weaker monitoring and widespread trust. Compounding this is the attackers’ demonstrated knowledge of their targets and use of the Ukrainian language, audio, and video communication to increase credibility.

Alongside this campaign, CERT-UA also reports additional activity from other threat clusters targeting Ukrainian defense forces, local governments, and educational institutions using phishing, stealer malware, and open-source backdoors – all pointing to sustained and evolving cyber pressure facing Ukraine’s public sector.



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Terraform MCP server updates: Stacks support, new tools, and tips

General AI models are great, but they guess wrong when it comes to your infrastructure. They don’t know your private modules, your security rules, or your internal secrets.

You can bridge that gap using the Terraform MCP Server. For those who are not familiar with HashiCorp’s Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, it links generic LLMs to your actual ops environment. They give the AI the live data and documentation it needs to stop hallucinating and give better responses.

For Terraform Enterprise users subject to strict data sovereignty requirements or limited internet connectivity, the MCP server provides an option to enable AI automation in air-gapped environments. By running a local AI model (such as a local LLM), developers can take advantage of the MCP server without external internet access, ensuring compliance with security and sovereignty policies.

Today, we are excited to add even more features to our Terraform MCP server and share tips on how to use all of our MCP servers. With new support for Terraform Stacks and policy sets, your AI assistant becomes more context-aware, secure, and ready for real enterprise work.

The Terraform MCP server: Smarter, safer automation

We’ve previously shared how the Terraform MCP server can benefit your workflow in our documentation and video deep-dive.

Today's release further improves the experience for HCP Terraform and Terraform Enterprise users. We’ve strengthened the connection to your infrastructure with a fresh set of tools and fixes designed to eliminate friction.

Instead of wasting time digging for internal security rules or writing repetitive boilerplate, the Terraform MCP server now has:

  • [New] Support for Stacks: Deploy and manage Terraform Stacks using natural language.
  • [New] Streamlined policy management: We’ve added a new tool called attach_policy_set_to_workspaces, allowing you to handle governance workflows directly via chat.
  • [New] Granular control: You can now choose exactly which capabilities to enable. Use the new --toolsets flag to toggle between public registry access, private registry access, or operations tools. You can even enable specific tools one by one with --tools for maximum security.
  • Security policy lookup: Intelligently look up Sentinel policies and CIS benchmarks to recommend security rules alongside your infrastructure code.
  • Access to private modules: Read private modules hosted in your internal registry to write code that matches your standards, not just public examples.
  • Natural language commands: Use natural language to create workspaces, update variables, and tag resources securely.
  • [Updated] Self-hosted improvements: We fixed an issue where the "Skip TLS" flag wasn't propagating correctly — a critical fix for air-gapped or self-hosted environments using custom certificates.
  • [Updated] Smarter error handling: Input validation errors now return as clear "Tool Execution Errors," helping the LLM understand why it failed so it can correct itself immediately.

Here’s a look at what Terraform MCP server usage looks like in an air-gapped demo environment:

The full HashiCorp MCP ecosystem: Vault & Consul

We have MCP servers for more than just Terraform. We’re also actively developing three other MCP servers to give you AI assistance with enterprise context when working in HashiCorp Vault, HCP Vault Radar, and Consul.

The Vault MCP server, available on GitHub and DockerHub, turns complex secret management into a conversation. If your AI spots a hard-coded secret, the MCP server can:

  • Create a secure mount in Vault
  • Write the secret securely
  • Refactor your code to fetch it dynamically

The Vault Radar MCP server allows you to stop digging through dashboards and just ask questions like, "What are my top security risks?" It queries GitHub, AWS, and Azure to give you an instant, prioritized list of leaks.

The Consul MCP server identifies the right API calls for service mesh by asking questions like, "Do I have any over-privileged tokens?" or "Check for secure configuration." The server translates your questions and creates precise Consul queries.

How to use these tools effectively

To get the best results when using these MCP servers, follow these two tips:

1. Force MCP server use. Sometimes the AI guesses instead of asking the server. In editors like VS Code (using Cursor), start your prompt with #terraform or #vault. This forces the AI to check the MCP server for the real answer.

2. Set your standards. Every team works differently. Drop a markdown file (like agents.md) into your workspace to tell the AI your preferences (e.g. whether you want CLI commands, API calls, or VCS workflows). There are some examples available for the Terraform MCP server.

Learn more and get started today

Ready to give your AI assistants a fuller context for your infrastructure and secrets landscape?

Give our other MCP servers a try here:

If you don’t have access to all of the Vault and Terraform features, get started with HashiCorp Cloud Platform (HCP), the fastest way to set up cloud-managed versions of those products.



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Five Malicious Chrome Extensions Impersonate Workday and NetSuite to Hijack Accounts

Cybersecurity researchers have discovered five new malicious Google Chrome web browser extensions that masquerade as human resources (HR) and enterprise resource planning (ERP) platforms like Workday, NetSuite, and SuccessFactors to take control of victim accounts.

"The extensions work in concert to steal authentication tokens, block incident response capabilities, and enable complete account takeover through session hijacking," Socket security researcher Kush Pandya said in a Thursday report.

The names of the extensions are listed below -

  • DataByCloud Access (ID: oldhjammhkghhahhhdcifmmlefibciph, Published by: databycloud1104) - 251 Installs
  • Tool Access 11 (ID: ijapakghdgckgblfgjobhcfglebbkebf, Published by: databycloud1104) - 101 Installs
  • DataByCloud 1 (ID: mbjjeombjeklkbndcjgmfcdhfbjngcam, Published by: databycloud1104) - 1,000 Installs
  • DataByCloud 2 (ID: makdmacamkifdldldlelollkkjnoiedg, Published by: databycloud1104) - 1,000 Installs
  • Software Access (ID: bmodapcihjhklpogdpblefpepjolaoij, Published by: Software Access) - 27 Installs

All of them, with the exception of Software Access, have been removed from the Chrome Web Store as of writing. That said, they are still available on third-party software download sites such as Softonic. The add-ons are advertised as productivity tools that offer access to premium tools for different platforms, including Workday, NetSuite, and other platforms.. Two of the extensions, DataByCloud 1 and DataByCloud 2, were first published on August 18, 2021.

The campaign, despite using two different publishers, is assessed to be a coordinated operation based on identical functionality and infrastructure patterns. It specifically involves exfiltrating cookies to a remote server under the attackers' control, manipulating the Document Object Model (DOM) tree to block security administration pages, and facilitating session hijacking via cookie injection.

Once installed, DataByCloud Access requests permissions for cookies, management, scripting, storage, and declarativeNetRequest across Workday, NetSuite, and SuccessFactors domains. It also collects authentication cookies for a specified domain and transmits them to the "api.databycloud[.]com" domain every 60 seconds.

"Tool Access 11 (v1.4) prevents access to 44 administrative pages within Workday by erasing page content and redirecting to malformed URLs," Pandya explained. "This extension blocks authentication management, security proxy configuration, IP range management, and session control interfaces."

This is achieved by DOM manipulation, with the extension maintaining a list of page titles that's constantly monitored. Data By Cloud 2 expands the blocking feature to 56 pages, adding crucial functions like password changes, account deactivation, 2FA device management, and security audit log access. It's designed to target both production environments and Workday's sandbox testing environment at "workdaysuv[.]com."

In contrast, Data By Cloud 1 replicates the cookie-stealing functionality from DataByCloud Access, while simultaneously incorporating features to prevent code inspection using web browser developer tools using the open-source DisableDevtool library. Both extensions encrypt their command-and-control (C2) traffic.

The most sophisticated extension of the lot is Software Access, which combines cookie theft with the ability to receive stolen cookies from "api.software-access[.]com" and inject them into the browser to facilitate direct session hijacking. Furthermore, it comes fitted with password input field protection to prevent users from inspecting credential inputs.

"The function parses cookies from the server payload, removes existing cookies for the target domain, then iterates through the provided cookie array and injects each one using chrome.cookies.set()," Socket said. "This installs the victim's authentication state directly into the threat actor's browser session."

A notable aspect that ties together all five extensions is that they feature an identical list comprising 23 security-related Chrome extensions, such as EditThisCookie, Cookie-Editor, ModHeader, Redux DevTools, and SessionBox, that are designed to monitor and flag their presence to the threat actor.

This is likely an attempt to assess whether the web browser has any tool that can possibly interfere with their cookie harvesting objectives or reveal the extension's behavior, Socket said. What's more, the presence of a similar extension ID list across all five extensions raises two possibilities: either it's the work of the same threat actor who has published them under different publishers or a common toolkit.

Chrome users who have installed any of the aforementioned add-ons are advised to remove them from their browsers, perform password resets, and review for any signs of unauthorized access from unfamiliar IP addresses or devices.

"The combination of continuous credential theft, administrative interface blocking, and session hijacking creates a scenario where security teams can detect unauthorized access but cannot remediate through normal channels," Socket said.



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